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Summary 
 
In post-colonial Africa, conceptions of the nature and purposes of development as well as 
the theories and strategies for achieving them have remained a territory traversed 
predominantly by non-African social scientists. In this context, social scientists studying 
Africa’s development proclaimed, at the dawn of the 1990s, a “paradigmatic crisis” and 
embarked on a quest for new paradigms1.  
  
In advancing this quest, a number of “homegrown” development strategies have 
emerged. This work argues that these are mere adaptations and reconstructions of 
dominant Eurocentic paradigms that exaggerate the value of economic goods and wealth 
creation founded on a competitive marketplace by making them immutable features of 
development. Yet the ethic of competition theoretically condones a trajectory of killing in 
the quest for wealth accumulation. In this way, internalist epistemologies perpetuate 
epistemicide and valuecide in Africa’s strides towards development.  
 
The stranglehold of internalist epistemologies has resulted in the impasse of rationality. 
By this we mean that Reason, apotheosized since the Enlightenment, has advanced 
humanity out of barbarism to “civilization” but has now placed humanity on the brink of 
unredeemable barbarism. Reason, through its manifestations in the philosophy of Mutual 
Assured Destruction and global warming, has condemned humanity to willful but 
avoidable suicide.  
 
Since the subjects and objects of development must be one and the same, development is 
necessarily culture-derived and culture-driven, with the preservation and improvement of 
human dignity and welfare as its ultimate aims. Accordingly, we defend the thesis that it 
is necessary for a framework meant for Africa’s development to be founded on 
indigenous knowledge and values, if it is to succeed. And at this moment of impasse 
                                                 
1 The project In Search of New Paradigms for African Development (ISENPAD), which yielded the 
Publication of African Perspectives on Development (see footnote 2 in the Introduction), is one such effort 
 xii
reached by Reason, an African ethics-based development paradigm, predicated on 
humaneness and “life is mutual aid”, can restore Reason to sober rationality and liberate 
Africa’s development efforts from the intoxicating prison of profit making.  
 
Hence the institutions and frameworks devoted to Africa’s development, such as the 
Constitution and Strategic Plan of the African Union as well as NEPAD, must 
incorporate salient features of the philosophic ethic emanating from the knowledge and 
ontological systems of indigenous Africa into visions of the African future.  
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INTRODUCTION: DEVELOPMENT AND PHILOSOPHY 
 
i. Statement of the Problem 
 
At the dawn of the 1990s, social scientists studying Africa’s development proclaimed a 
“paradigmatic crisis” and embarked on a quest for new paradigms1. Undeniably, 
conceptions of the nature and purposes of development as well as the theories and 
strategies for achieving them have remained a territory predominantly traversed by non-
African social scientists. The contribution of many African academicians towards a 
development vision for Africa has been “to echo, often in an opportunistic fashion, the 
voices of theorists elsewhere in the world.2” Since the 1950s, three Euro-American 
development ideologies, and their concomitant theories (Modernization, Dependency and 
Neo-Liberalism), have held sway over development thought and practice in Africa.   
 
In furtherance of the quest for new paradigms, a few ‘African inspired’ development 
paradigms have emerged. Significant amongst these are the Lagos Plan of Action, and 
The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD). We will advance the view that 
their pretensions to a homegrown origin are adaptations and reconstructions of the 
Eurocentric paradigms mentioned above. These ‘African’ frameworks were formulated 
without much input from the African grassroots and can, therefore, hardly escape the 
charge of being alien in spirit.  
 
ii. Against ‘Economism’ 
 
A close analysis of these formulas for Africa’s development discloses that they share at 
least two prominent features. The first is their exaggerated emphasis on measurable 
economic indexes, especially wealth creation founded on a competitive (or in the case of 
                                                 
1 The project In Search of New Paradigms for African Development (ISENPAD), which yielded the 
Publication of ‘African Perspectives on Development’ (see footnote 2), is one such effort 
2 Hyden, G, 1994, “Changing Ideological and Theoretical Perspectives on Development”, in African 
Perspectives on Development,  Himmelstrand, U, Kinyanjui, K and Mburugu, E (eds), London: James 
Currey Ltd., p. 318.  
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dependency theory, on a fair) marketplace, as sufficient categories for defining 
development3. This is exemplified by the identification of development with the capacity 
of a national economy to generate an annual increase of its gross national product by at 
least five or seven percent4. The second is their inspiration by categories and principles of 
Western epistemology and values.  
 
Gyekye has coined the term “economism”5 to describe such theories, and it is a 
description that we wish to adopt. These features lead us to conclude that economistic 
theories affirm processes and relations that denigrate the values and knowledge systems 
that sustain indigenous African social organization6.  
 
Economism is misplaced and overstated because of its narrowness and disregard for 
differences in historical or social situations in conceiving development. Further, 
economism essentially categorizes societies in a binary pole of wealthy or poor countries, 
which are the same as developed or under-developed, represented geographically as the 
north and south!7.  Within this binary structure are embedded nodal points representing 
gradations of development/wealth or underdevelopment/poverty. These nodes are 
identified with measurable economic indicators, such that, for instance, country x, whose  
GDP per capita is say $1000, is conceived as being more developed than y which has  
$ 700; but x would not match d in development if d’s GDP per capita is $1500. Since 
wealth creation in this framework is driven by the license to the private sector of the 
economy to maximize its profits, the basic character of economism can best be described 
as economic fundamentalism8. 
 
                                                 
3 Ake, C, 1996, Democracy and Development in Africa, Spectrum Books, Ibadan, p 127 
4 Torado, M. P., 1985, Economic Development in the Third World, New York and London: Longman, p. 83 
5 Gyekye, K., 1994, “Taking Development Seriously” in Journal of Applied Philosophy, 11, no. 1, p. 46 
6 Hyden, G. 1983, No Short Cuts to Progress: African Development management Perspectives, Berkeley: 
University of California Press, p. 8-11. Here, Hyden locates the root causes of Africa’s underdevelopment 
in economic processes and affirms the view that relations that have economic and social value in 
indigenous African social organization are impediments to development 
7 In this work the term “the West” will be identified with “the north” 
8 Ramose, M. B. 2002, African philosophy through Ubuntu, Harare: Mond Books, p. 131 
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Although overt discourse on Africa’s development by African philosophers is sparse, the 
subject is clearly implied in their discourse on Africa’s self-identity, social progress and 
the relevance of knowledge and values in the traditional setting to contemporary life and 
in shaping the African future.  Much of these works devote attention to unjustified 
constructions about Africa in the Western episteme to which philosophical critique needs 
to be directed 9. Others point out the importance of Africa taking charge of the struggle 
for its liberation10. Yet others advocate the need to insert a morality motivated by a sense 
of duty and “inspired by an imaginative and sympathetic identification with the interests 
of others even at the cost of a possible abridgement of one’s own interests”11  
 
The need for morally inspired solutions is taken up by Odera Oruka in his critical 
attention to the question of Africa’s development. Oruka rejects the economistic 
conception of development and argues for the need to insert “ethically appropriate actions 
and the rational reorganization and redistribution of resources” into development thinking 
and practice12. According to him, a normative aspect to development thinking is 
necessary because even if the basic physical (economically measurable) needs of the poor 
are met, in a world of class distinctions, the disparities between the rich and poor will 
carry over into other rights such as political rights13. In this sense, Oruka recognizes the 
importance of the rights discourse, to which we will return in chapters three and five, to 
                                                 
9 Some of these are:  
- Anta Diop, C, 1974, The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality, Westport: Lawrence Hill 
& Co.; 
- Eze, E. C, (ed),1997, Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Reader, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers  
- Mudimbe, V. Y.,1988, The Invention of Africa:Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press   
- Ramose, M. 2002, African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books 
10 See for instance: 
- Irele, A. 1983, “Introduction”, in Hountondji, P. J, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality. London: 
Hutchison and Co.; pp 7-32 
- Serequeberhan, T. 1998, “Philosophy and Post-Colonial Africa”, pp. 9-22 in Emmanuel C. Eze 
(ed), African Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell; 
- Sefa-Dei J. S.  2000. “African Development: The Relevance and Implications of 
‘Indigenousness’”. pp 70-88 in George Sefa-Dei, Budd L. Hall and Dorothy G. Rosenberg (eds) 
Indigenous Knowledges in Global Contexts. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. 
11 Wiredu, K, “The Moral Foundations of An African Culture”  in Coetzee P. H and Roux, A. P. J. (eds) 
Philosophy from Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 287. 
12 Presby, G. M. 2002 “African Philosophers on Global Wealth Redistribution”, in Presby, G. M. et. Al 
(eds), Thought and Practice in African Philosophy, Nairobi: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, p 284. 
13 Ibid p. 285-286 
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the development of Africa.  However, he identifies “ethno-religious solutions” with 
dogmatism and non-philosophy, and argues that these have no role in addressing the 
“current prevailing and dehumanizing ethics of political might”14. Although the notion of 
“ethno-religion” is not sufficiently elaborated on in the work from which we refer, it is 
reasonable to suppose that Oruka means by it what we consider to be salient tenets of 
indigenous African ontology, epistemology and values. If we are right in supposing this, 
then we take exception to identification of “ethno-religion” with non-philosophy, and the 
claim that it has no relevance to interrogating political power.   
 
Gyekye also dismisses economism as “lopsided, inadequate and unrealistic15”, because it 
“fails to come to grips with the complex nature of human society and culture”16. 
Furthermore, he highlights the fallacy of composition committed by economism by 
pointing out that it identifies economic development with development, yet “a species is 
never identical with its genus17”.  
  
Although these critics reveal the overstatement and arrogance of the Eurocentric 
paradigms, there is, in them, a latent acceptance of the position that underdeveloped/poor 
countries are late on the bandwagon of development, and that they can catch up if they 
adjusted the economistic conception of development a bit.   
 
A crucial issue often ignored by the critics of economism is the absurdities to which its 
classification and hierarchization lead. For, if there is a hierarchy of wealthy nations, the 
apex of which is represented by the G7, then one would expect that its expansion into the 
G8 would be achieved by adding the next wealthy nation on the rung beneath the G7 
countries to make up the G8. Yet Russia, which is much poorer than many nations, 
becomes the 8th nation of the wealthiest nations. This represents an absurdity by reference 
to the paradigm that determines ‘wealthy nations’.  
 
                                                 
14 Ibid., p. 288 
15 Gyekye, K, 1994, Taking Development Seriously, op. cit. p 46 
16 Ibid. p. 45 
17 Ibid. p 49 
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Now, this absurdity brings into sharp relief weaknesses in the criticism of economism, 
such as their passing over pertinent questions arising from the tensions within 
economistic paradigms. Some of these questions are: what makes a country a latecomer 
to development? Why should so-called poor countries catch up with the wealthy ones? 
What does it mean for these countries to be poor, and given a critically appraised 
meaning of ‘poverty’, can it be said that their poverty is really being recognized?   
 
iii. Critique of Competition 
 
Wealth creation based on competition is the cornerstone of economism. A level playing 
field is assumed for this competition, with disregard for the historical and actual 
conditions of countries. This assumption of a level playing field is captured in the notion 
of non-discrimination, which features as a key concept in the law and policy of the World 
Trade Organization. (W.T.O.)18. The notion of competition upheld here represents the 
pursuance of self-interest in an adversarial and exclusivist fashion. What this means is 
that competition as it is understood in the context of economism refers to a contest 
between rivals in which a rational actor seeks his/her interest against that of another 
rational actor19. Under this conception, one becomes excluded from the field of 
meaningful ability for self-interest seeking if one lacks material or intellectual wealth. 
Consequently, the assumed level playing field is rendered abstract and meaningless in 
certain concrete situations. 
 
This understanding of competition can be challenged, even on the basis of the etymology 
of the word. This is so because competition stems from a contraction of two Latin words 
“cum” and “petere”, which together mean “to seek together”20.  But if we seek together, it 
must be because we have a common goal towards which we are working. This surely 
                                                 
18 Van den Bossche, P., 2005, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 308. Here, the author distinguishes two main principles of non-
discrimination discernible in WTO law. The first is the most-favoured nation treatment obligation, which 
prohibits a country from discriminating between countries. The second is the national treatment obligation 
which prohibits a country from discriminating against other countries.  
19 The Group of Lisbon, 1995. Limits to Competition. Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press. p xii 
20 Ibid, p xi 
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shows the distortion of the meaning of ‘competition’ under the prevalent economistic 
regime.  
 
iv. Poverty is Unnatural 
 
Again, this framework of development considers the creation of wealth a necessary 
condition for alleviating poverty. Indeed “poverty is the creature of a political 
relationship designed, in practice, to exclude ethics from politics”21. From this point of 
view, it can be legitimately argued that wealth creation necessarily generates poverty, 
especially if political institutions fail to place definite limits on the notion of competition 
advanced by economism in the capitalist/globalist context in which it holds sway.  
 
Giving philosophical attention to the notion of poverty becomes an issue at stake, for at 
least two reasons. One would be to explore various dimensions of poverty and to inquire 
the extent to which intellectual poverty, manifested in illiteracy, affects the lives of the 
poor in a world governed by the economistic conception of development. Such an inquiry 
is likely to yield the view that intellectual poverty represents the helplessness or 
powerlessness of the poor. Bondy’s emphasis on the strong correlation between the 
concepts of poverty and domination lends credence to this view22. According to him, the 
production of knowledge in underdeveloped countries is characterized by the adoption, 
tout court, of foreign ideas and values, which prove to be sterile in the adopted milieu. 
Because of their inability to fertilize thought and action in any meaningful sense, these 
ideas and values create bonds of domination that form and sustain the condition of 
dependency. With this, the centers of knowledge and power then direct the activities of 
the dependent countries. The dominated powers live with an orientation to the outside, 
depending in their existence on the decisions of the dominant powers. Consequently, the 
keys to knowledge become the keys to power: “only he who has the key to theory can 
                                                 
21 Ramose, M. B, 2004, “Poverty: A Creature of Politics and a Question of Justice”, in International 
Journal for Humanistic Studies, Volume 3, p. 39 
22 Bondy, A. S. 1986. “The meaning and Problem of Hispanic American Thought” in Jorge J. E. Gracia 
(ed) Latin American Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. New York: Prometheus Books,  pp 240 - 241 
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appropriate the advances and powers of civilization”23. Intellectual poverty then easily 
translates into material poverty. Further, as the precursor to illiteracy, intellectual poverty 
is epistemicide24 because it kills the intellectual power of those who can be intellectually 
wealthy. 
 
Secondly, philosophical attention will be apposite in order to determine whether poverty, 
which is endemic in sub-Saharan Africa, is a natural condition of societies or it is 
culturally constructed.  Three degrees of poverty are clearly delineated in the various 
attempts at defining poverty. These are extreme (or absolute) poverty, moderate poverty 
and relative poverty. Extreme poverty means that households cannot meet basic needs for 
survival. Moderate poverty generally refers to conditions of life in which basic needs are 
met, but just barely.  Relative poverty is generally construed as a household income level 
below a given proportion of average national income. ‘Poverty’, as employed in this 
dissertation, will refer predominantly to extreme poverty and the lower fringes of 
moderate poverty as defined. This sort of poverty is characterized by a range of 
symptoms which include under- and malnourishment; living in miserable housing with 
bad hygiene and sanitary conditions, which make people susceptible to disease and 
reduce their life expectancy at birth25. Let us look at three key indicators of extreme 
poverty and determine how sub-Saharan Africa fares by these. 
 
Income of one U. S. dollar or less per day, measured at purchasing power per person per 
day, is the internationally acknowledged measure of extreme poverty, whereas income 
levels between one and two dollars is used to measure moderate poverty26.  Using this 
measure, about 150 million (or about forty percent of the population) were deemed to live 
in extreme poverty in sub-Saharan Africa in1981. This number had increased to 310 
                                                 
23 Ibid. p 243 
24 I adopt Ramose’s use of this term to describe the suppression of the Africans’ conception of reality, 
knowledge and truth by the European epistemological paradigm. A salient philosophical character of this 
domination, from the point of view of Africans, is the overbearing governance of their lives by foreign 
epistemologies that invariably leads to the “killing” of their native knowledge systems.  This is the 
commission of epistemicide. See Ramose, M. B., 2002, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, op. cit. p. 36 
25 Martinussen, J, 1997, Society, State & Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development,  
London: Zed Books, p 299-300 
26 Ibid.  
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million persons (or almost half of Africa’s population) by 200127. In 2001, therefore, 
most countries in sub-Saharan Africa lived in extreme poverty28. Further, about 200 
million people (or about 30% of the population) in sub-Saharan Africa in 2001 were 
deemed to be moderately poor29. What these figures show is that extreme poverty is not 
only concentrated in sub-Saharan Africa; but also that it is rising in both absolute 
numbers and as a share of the population.  
 
According to the Human Development Report of 2005, life expectancy at birth for the 
whole world was 67.1 years old, but for sub-Saharan Africa it was 46.1 years old30. Of 
the one hundred and seventy seven countries listed in the Report, the highest ranking sub-
Saharan African country was South Africa, at number one hundred and twenty. In fact 
from number one hundred and forty one, only Yemen, ranked one hundred and fifty one, 
is not a sub-Saharan African country31. 
 
The third indicator of extreme poverty that we would like to comment on is access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation facilities. Here, it is reported forty two percent of sub-
Saharan Africans lack access to safe drinking water whereas about sixty four percent of 
them lack access to sanitation facilities32.  
 
In addition to these, the poor lack even the most elementary education. This bad health 
condition and lack of education conspire to make the extremely poor generally less 
productive than the rest of the population. For these reasons they are poorly paid when 
employed and when unemployed are unable to exploit the opportunities available through 
self-employment. Consequently, they remain trapped in extreme poverty and unable to 
meet their basic needs.  
 
                                                 
27 Ibid. p 21 
28 Ibid. p 22 
29 Ibid. p 23 
30 UNDP, 2005, Human Development Report, p. 222 
31 Ibid. pp. 220 – 222. 
32 UNDP, Annual Report 2006, p. 14 
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This dissertation takes the view that poverty and its trap are cultural constructions with 
foundations in from two factors. One is economism’s arbitrary hierarchical construction 
and inattention to the significance of the power of ‘poverty’; and the second is its 
perpetuation of structural poverty emanating from the unjust wars of colonization that 
have survived beyond decolonization.  
 
However, few works in African philosophy succeed in providing a clear approach to an 
episteme and value system that will affirm and guide theory and practice in the applied 
sciences in this quest for liberation33. Of those that suggest credible prescriptions for 
addressing the epistemological question, an unequivocal statement on the role that 
indigenous African knowledge and values may play in fashioning theories and practices 
for Africa’s development is hard to come by.   
 
v. Thesis Statement 
 
The one-dimensionality of economism, with its attendant absurdities, clearly leads to the 
need to find alternatives to guide Africa’s development. This dissertation proposes one 
such alternative, by defending the thesis that founding the theories and practices meant 
for Africa’s development on indigenous African knowledge and values is a necessary 
condition for their success. Accordingly, we will propose a theory of being that 
recognizes wholeness as the basis for understanding the practice of indigenous African 
knowledge and values and advancing development in the African spirit.  
 
Our thesis implies the proposition that a framework of development that disengages from 
the aspirations of the African masses cannot hope to succeed in application.  
Accordingly, the ‘crises of paradigms’ is an inexorable consequence of the epistemicide 
and valuecide34 that the Eurocentric paradigms foster. It is evident that the discourse on 
Africa’s development has not sufficiently interrogated the epistemological and value 
basis, as well as the teleology, of these paradigms. Our thesis affirms that there is a viable 
                                                 
33 An exception to this is Mogobe Ramose’s African Philosophy through Ubuntu, op. cit. 
34 This term endorses the view advanced in footnote 23 but with respect to the domination of European 
values.  
 10
alternative to the Eurocentric paradigms, and that the seeds of these alternatives are 
embedded in indigenous African thought and practices. 
 
vi. Methodology: 
 
We wish to advance two claims at the onset of a discussion of the methodological 
approach to this dissertation. The first is that it is jointly an exercise in deconstruction and 
reconstruction. Many African philosophers have commented on how Western 
philosophers persisted in conceiving Graeco-European paradigmatic forms of rational 
contemplation and understanding as the most definitive and exalted activities of which 
true humans are capable35. In the mirror of this Eurocentric definition of ‘rational man’, 
Africans were not truly human36. The transition from the self-conception of the West as 
the only rational beings who occupied the universe and as the agents of the universe was 
effortless.  
 
Now, we hold the view that science is contingent upon philosophy because the theories 
and practices of science are derived from particular ontologies, epistemologies and sets of 
values. Development theories and practices are applications of social science, therefore 
they are sustained by philosophical foundations 37. Accordingly, this dissertation, as an 
instance in African philosophy, is deconstructive in the sense that it de-centers the 
Eurocentric paradigmatic forms “into the history of their construction and maintenance, 
into the historicity of the philosophical anthropology that forms the fabric of their 
textuality, and the cultural agenda of the voices in which they became embodied, and the 
practices through which they were constituted and institutionalized”38. The reconstructive 
component follows from the re-claiming of the historicity of philosophical practice 
constituted in the thesis.  
                                                 
35 Irele, A, 1983, op. cit. pp 10 – 21; Mudimbe, V. Y, 1988, op. cit., p 15 – 19; Ramose, M. B. 2002, op. cit.  
pp 10 – 15; Sereberquehan, T, 1994, The Hermeneutics of African Philosophy, New York: Routledge, pp 
21 – 23 
36 This is one of the main thrusts of Hegel’s theory of history. For a commentary on this see Ramose, M. B., 
2002, ibid. pp 1 - 24 
37 We elaborate on this in Chapter 4 
38 Outlaw, L. 2002. “African ‘philosophy’: Deconstructive and Reconstructive Challenges” pp 137 – 160 in  
Coetzee, P. H and Roux, A. P. J (eds), Philosophy from Africa, p147 
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Our second claim, which is partly implied in the elaboration of the first, is that this 
dissertation subscribes to the conception of philosophy as a critical and systematic 
inquiry into the fundamental ideas or principles underlying human thought, conduct and 
experience39. On these terms, philosophical activity may be inspired by situations or 
experiences that pose certain fundamental problems for a particular society; for, if 
philosophy is concerned with human problems, then paying critical attention to the 
human problems that arise in, or out of, particular historical or social situations is 
philosophical practice. The fact that certain development approaches have facilitated the 
progressive impoverisation of African countries underscores the need to turn a 
philosophical gaze on the suitability of these approaches.  
 
Our thesis is therefore sustained by three key premises. The first of these is that 
conceptions of development must be based on the specificity and historicity of the culture 
seeking to be developed, if they are to be relevant. This is necessary because “each 
philosophy is the self-interpretation of a culture40”. What this means, according to Okere, 
is that philosophy is an effort at giving meaning to one’s world and existence. As such, it 
is only within a particular cultural framework that one can understand or philosophize41. 
Given this, it becomes clear that conceptions, theories and strategies of development must 
be ultimately derived from the needs, aspirations, values and ideals expressed by the 
people’s understanding of the real, the true, the valuable and the beautiful.  
 
This position may be rejected by the Essentialist, whose methodological stance would 
seem to exclude the subject matter of this dissertation from the set of philosophical 
questions. According to Essentialists, philosophy's concern is with the human qua 
human, or with human nature as such, rather than with "particular" or "applied" social 
questions.  An appropriately philosophical subject matter, these philosophers argue, is 
defined by a criterion of universality which abstracts from such differences. 
                                                 
39 Gyekye, K., 1997, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 5 
40 Okere, T. 1983, African Philosophy: A Historico-Hermeneutical Investigation of the Conditions of its 
Possibility, Lanham: University Press of America. p xii. 
41 Ibid. pp xii, 114 
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Consequently, a concrete social and historical question, such as the question of the 
paradigm for Africa's development, cannot be accorded philosophical status on the 
criterion of abstract universality.  
 
Carol Gould42 labels this Essentialist version of universality as abstract universality, and 
refutes it. She then proposes an alternative which she terms concrete universality and 
argues for its adequacy as a criterion for justifying the philosophical nature of particular 
historical and social subject matters. This is in consonance with Okere’s position 
discussed above. 
  
We uphold Gould’s and Okere’s conclusions on the nature of philosophical subjects, and 
wish, therefore, to dwell briefly on her arguments against Essentialism. Gould’s 
refutation rests on two grounds: First, in failing to treat historical or accidental properties 
philosophically, Essentialism cannot arrive at an adequate account of essences, because 
the concept of universality entails that actual differences play a role in the determination 
of what is universal. This is so because not all human properties are essential, and since 
we cannot know in advance of philosophical inquiry which human properties are 
accidental and which essential, Essentialists will have to include accidental properties in 
their investigation. Thus by virtue of this methodological stance, Essentialists are 
compelled to include consideration of accidental properties as part of their philosophical 
task. If so, then the claim that philosophy is concerned only with essential properties but 
not accidental ones fails as a procedural premise43.  
 
Gould’s second objection to abstract universality is that its employment for the 
determination of essential human properties is not value-free but value-laden. This is 
because if one can establish an essence for any class of things, and must do this by 
considering the properties of particular classes, then the Essentialist’s choice of one 
property as essential, with respect to which others are accidental, cannot depend on 
                                                 
42 In "The Woman Question: Philosophy of Liberation and the Liberation of Philosophy" in Gould, C. C 
and Wartofsky, M. W, 1978, (eds), Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation 
43 Gould, C., 1978, "The Woman Question: Philosophy of Liberation and the Liberation of Philosophy", op. 
cit., in Gould, C. C and Wartofsky, M. W, (eds), Women and Philosophy: Toward a Theory of Liberation, 
New York: Capricorn Books, pp. 8 - 15 
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methodological considerations alone if the choice is not a random one. The choice of an 
essential property then is likely to reflect particular or contingent social and historical 
beliefs, prejudices, interests and needs44. This value-laden determination of the universal, 
Gould thinks may expose Essentialism to the charge of deceptiveness45.  
 
It is a credible philosophical undertaking, then, on the criterion of concrete universality, 
to justify the claim that conceptions of development must be based on the specificity and 
historicity of a culture seeking to be developed, if the theories and practices deriving 
from those conceptions are to be relevant and effective.   
 
The second premise to our thesis advances the view that the frameworks applied for 
Africa’s development thus far are unjustified because they assume the role of principal 
when their proper role should be that of agents. Consequently, they act ultra vires. The 
primary function of the principal/agent principle is to define the relationship between an 
ultimately responsible subject (principal) and her delegate (agent) in such terms as to 
make the agent an extended arm of the principal in the implementation of the principal’s 
will46. Consequently, the principal is empowered to sever the relationship between them 
if the agent transcends the delegated powers47.  
 
In accordance with this principle, it becomes clear to us that Africans ought to be both 
objects and subjects of their quest for development. Consequently, other entities engaged 
in this quest become agents, at best. This means that the structure and content of a 
development paradigm for Africa would have to reflect the will and aspirations of 
Africans. To ensure this, Africans need to participate in forging these paradigms and their 
implementation. However, with African voices merely ‘echoing the voices of theorists 
elsewhere in the world’, the roles of principal and agent are inverted. 
 
                                                 
44 ibid. p 16 
45 ibid., p 17 
46 See Furmston, M., 2001, Chesire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract, London: Butterworths, pp. 534-
536 
47 Ibid. pp 546-559 
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This is closely bound to the third premise to our thesis, which takes the position that the 
conceptions of development that have prevailed in Africa ultimately generate absurdities. 
There are a number of reasons for this, most of which will be elaborated in chapters Two 
and Three. One of these reasons is that money, which in these paradigms establishes the 
boundary between rich and poor countries, is the main reason for the historical inversion 
of the roles of principal and agent.  
 
The main means by which money achieves this inversion is its complete indifference to 
individual qualities. Money extracts “from the concrete totality of the streams of life one 
abstract, general factor which develops according to its own independent norms and 
which intervenes in the totality of existential interests and imposes itself upon them”48. 
Resultantly, the most salient feature of money, in its regulation of both individual and 
social relations, is its calculative function. The influence of money, in this regard, “is to 
conceive the world as a huge arithmetical problem, to conceive events and the qualitative 
distinction of things as a system of numbers”49. It is this abstract quantification of life and 
the relations in it that obliterates the concrete differences between principal and agent, 
and consequently allow for the historical inversion of the roles of the two.   
 
Our choice of the criterion of concrete universality as a methodological guide is founded 
on a number of reasons.  The first is that on this criterion, philosophy is concerned with 
human and social differences; yet it conceives them not as simply accidents, but as 
aspects which constitute the universal because they are related to each other in 
constituting the universal itself. This is in consonance with my proposed recognition of 
be-ing50 as the basis for understanding the practice of indigenous African knowledge and 
values.  
 
Further, concrete universality implies a conception of history and of society which I 
                                                 
48 Simmel, Georg, 2004, The Philosophy of Money,  Bottomore, T & Frisby, D. (eds), London: Routledge, 
p. 442 
49 Ibid. p 444 
50 I follow Ramose, M. B, 2002, African Philosophy Through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books, pp 40 – 51, in 
contrasting ‘be-ing’ as an ontological category, from ‘being’. The hyphenated usage establishes the 
dynamism of be-ing by highlighting the importance of the principle of motion within it. This has decisive 
implications for African metaphysics and ethics. We will return to this is Chapters 5 and 6. 
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affirm. On its terms, “accidents” are the characteristic features of historical change and 
actual social life, because society is not a changeless set of relations among individuals 
who are all essentially the same at all times. Rather, it is constituted by a set of relations 
among individuals who are very different. Consequently, history becomes constituted by 
the actions of individuals through their interaction with each other and with the natural 
world. On this view, theories of development can only reflect responses to historical 
perspectives which develop through interactions between societies and the dynamics of 
power that emerges from these interactions. Secondly, the relationship between the West 
and Africa on the subject of development arises from conquest in the unjust wars of 
colonization. The conqueror and conquered relationship is the ground for the prevailing 
exploiter/rich and exploited/poor duality. Since it is a relationship which has developed 
historically, it is subject to change.  
 
Finally, by conceiving proper philosophical subjects as also embodied in society and 
history, this criterion empowers us to formulate norms and values in terms not only of 
what is the same, but in terms of relevant differences which specify the conditions for 
applying the norm or value. The advantage with such a formulation would be that when 
such a norm or value is violated, we will not only know that a violation has occurred, but 
also why or on what grounds, such a violation occurred. Such knowledge is required if 
we are concerned not only with rectifying the specific violation, but with eliminating the 
conditions which gave rise to it in the first place and establishing conceptual and practical 
directions that will sustain the absence of such violations. We wish to reaffirm that our 
work is primarily concerned with how to critically understand and change the conditions 
that produced and sustain the ‘epistemicide’ and ‘valuecide’ in the discourse and practice 
on Africa’s development 
 
vii.     Structure of the Dissertation 
 
The dissertation unfolds in an introduction and five chapters. Chapters one and two will 
be devoted to a deconstruction of the European epistemological paradigm and the 
establishment of its influence on the three ideologies and theories mentioned in section i 
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above. The third, which serves as a bridge between the two chapters preceding it and the 
subsequent ones, establishes the dependence of applied social science on ontology and a 
system of values and knowledge. Chapters four and five are devoted to reconstructing a 
framework for development underpinned by indigenous African knowledge and values. 
What follows is a brief indication of the content of these chapters.  
 
Introduction:  
The key task of the introduction is to set the scene for the thesis by exploring the question 
‘what is development’? We begin by confirming the philosophical character of this 
question. We then examine the core characteristics of development, its purpose and 
possibility conditions.  
 
Chapter One  
 
Here, we present three Euro-American ideologies and their concomitant theories which 
have influenced development thinking in Africa, and critically review them. These are the 
Modernization, Dependency, Neo-Liberalist theories of development. Further, we  
outline and subject to critique supposedly ‘homegrown’ development frameworks and 
plans such as the Lagos Plan of Action, Structural Adjustment Policies and Poverty 
Reduction Strategies, as well as NEPAD, which is publicized by consensus by African 
leaders and their development partners as the current development framework for the 
continent51. We will locate the genesis of the three theories as well as NEPAD in 
European epistemology and values, and argue that they sustain the epistemicide and 
valuecide that continues to be committed in Africa’s development efforts.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
51 NEPAD has been endorsed by the G8, which adopted the Africa Action Plan in June 2002. It also forms 
part of the agenda of the Conference on Financing for Development, held in Monterrey, in March 2002 as 
well as the agenda of the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in September 2002.  
Further, it has achieved the endorsement of the international community through United Nations Resolution 
57/7 of 2002 which explicitly supports the document.   
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Chapter Two 
 
This chapter will consider various ‘alternatives’ to the mainstream development theories 
discussed in chapter one, and argue that they are mere adaptations and extensions of the 
mainstream theories and cannot, as such, engender authentic development in Africa.  
 
Chapter Three 
 
This chapter will recapture the unifying ideas of the preceding chapters and strengthen 
the argument that all applied natural and social sciences are contingent upon an ontology, 
epistemology and values. We will then proceed to justify the claim that technologies and 
social-scientific approaches succeed better when they are congruent with the philosophies 
that conceptually sustain them.  
 
Chapter Four 
 
This chapter upholds ontological categories as fundamental premises which guide the 
thinking behind a society’s institutions and practices. Accordingly, it sees these 
categories as providing the conceptual grounds for indigenous knowledge and values, 
defined as “knowledge [and value] consciousness arising locally and in association with 
the long-term occupancy of a place52”. The Chapter then looks at the foundations of an 
entirety of traditional norms, social values and mental constructs that guide, organize and 
regulate the African’s ways of life and her making sense of the world. It is from this point 
of view that we think the categories they expound can properly guide a paradigm of 
Africa’s development.  
 
We will expound here a theory of being that recognizes be-ing. This ontology discloses a 
relationship of beings existing in the visible and invisible realm of the universe, and who 
constitute a network of points of affinity in a universe that “forms one internally 
                                                 
52 Sefa-Dei. 2000, Sefa-Dei J. S.  2000. “African Development: The Relevance and Implications of 
‘Indigenousness’ op. cit. p.73 
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contiguous order53” rather than as independent categories existing in a conception of 
space and time inextricably locked under the key of logical rules.  The two realms of 
existence are complementary aspects of a complex wholeness, and are inhabited by be-
ings which share characteristics of both realms. Consequently, categories in this ontology 
relate to each other with such fluidity that their essential attributes dovetail into each 
other. 
 
The chapter also expounds on indigenous epistemological systems and argues that 
although they acknowledge the importance of logic, they do not dismiss the possibility of 
asserting truths about reality that are dissonant with The Law of Identity, which is a 
synthesis of the three fundamental canons of Western logic54. We then discus how 
African epistemologies recognize the limitations imposed on the concepts of ‘truth’ and 
‘the good’ by this logic.  
 
We argue that the knowledge practices emerging out of this epistemology afford us a 
picture of nature and of history as an aggregate of components that interact in both 
determinate and indeterminate patterns. It is a knowledge system that encourages 
recognition and exploration of the interdependence of significant elements in a totality 
without demanding that they be observable and measurable. Obviously, this definition of 
indigenous African knowledge does not make a clear and exclusive distinction between 
knowledge and values, and will therefore not be neatly situated in the categories of 
Eurocentric thought55.  
 
Finally, we then defend the Africanity of this theory of be-ing and knowledge, and show 
how they relate to a concrete universalist framework for development. Implied in this 
defense is the position that the cultures of sub-Saharan Africa share enough features to 
make it meaningful to understand the similarities in their basic problems and theoretically 
                                                 
53 Abraham, W. E, 1962, The Mind of Africa, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 99 
54 Identity, Excluded Middle, Non-Contradiction 
55 The ‘is/ought’ distinction is fundamental in Western philosophical discourse. The Logical Positivists, for 
instance, hold that a statement has cognitive meaning if and only if it is either logically justified or 
empirically observable. Value judgments, for instance, have no cognitive meaning and cannot therefore be 
the basis of truth 
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formulate solutions to them within a particular conceptual framework. Such a position 
does not amount to the claim that sub-Saharan Africa comprises of homogeneous 
societies which hold unanimous conceptions and beliefs about society and progress56. 
Such a position would, in fact, be absurd. In spite of its near geographical unity, sub-
Saharan Africa is by no means a culturally homogenous entity. Therefore, talk about 
indigenous African systems is first and foremost talk about particular cultural systems. At 
a second level, which is a general level, one may meaningfully talk about indigenous 
systems. This is the level at which “analogous existential experiences of life ….have 
slowly produced a unified African world distinct from, and comparable to the Western 
and Asian World”57.The discussion in this thesis will be pitched at this latter level. In 
giving legitimacy to our discourse at this level, we affirm the position of the South 
Report, that “what the countries of the South have in common transcends their 
differences; it gives them a shared identity and a reason to work together for common 
objectives”58. It must be noted that the common features allowing for this unity and 
shared identity is distinctly cultural. 
 
Chapter Five 
 
This chapter will theorize indigenous knowledge and value systems as necessary 
conditions for the formulation and implementation of development theories and strategies 
for Africa. It will claim that such theories and strategies must be ethics-based. Towards 
justification for this, the chapter will proceed to expound on African social and ethical 
doctrines and their concomitant norm-finding procedures; and show how these derive 
from, and in their turn strengthen the ontological and epistemological aspects of 
                                                 
56 This view of African societies is held by both Paulin Hountondji and Robin Horton. Thus Hountondji (at 
Hountondji, P. J., 1983, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, London: Hutchison and Co., pp 51-55), 
discusses the “myth of unanimity and the “myth of consensus” held in African societies. This implies a 
monolithic understanding of issues to which all thinkers in a given African society give unanimous assent. 
In like manner Horton (at Horton, R, 1971, “African Traditional Thought and Western Science”, in Wilson, 
B (ed) Rationality, New York: Harper Touchbooks, p 153), writes that “to me, the most important thing 
about the traditional cultures is that in each, there is a single, overarching world view which prevails 
without competition; which has, as it were, a monopoly of people’s cognitive preoccupation”.  
57 Maquet, J., 1972, Africanity: The Cultural Unity of Black Africa, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 
4 
58 South Report. 1990. The Challenge to the South. The Report of the South Commission, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; p 1 
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holonistic reality as discussed in chapter four. We will then attempt concrete applications 
of these principles and norms to aspects of development practice in Africa.  
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CHAPTER ONE: 
DIMENSIONS OF DEVELOPMENT AND THEIR INFLUENCE ON AFRICA 
 
1.1: What is ‘Development’? 
 
Since the Second World War, Western conceptions of the world and history have been 
characterized by the notion of ‘development’1. In spite of disputes regarding its exact 
definition, there is a widespread tendency to associate something positive and desirable 
with this word. This chapter has multiple aims. First it seeks to establish the meaning of 
‘development’ that has prevailed in the discourse on Africa’s development. It will then 
offer a brief exposition of three schools of thought that have dominated the discourse on 
development in the aftermath of World War Two; indicate how they have utilized the 
pre-existing meaning of ‘development’; trace their influence on thinking and practice in 
Africa and briefly indicate why they have failed in this context.  
 
 Such a task compels, at the onset, clarifying the distinction between development 
concept, development theory and development strategy2. A development concept 
contains the answer to what ‘development’ is. The concept, as such, is value-laden 
because it encapsulates notions of what ought to be understood by development. These 
notions are then formulated as development goals, either in terms of particular conditions 
that must be achieved or in terms of the conceptual directions for change. Development 
theories, on the other hand, seek to determine how chosen development objectives can be 
promoted. They are therefore concerned with the conditions that will facilitate or impede 
progress, causal relationships that apply to the processes of change and how the changes 
affect various social groups and localities. Clearly, then, theories also contain significant 
normative elements3. A development strategy on its part refers essentially to the actions 
                                                 
1 So, A. Y. 1990. Social Change and Development, Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications ; Ake, C. 1996, 
Democracy and Development in Africa, Washington D. C: Brookings Institution Press, p.1 
2 Martinussen, J, 1997, Society, State & Market, London: Zed Books, pp 14-15. These distinctions are well 
articulated here. 
3 Pickering, A, 1992, (ed), Science as Practice and Culture, Chicago: Chicago University Press. Most of 
the contributions to this anthology affirm this point.  
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and interventions that can be used to promote defined development objectives. As such, it 
is heavily value-laden because of its prior choice of development concept.  
 
Initially, planners of development as a goal to be achieved by underdeveloped countries 
estimated that it could be attained through bilateral relations between the colonial powers 
and their colonized territories.  However, this emphasis on bilateralism was to change by 
the end of the 1940s4. Chirot5 and other commentators argue that an important catalyst to 
this change was the immediate political interests of the United States of America. Preston 
suggests that these interests were, predominantly, to fortify America’s role as the core 
power of the liberal capitalist system and order the post-war world in such a fashion as to 
allow its capitalists access to territories in the Third World6; and to halt the spread of 
communism7. However in 1949, Harry Truman, then president of the U. S. A., envisaged 
his country’s role to be thus:   
  
“We must embark on a bold new programme for making the benefits of our 
scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas. The old imperialism – exploitation for foreign 
profit – has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a programme of 
development based on the concept of democratic fair dealing8”. 
 
The shift of focus from bilateralism to multilateralism, and the role of the U. S. A. in it, 
was achieved in two main ways. First, the U. S government provided enormous support 
to interdisciplinary research on development9. Secondly, it spearheaded the creation of 
the Bretton Woods institutions – specifically the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
                                                 
4 Cooper, F. and Packard, R. 1997. “Introduction”,  in International Development and the Social Sciences: 
Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge. Cooper, F and Packard, R (ed). California: University of 
California Press 
5 Chirot, D. 1981. “Changing Fashions in the Study of the Social Causes of Economic and Political 
Change” in James Short (ed) The State of Sociology. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, p. 261 -262.  Chirot suggests 
here that the U. S government’s interest in development at the time stems principally from its recognition 
of the appeal of communism to the newly independent states of the world (or for the indigenous political 
elite agitating for independence in colonized countries) 
6 Preston, P. W., 1997, Development Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 153 
7 Ibid.,  pp. 157, 168 
8 From Esteva, G. 1992. “Development”, pp 6-25 in The Development Dictionary, Sachs, W. (ed) London: 
Zed Books 
9 So, A. Y. 1990, Social Change and Development,  op. cit., p. 18;  
- Also, Almond, G. 1987. “The Development of Political Development”, in Myron Weiner et al. (eds) 
Understanding Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown., p. 437 
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the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, now generally known as the  
World Bank – whose functions were predicated upon the notion of open liberal trade10. 
The IMF was established to encourage international cooperation in the monetary field, 
remove foreign exchange restrictions and facilitate a multilateral payments system 
between member countries. The purpose of the World Bank was to encourage capital 
investment for the reconstruction and development of its member countries. This function 
was an extension of American policy11 towards Europe, which emphasized economic 
reconstruction after the destruction of the war. Accordingly, the World Bank’s strategy at 
this period was to lend, and facilitate a massive transfer of resources, to Europe12.  
 
These institutions helped reinforce the partitioning of the world into three geo-economic 
areas: the first world, which was conceived as developed; the second world considered to 
be semi-developed and the Third World which was rendered under-developed. All 
countries in sub-Sahara Africa, with the exception of South Africa, were categorized as 
under-developed.  
 
Two observations may be made, with regard to The Bretton Woods institutions and Third 
World Development. The first is that their predominant interests, right from the onset of 
their operations, have been far from the facilitation of Africa’s development. They have 
at times remained apathetic to efforts at Africa’s development, and on many occasions 
have pursued strategies and policies that undermine development in Africa. We return to 
the negative influence of the World Bank on sub-Saharan Africa’s development efforts in 
sections 1.4.3.3 and 1.4.3.4 below. It is worth noting presently, however, that the IMF’s 
                                                 
10 Preston, P. W., 1997, Development Theory, op. cit., p. 168 
11 The most prominent of these were the Marshall Plan. The Marshall Plan (from its enactment, officially 
the European Recovery Program [ERP]) was the primary plan of the United States for rebuilding and 
creating a stronger foundation for the allied countries of Europe, and repelling communism after World 
War II. The initiative, developed at a meeting of the participating European states on July 12, 1947, was 
named after the then United States Secretary of State George C. Marshall. The plan was in operation for 
four years beginning in July 1947, and during that period some $13 billion of economic and technical 
assistance was given to help the recovery of the European countries. In recent years historians have 
questioned both the underlying motivation and the overall effectiveness of the Marshall Plan. Some 
historians contend that America’s economic interest was foremost in devising the Plan as, for instance, the 
money was to be used to buy goods from the United States, and shipped across the Atlantic on American 
merchant vessels. 
12 Martinussen, J. 1997. State, Society & Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development. London: 
Zed Books 
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mandate essentially severs it from any meaningful contribution to Africa’s development.  
This is because at the time of its establishment, in 1944, all sub-Saharan African 
countries with the exception of Liberia13 were occupied by the armed conquest of 
Europeans who exploited and traded the resources of these countries for their own (the 
conquerors’) interests. Consequently, any benefits that may have accrued from 
international monetary cooperation or facilities to enhance multilateral payments between 
countries must have gone to the colonialists. This exclusion from benefit by sub-Saharan 
Africa by the IMF persists presently, as the Debt Trap in which sub-Saharan Africa, 
which was facilitated by the IMF, clearly illustrates. In addition to this, a key finding of a 
recent report by the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group (IEG), is that the voices 
of developing countries are inadequately represented in the Bank’s operations14. 
 
Further, the designation “Third World” has a philosophic dimension to it that weakens 
attempts at development by the ‘under-developed’ world. It is, as Parkinson argues, a 
residue of Aristotelian superiority and Augustinian exclusiveness which instinctively 
endorsed the view that the Amerindian, the African and the Australasian cannot be a 
wholesome authentic human being. Contemporaneously, this racist superiority complex 
is effected in the following manner: “lurking behind an outward benevolence, it is 
manifested in a generally condescending attitude towards what we are now pleased to call 
“under-developed countries” or, relegating it instinctively to the bottom of the scale, the 
“third world15” In Chapter Three, we look more closely at the philosophical foundations 
of the mainstream development theories and practices propagated after the second World 
War. Presently, however, we have reason to wonder at the extent to which “the old 
imperialism” has been transcended in the relationship between the people relegated to the 
lowest third rung of the ladder and those on the topmost rung.  
                                                 
13 This statement is contestable, because although Liberia was officially never colonized, it was a de facto 
colony of the USA. See Akpan, M. B, Jones, A. B and Pankhurst, R, 1990, “Liberia and Ethiopia, 1880-
1914: the survival of two African States” and “Ethiopia and Liberia, 1914-35: two independent African 
states in the colonial era”, (chapters 11 and 28, respectively, in Boahen, A. A. (ed), General History of 
Africa, VII: Africa Under Colonial Domination 1880 – 1935, Paris: UNESCO 
14 The World Bank, 2006, Evaluating the World Bank's Approach to Global Programs: Addressing the 
Challenges of Globalization. http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/gppp/index.html 
15 Parkinson, F. 1977. The Philosophy of International Relations: A study in the History of Thought, 
Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 24-25. 
 25
 
1.2: Development and Economic Growth 
 
From the onset of their existence, the official conceptions of the Bretton Woods 
institutions as well as in North America and Western Europe identified ‘development’ 
with economic growth (or economic development) in the industrialized countries. An 
early attempt was made to distinguish between ‘growth’ and ‘development’ by Joseph 
Schumpeter. According to him, growth was the gradual extension of the capital apparatus 
and increasing production. Development, on the other hand, could occur only when 
technical innovations introduced new production techniques, new products or means of 
organizing production16. The salutary point for us is that the utilization of production 
factors in new ways does not change the economic focus of this conception of 
development. Since my main concern in this work is to indicate the conflation of 
economic growth (or development) with ‘development’, I will not hesitate to use 
economic growth and economic development interchangeably, and ‘economism’ to 
denote both.   
 
In spite of the lack of general agreement, wide approval has been gained for the notion of 
economic development as “a process whereby the real per capita income of a country 
increases over a long period of time while simultaneously poverty is reduced and the 
inequality in society is generally diminished”17.  Conceptions of this kind have been 
adopted in World Bank analyses and strategies since the early 1970s. Until around 1980, 
the Bank’s overall conception of development was determined by combining growth in 
per capita income with assistance to the poor. One strategy associated with this was the 
‘Basic Needs Approach’, which we will consider in Chapter Two. In the 1980s, the 
Bank’s focus shifted towards aggregate economic growth in conjunction with restoration 
of macro-economic imbalances, structural adjustment and increased foreign exchange 
                                                 
16 Schumpeter, J. A. 1934, The Theory of Economic Development, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press 
17 Meier, G. M., 1989, Leading Issues in Economic Development,  New York: Oxford University Press, p. 6  
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earnings. Since 1990, it has again emphasized aggregate growth along with growth for 
the poor and resource-weak groups18. 
 
Therefore the one-dimensional focus of economism, and change processes towards 
greater similarity with conditions prevailing in the USA and the industrialized countries 
of Western Europe continues to be the official conception of the Bretton Woods 
Institutions and their mentors19.  Now, per capita income is computed on the basis of 
production, employment and consumption of goods and services. However, it is 
questionable whether measurement of development in sub-Saharan Africa in terms of 
increasing per capita incomes can give a correct impression of the conditions and state of 
human dignity and welfare.   
 
First, many of these countries lack the means to gather the necessary data for analysis. In 
addition, the national accounts, from which per capita income is extracted, are usually 
based on measurements of production and consumption in prices which assume market 
exchanges of all the products. But a large segment of production in these countries is 
exchanged in other ways without pricing. This occasions distortions in the national 
accounts.  
 
Secondly, these national accounts hardly reflect the distribution of incomes among the 
citizens of the country.  Therefore, aggregate growth in per capita income is often a 
reflection of growth for high income groups, which necessarily means a decline or 
stagnation for low-income groups.  Per capita income, then, may mask the uneven 
distribution of national income socially or geographically.  
 
What this means is that the narrow definition of development by economism, results in 
undue generalization and abstraction. These core features of economism: its one-
dimensional focus and abstract character have been inherited by the three predominant 
schools of thought, to which we now turn.  
                                                 
18 Martinussen, J. 1997, State, Society and Market, op cit. p. 37 
19 Keita, L., 2004, “Philosophy and Development”, in Africa Development, Vol. XXIX, No 1, Dakar: 
CODESRIA, p 1 
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1.3 Schools of Development Thought and their Influence in Africa 
 
1.3.1: The Modernization School and its Essential Claims 
 
The first of these is the modernization school, which held sway in the aftermath of the 
Second World War until the early 1960s. According to this school, countries in the Third 
World were ‘backward’ in comparison with countries in North America and Western 
Europe. The panacea for this ‘backwardness’ was a process of evolution terminating in 
modernization, which involves a phased, lineal, irreversible, progressive, and lengthy 
process modeled on the development paths of the developed world20. A key dimension of 
this process is free trade. Accordingly, each country would prosper it if sold the goods for 
which it had a comparative advantage on a competitive market. The Third World will 
achieve modernization if it absorbed Western values and resources in the form of 
investments, loans and aid21.  
 
Tipps observes that “there was little in modernization that would seriously disturb the 
White House, Pentagon, or State Department policy makers22.” This view is pertinent to 
the whole of Western Europe at the time, since it was indebted to the United States after 
the war and looked toward it for political, economic and military leadership.  But what is 
the genesis of this school of thought?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 Himmelstrand U. 1994. “Perspectives, Controversies and Dilemmas in the study of African 
Development”, in Himmelstrand, U, Kinyanjui, K and Mburugu, E (eds), African Perspectives on 
Development, London: James Currey Ltd., p. 37 
21 So, A. Y. 1990., Social Change and Development, op. cit., p. 36 
22 Tipps, D. C. 1976. “Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical 
Perspective”, 62-88 in Black, C. E (ed) Comparative Modernization: A Reader. New York: Free Press, p. 
72 
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1.3.1: The Theoretical Heritage of modernization 
 
The core claims of modernization derive from a triple heritage comprising of 
evolutionary theory23, and Functionalism24 and a blend of classical economic 
theory/Keynesianism25.  
 
1.3.1.1: Growth Theory under Economic Liberalism 
 
The economics of modernization is best described as “the work of Keynes simultaneously 
absorbed into a revivified neo-classical orthodoxy”26.  
 
Elaborating on Adam Smith’s political economy, neoclassical economics emphasizes the 
critical role of market mechanisms, especially competition, as well as the accumulation of 
wealth and investment to economic growth. If the market were left to its own devices it 
would spontaneously order society in such a fashion as to maximize human well-being. 
To this was added the views of David Ricardo, who augmented Smith’s sources of 
growth with technical innovations and international trade based on the comparative 
advantage of productive inputs in participating countries27.  
 
On the other hand, Keynesianism holds that if the total level of expenditure in an 
economy falls below that which is necessary for full employment, then the shortfall 
should be made up by government spending28. Government borrowing to finance 
expenditure is justified as this spending will boost economic activity. A boosted economy 
will generate higher tax returns, which could be used to offset the initial borrowing. It 
                                                 
23 Portes, A. 1980. “Convergences between Conflicting Theoretical Perspectives in National 
Development”, in Herbert Blalock (ed) Sociological Theory and Research. New York: Free Press,  p. 223 
24 So A. Y., 1990, Social Change and Development, op. cit., p. 18 
25 Preston, P. W., 1997, Development Theory, op. cit., pp. 153 - 165 
26 Preston P. W. 1997, Development Theory,  op cit., p. 154 
27Mankiw, G. N., 2000, Principles of Microeconomics, N. Y. Thomson Learning, p. 55 
28 Ibid. pp 31-33. Also Keynes, J. M., 1936, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, 
London: McMillan & Co, (rendered into html for the University of Adelaide Library, at 
http:/etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/k/k44g/html), Chapter 17, II-III and Chapter 20, III – IV.  
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would seem that Keynesianism was admitted into the folds of modernization because it 
was desirable to promote a suitable rate of growth in countries receiving Western aid, and 
this lent credence to the notion that deliberate intervention in an economy in order to 
raise its level of activity was allowable29. Modernization implied growth but, in applying 
the school in Africa30, this growth was conceived to have better come through the 
functioning of liberal market economies.  
 
1.3.1.2: Evolutionary Theory 
 
Evolutionary theory flourished in the nineteenth century, in the aftermath of the Industrial 
and French Revolutions. These revolutions both shattered an existing order and laid the 
foundation for a new one. The industrial revolution led to the mechanization of 
production, higher productivity and their concomitant quest for new markets, many of 
which were found in colonized territories. The French revolution signaled the beginning 
of the end of monarchy, and ushered in parliamentary democracy in Europe.  
 
In observing these social, political and economic transitions, evolutionary theorists used 
different labels to characterize the old and new societies. Thus Ferdinand Tonnies 
distinguished between gemeinschaft (community) and gesellschaft (society). In 
traditional societies, relationships are emotion-based, and are such communal 
(gemeinshaft) relationships. On the other hand, relationships in modern societies are 
driven by the desire to achieve some specific goal (for example, financial gain). Tonnies 
called these goal-driven relationships gesellschaft, or social relationships31. Durkheim, on 
his part, theorized mechanical and organic solidarity as characteristic modes of 
relationships in two distinct phases of social change32. According to him, everyone is a 
jack of all trades in traditional society. What sustains such a society is collective 
conscience consisting of primitive values and norms. In modern (organic) society, 
division of labour pertains, and because of this mutual dependence becomes necessary for 
                                                 
29 Preston, P. W. 1997, Development Theory, op. cit., p. 158 
30 See subsection 2.1.3   
31 Tonnies, F., 1957, Community and Society: Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft, Loomis, C. P. (trans & ed.), 
pp. 223-231, East Lansing: Michigan State University Press. 
32 Durkheim, E., 1964, The Division of Labour in Society,  London: Collier-Macmillan, pp. 70 - 132 
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survival. It is this need for mutual dependence, rather than a collective conscience, that 
holds the society together. Another of these characterizations is Comte’s theoretical, 
metaphysical and positive stages of social change33. According to this distinction, 
reasoning in traditional societies, characterized as the theoretical stage, is based on 
religion whereas reasoning in modern (positivistic) societies is based on science. 
 
Three salient features of Evolutionary Theory informed the structure of modernization 
theory. First, it assumed that social change is unidirectional34. Human society, on this 
account, invariably moves in one direction from a primitive to an advanced state typifed 
by Western society. Second, it imposed a value judgment on the evolutionary process: the 
unidirectional movement towards the final phase is good because it represents progress, 
humanity and civilizations35.  Third, it assumed that the rate of social change must be 
slow, gradual and piecemeal - it is evolutionary, not revolutionary -, and the process of 
evolution from a primitive society to a modern one, is time-consuming.  
 
1.3.1.3: Functionalist Theory 
 
Functionalism bequeaths to modernization its other theoretical heritage. In his version of 
functionalist theory, Talcott Parsons articulates the concept of pattern variables to 
distinguish traditional societies from modern ones36. According to him, there are five sets 
of these variables 37.  
 
First of these is affective versus affective-neutral relationships38. Social relationships, in 
traditional societies, tend to have an affective component. What this means is that they 
tend to be personal, emotional and face-to-face. Employers treat employees as family 
members and find it hard to dismiss them even when their company fails to be profitable. 
                                                 
33 Comte, A., 1964, “The Progress of Civilizations through Three States” in Etzioni, A and Etzioni, E (eds) 
Social Change, New York: Basic Books, p. 14-16 
34  ibid.  
35 Levy, M. J. 1967. “Social Patterns (Structures) and Problems of Modernization”, in Wilbert Moore and 
Robert Cook (eds). Readings on Social Change. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 196-201  
36 So, A. 1990, Social Change and Development, op. cit. p. 21 
37 Parsons, T., 1952, The Social System, London: Tavistock, p. 67 
38 ibid., p. 60 
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In modern societies, however, social relations are essentially affective-neutral in that they 
are impersonal, detached and indirect. Consequently, employees stand the threat of being 
dismissed if they stand in the way of economic productivity and entrepreneurial 
profitability. 
 
The second set of variables is the particularistic versus universalistic relationships39. 
According to Parsons, people in traditional societies tend to associate with members of 
the same social circle, trust one another and feel an obligation to fulfill social promises. 
Usually, an oral agreement is all that is needed to carry out a business transaction. Thus 
they treat each other as specific and distinct individuals. On the other hand people in 
modern societies are forced to interact with strangers frequently, and tend to use 
universalistic norms. For example, a cashier in a bank will not honour a cheque unless the 
payee presents identification documents.  
 
The third set of variables is collective orientation versus self orientation40. In traditional 
societies loyalty is often owed to the collectivity, such as the family or community, and 
people are asked to sacrifice their interest for the sake of fulfilling collective obligations. 
This stress on collective orientation constrains individual innovation, creativity and 
imagination. On the other hand self orientation is stressed in modern society. This means 
that people are encouraged to be themselves and develop their own talents and prospects. 
This stress on self orientation is said to energize the individual, leading to technological 
innovation and raising economic productivity. 
 
Ascribed versus achieved status constitutes the fourth set of variables. In traditional 
societies, a person is evaluated by his or her ascribed status, often derived from social 
background and family connections, whereas achievement is the yardstick for personal 
evaluation in modern society41.  
 
                                                 
39 ibid., p. 62 
40 Ibid., p. 60 
41 Ibid., p. 64 
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The fifth and final set is functionally diffused versus functionally specific relationships42. 
The relationship between an employer and employee in both societies is invoked for 
illustration. In traditional societies, according to Parsons, the employer’s role is not just to 
employ. Frequently, it involves training the employee through apprenticeship, the 
responsibility of hosting and guiding him or her. Therefore, the employer’s role becomes 
functionally diffused, and highly inefficient. In modern societies, however, the employer 
has limited obligations to the employee. Their relationship seldom extends beyond the 
sphere of work. Therefore the employer’s role tends to be functionally specific. Because 
they are able to avoid other obligations to each other, the employer and employee can 
focus on increasing efficiency and productivity.  
 
1.3.1.4: Common Assumptions and Methodology 
 
These foundations of economic liberalism, evolutionary theory and functionalist theory 
led to shared assumptions and methodology amongst the adherents to the school43. First 
of these is that modernization is a phased process towards economic development. 
Rostow, whose theory of economic growth44 represents an apogee of modernization 
theory, distinguishes five stages of economic development, through which all societies 
seeking it must travel. The initial stage is that of traditional society which Rostow 
characterizes as “one whose structure is …. based on pre-Newtonian science and 
technology, and of pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world”45. A series of 
stages must be passed46 before coming to the terminal stage, which is high mass-
                                                 
42 Ibid., p. 65-66. For a more straightforward elaboration of these variables, see So, A., 1990, Social 
Change and Development, op. cit., p. 23 
43 See Hungtington , S. (1976) “The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics”, in 
Cyril E. Black (ed) Comparative Modernization: A Reader. New York: Free Press., pp. 30-31 
44 Rostow, W. W. 1960. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
45 Ibid., p. 6 
46 Ibid., pp. 5 – 14. From the traditional stage, a society slowly edges into “precondition for takeoff 
growth”, when it begins to change by virtue of the rise of new entrepreneurs, the expansion of markets, 
among others. When the rate of productive investments reaches 10% of national income, the country would 
have reached the “take-off stage”. If this level of investment is sustained, the country soon reaches the 
phase called “the drive to maturity”. This stage is followed by growth in employment opportunities, 
increase in national income, rise in consumer demand and the formation of a strong domestic market. The 
country would have then reached the final stage of economic development, labeled “high mass 
consumption society” by Rostow. 
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consumption society. According to Rostow, these stages “constitute in the end both a 
theory about economic growth and a more general, if still highly partial, theory about 
modern history as a whole47”.    
 
Accordingly, modernization is, secondly, a homogenizing process. This is easily inferred 
from Parson’s view that “as time goes on, they [the Third World] and we [the western 
world] will increasingly resemble one another…. Because the patterns of modernization 
are such that the more highly modernized societies become, the more they resemble one 
another48”.  Levy, concurs with this view. For him, modernization is a universal solvent 
in that mere contact with a modern society is a catalyst for the modernization of a 
primitive society. This, according to him, is because the patterns of modernized societies 
have shown a universal tendency to penetrate any social context whose participants have 
come in contact with them. Once this penetration begins, the previous indigenous patterns 
always change; and they always change in the direction of some of the patterns of the 
modernized society49.  
 
In this phased process seeking homogeneity, societies obviously begin with the primitive/ 
traditional stage associated with the Third World and advance to the complex/modern 
stage associated with the Western world. Therefore, modernization is, thirdly, an 
Americanization/Europeanization process. Tipps50 substantiates this by claiming that 
Western Europe and the United States have unmatched economic prosperity and liberal 
democratic stability, and since they are the most advanced nations in the world, they are 
definitely models that latecomers in development should emulate.   
 
Fourthly, modernization is an irreversible and unstoppable process, such that once Third 
World countries come into contact with the West, they will not be able to resist the 
impetus towards modernization. This is implied by the views of Levy and Rostow, and 
requires no further elaboration. In fact it is modernization’s necessarily unidirectional 
                                                 
47 Ibid., p. 1 
48 Levy, M. J. 1967. “Social Patterns (Structures) and Problems of Modernization”, op. cit., p. 207 
49 ibid., pp. 206-207 
50 Tipps, D. C. 1976. “Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A Critical 
Perspective” op. cit., p. 81 
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character that makes it a “universal social solvent” capable of dissolving traditional traits 
of the Third World countries. All the above assumptions are derived from evolutionary 
theory.  
 
Fifthly, modernization is a transformative process that renders “tradition” and 
“modernity” mutually exclusive51. This is correctly inferred from Parsons’s view that a 
society’s traditional structures and values must be replaced by a set of modern ones in 
order for it to enter into modernity. Now, if development is equivalent to modernization, 
and modernization a complete break from the traditional, then anything ‘traditional’ 
detracted from the surge toward modernization and must be discarded on the path toward 
development.  
 
Finally, modernization theorists share the common methodological approach of 
conducting discussions at a highly general and abstract level52. This, with the 
assumptions enumerated above, leads us to the conclusion that they subscribe to abstract 
universalism. 
 
1.3.1.5: The Influence of Modernization on Development Practice in Africa 
 
The influence of the concept and theories of modernization on the planning and 
implementation of development strategies in Africa lasted till about the mid-1960s, and 
was characterized by two related trends. The first was the investment, predominantly 
financed by private capital, in enhanced production of mineral, agricultural and forestry 
resources for American and European industries and economies53. In furtherance of their 
economistic agendas, many of the newly independent governments justified these 
investments on the grounds that they would help generate capital for an industrial 
foundation.  
 
                                                 
51 Huntington, S. 1976. “The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and Politics”, in Cyril E 
Black (ed). Comparative Modernization: A Reader. NY: Free Press. pp 30-31 
52 So A. Y. 1990, Social Change and Development, op. cit. p. 35 
53 Nkrumah, K. 1966. Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, New York: International Publishers, 
p. 85. 
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The second trend involved the establishment of “large, shiny, capital-intensive projects 
incorporating the latest in foreign technology and sited where everybody could see them 
– which meant in or near cities54”. This drive to industrialize was also fed by the 
economistic notion. Economic development was positively correlated with the degree of 
industrialization55. 
 
Nkrumah observes that the exploitation of Africa’s primary products for export, often 
with the consent of African governments, gained tremendous momentum in the late 
1950s and early 1960s56. Investments in agriculture were exemplified by the widespread 
plantations in the erstwhile French colonies. The exploitative tendency in agriculture 
involved the employment of cheap labour and purchase of land by the capitalists at 
nominal prices57.  
 
Exploitation of mineral resources was also a continent-wide phenomenon, but the most 
obtrusive examples of this occurred in Southern and Central Africa58, with the tacit 
approval of the Bretton Woods institutions which served to ensure a stable fiscal regime 
in the host countries for the functioning of the exploitation.59. Another form of 
exploitation by these foreign capitalists, with the complicity of governments of the host 
states, was by way of tax remission for the investments and duty exemption for imported 
machinery60.  
 
However, the returns on the export of these primary products could not provide the 
capital anticipated for an industrial foundation. In fact the returns were even paltrier 
                                                 
54 Pearson, D. S. 1992. “Trends in planning for Growth and Development” in Aryeetey, E (ed) Planning 
African Growth and Development. Accra: ISSER and UNDP,  p. 22. 
55 Ibid. 
56 Nkrumah, K. 1966, Neocolonialism, op. cit., p. 84 
57 Rodney, W. 1972. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Abuja: Panaf, pp. 183–184. Rodney, among 
others, cites here the selling of 100, 000 acres of the best farmland in the Kenyan highlands to Lord 
Delamere at one penny an acre! There was also the acquisition by Firestone Rubber Company of U. S. A of 
one million acres of land in Liberia for a cost of six cents per acre! 
58 Especially in South Africa; South West Africa (Namibia); Angola; Mozambique; Northern Rhodesia 
(Zambia); Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe); and the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo). See ibid, 182-
183 
59 See footnote 117 below. 
60 Nkrumah, K. 1966, Neocolonialism,  op. cit., p. 85 and p. 233 
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“when measured against the values that are added the moment the materials are placed on 
board the transportation carrier at the point of exit61”. This is largely because, in 
consonance with its design, modernization led to the control and ownership of large 
portions of the economies of these countries by Western interests62.  
 
The application of modernization in Africa, therefore, provides strong indication of a new 
scramble for Africa which departs from the old imperialism (colonialism) only in form. 
The new imperialism does not seek political control of economies. Its main interest is to 
devise ways to assume direct control of a territory’s natural resources and thereby 
accomplish the objectives achieved by colonialism63. Many newly independent African 
governments served as “policemen” for the new “imperialists”64; and the few African 
countries that dared to resist them were considered as subverting the process of 
modernization by stifling foreign investment and encroaching on expatriate rights65.  
 
1.3.1.6: Critique of Modernization 
 
The above considerations subject the modernization perspective to several criticisms. We 
will elaborate on a few here and consider others at the end of the chapter.  One of these is 
its insistence on an exclusively “internal” explanation of the causes of Third World 
development, according to which the deficiencies of the economic, social and cultural 
patterns internal to the Third World countries account for their underdevelopment status.  
                                                 
61 Ibid., p. 236.  
62 According to the U. N Report E/CN.14/246 of 7th January 1964, over 50% of the national income of 
Congo; 33% of  Gabon’s and 40% of Liberia’s went regularly to European residents and foreign firms. 
63 Kwame Nkrumah calls this Neo-colonialism. 
64 Nkrumah, K. 1966, Neocolonialism,  op. cit.,  p. 86 
65 In May 1965, the government of Kwame Nkrumah made her first approach to the IMF for financial 
assistance. Later in the same year, assistance from the World Bank was also sought. The two institutions 
sent missions to Ghana, and officials prescribed non-inflationary borrowing and drastic reduction of 
government spending to levels that could be covered by government revenues. The Nkrumah government 
found these stipulations unacceptable, as acceptance would have amounted to curtailing the government’s 
development programs which did not necessarily aim, at macro economic prudence but did raise the levels 
of medical and educational facilities; improve the road and rail network; construct Tema harbor and the 
township together with related industrial facilities; and built the Akosombo Dam.  According to Rimmer  
(Rimmer, D. 1992. Staying Poor: Ghana’s political Economy 1950 – 1990. Oxford: Pergamon, p. 120), 
Nkrumah's rejection of the institutions' pressures “shook foreign confidence in the Ghanaian economy.” 
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The diversity of the experiences of Third World countries is lost in their aggregation into 
these patterns, which are simply residual categories that summarize ways in which the 
Third World is supposed to differ from the West. In this way, the historical experience of 
sub-Saharan Africa, especially of colonization and the unjust wars of conquest, are both 
denied and assimilated to the historical experience of the West. In view of these, the 
model of the Third World is very abstract, and that of the modern very skewed. 
 
The question whether sub-Saharan Africa can follow the Western path to development 
stands in sharp relief. This is principally because of two reasons. First, the racist 
superiority complex that relegated its peoples to the Third World also defined and 
sustained the conceptions of development upheld by modernization. Secondly, the same 
complex underlay the “imperialist” ideology which prosecuted the slave trade and 
wrested control over sub-Saharan space by force of arms in the enterprise of 
colonialism66. Colonialism fostered an organizational structure that brought non-Western 
territory forcibly into the capitalist world. In this world, the potential for development of 
the colonized countries was curtailed since they were deprived of the structural capacity 
for autonomy and sustained economic growth67. Consequently, their developmental fate 
was essentially determined by the colonizing developed countries, which defined and 
sustained the conceptions of development upheld by modernization. Therefore, sub-
Saharan Africa can justifiably repudiate the values underlying modernization.  
 
In this connection, it has been argued that the historical processes that generate 
development in Western countries  - particularly, the model of economic relationship 
established between the colonizing powers and the colonies - simultaneously generate 
underdevelopment in Third World countries68. This “development of underdevelopment” 
of Third World countries stems from the extraction and transfer of economic surplus 69. 
                                                 
66 Irele, A,1993, “Introduction”, in Hountondi, P. J. African Philosophy: Myth and Reality. London, 
Hutchison & Co.  
- See also Mudimbe, V. Y. 1988, The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, Chapter 1 
67 Ibid., p 3 
68 Amin, S, 1974, Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of Underdevelopment,  New 
York: Monthly Review Press. Also Rodney, W. 1972. op. cit. 
69 Frank,  A. G., 1967, Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, N. Y: Monthly Press Review 
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We conduct a fuller discussion of whether wealth creation necessarily generates poverty 
in section 1.4.1 and in Chapter Five. For now, suffice it to say that this feature of 
modernization underrates the immensity of the question of poverty to development.  
 
The prescription to the developing world to move along the same trajectory as the West 
derives from centuries of ethnocentrism codified in the belief that European cultural 
knowledge and values are the best in the world70.  This ethnocentric posture overlooked 
the possibility of an alternative pathway for Third World development. Such bias falls 
woefully short of the requirements of science, to which modernization appeals.  
 
Another aspect of modernization open to criticism is its insistence on the need to 
eliminate traditional values on the road to development. As mentioned earlier, this 
insistence depends on the assumption that tradition and modernity are mutually exclusive. 
This is easily controverted at many levels. First, it needs to be stressed that tradition and 
modernity always coexist and nurture each other in every culture71. Secondly, the leaders 
of the West today admire and adopt the supposed values of “collective ascription” 
cherished by traditional societies72. Illustrations of this are found in Tony Blair’s effusive 
adoption of the values of communalism during his press conference to explain the need 
for Britain to amend its immigration laws in the wake of the London bombings of July 7th 
200573, as well as Hilary Clinton’s views in her book “It Takes a Village to Raise a 
Child”. 
 
Again, it can be legitimately denied that traditional values are always obstacles to 
modernization. In fact, traditional values have promoted modernism in some instances. 
For instance, in the modernization of Japan, the Samurai’s value of loyalty to the emperor 
was easily transformed to loyalty to the firm74. This helped to enhance workers’ 
                                                 
70 Abiola Irele, 1993, “Introduction”. op. cit. Also Mudimbe, V. Y. 1988. Invention of Africa, op. cit. 
Chapter 1 
71 Gyekye, K, 1997, Tradition and Modernity, Oxford: Oxford University Press,  p. 252-263 
72 Ibid., 36 – 61. 
73 The Prime Minister was at pains, during a  press conference aired on BBC, to explain to journalists why 
the British would not allow people who “are enjoying our hospitality” to undermine “our country, our 
values” 
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productivity and to reduce the turn-over rate of employees in Japanese firms. Some of the 
above criticisms, a decade or so later, gave rise to the next dominant perspective on 
development, to which I now turn.   
 
1.3.2: Dependency Theory and its Essential Claims 
 
By the mid-1960s Dependency Theory75 , which represents the first major shift from 
modernization in development conception and theory, was well formulated. In opposing 
the Ricardian-inspired claims that international specialization conferred benefits on Third 
World countries for exporting primary products to the European and American markets 
and receiving industrial goods in return, scholars within the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America (ECLA), particularly Raul Prebisch76, held that this 
international division of labour was at the root of the developmental problems of the 
Third World77. This is because it bequeathed to the Third World the position of 
subordinate incorporation in the global economy polarized into a core and periphery, 
where the core is the developed world and the periphery the Third World. In the 
economies of the Third World structured by imperial interests, each sector represents 
either a residue of the historical process of the expansion of Western European capitalism 
or a present requirement of capitalism78.  
 
A number of interrelated factors accounts for the subordination of Third World 
economies. First, free trade with the developed world was unfair for the developing world 
because these worlds were unequal trading partners. The terms of trade between centers 
and peripheries have perpetually moved in favour of the center as the real prices of the 
goods for which peripheral countries have a comparative advantage (primary products) 
progressively depreciate relative to the price of manufactured goods. Secondly, the 
                                                 
75 The relation between two or more countries assumes the form of dependence when some countries (the 
dominant ones) can expand and be self-starting while other ones (the dependent ones) can do this only as a 
reflection of that expansion. See Dos Santos,  T. 1971. “The Structure of Dependence”, pp. 225-236 in 
Kan, K. T. and Hodges, D. C (ed) Readings in  U. S. Imperialism. Boston: Extending Horizons,  p. 227. 
76 Prebisch, R. 1950. The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal Problems. NY: United 
Nations 
77 So, A. Y. 1990, Social Change and Development,  op. cit., p. 93 
78 Preston, P. W. 1997, Development Theory, op. cit., p. 184 
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capacity of the center to import from any number of locations within the global periphery 
pitted peripheral countries against each other and drove prices further down. Also, the 
major global sources of finance were controlled and regulated by Western capitalist 
countries. Such unfair conditions of trade were unlikely to result in development for 
peripheral countries. Accordingly, the development of peripheral countries called for a 
different set of policies than those envisaged by modernization theorists79.  
 
These policies must have as their goal a development typified by an autocentic economy. 
This is an economy generally characterized by being self-reliant80. For these theorists, 
therefore, the preferred route to development was import substitution industrialization 
behind protective tariff barriers as a means to meeting the needs of the domestic market81. 
Consequently, dependency theorists advocated active planning on the part of the state to 
ensure that economic surplus could be extracted from the agricultural sector and used to 
finance a modern industrial sector82. In doing so, these peripheral countries would slowly 
decrease their reliance on the core countries for their industrial needs. This would help 
the peripheral countries conserve foreign exchange over time and eventually enhance 
their economic positions. 
 
The broad sweep of dependency theory analysis can be reduced to three key ideas. The 
first is the claim that the relationship amongst countries of the world is better conceived 
in terms of core/centers and peripheries. It therefore stresses the historical experience of 
countries in conceptualizing and analyzing development. The second key idea is the 
encouragement of the Third World to focus on import substitution industrialization. 
Thirdly, they prescribe an active role to governments in the planning and activation of 
their economies.  
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80 Amin, S. 1976, Unequal Development, Sussex: Harvester Press 
81 Sikkink, K. 1997, “Development Ideas in Latin America: Paradigm Shift and the Economic Commission 
for Latin America” in Cooper, F and Packard R (eds), International Development and the Social sciences: 
Essays on the Politics and History of Knowledge.  CA: University of California Press., pp. 1-44 
82 Bloomstrom, M and Hettne, B, 1984, Development Theory in Transition: The Dependency Debate and 
Beyond-Third World Responses, London: Zed, p. 41-42 
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1.3.3: The Theoretical Heritage of Dependency Theory 
 
1.3.3.1: Structuralist Economics and the ‘Prebisch Thesis’ 
 
One of the intellectual insights that fostered dependency theory was the ‘Prebisch 
thesis’83, which held that the global system was not a uniform marketplace with 
producers and suppliers freely making mutually beneficial contracts. The principal 
position against which Prebisch developed his views was Modernization’s orthodox 
Ricardian-inspired theory that international specialization conferred benefits upon all 
participants. Against this, Prebisch held that a discernible and enduring pattern in the 
global economic system is divided into powerful central economies and relatively weak 
peripheral ones. This pattern consigned Third World economies to a secondary and 
relatively declining position as primary product exporters, and Third World 
underdevelopment is to be found in these historically generated patterns of economic 
activity which form their structural circumstances within the global industrial capitalist 
system.   
 
Prebisch points out a few consequences of this polarization of economies. The first is that 
the terms of trade between the central and peripheral economies progressively moves 
against the latter, as primary products fall relative to manufactured ones. This 
significantly weakens the periphery, as its capacity to finance imports is reduced. On the 
one hand, the center is better enabled to import independently of its exchanges with the 
periphery, as poor peripheral countries compete among themselves for trade with the 
center. Added to these is the sharp fluctuation in the prices, determined by the center, of 
raw materials. This further weakens peripheral countries as they cannot rely on a steady 
stream of income. This erratic earning is exacerbated by the fact that the major global 
sources of finance are controlled and regulated by the capitalist countries of the center, 
making it difficult for the poor countries of the periphery to have economically viable 
                                                 
83 Developed principally in  Prebisch, R., 1950, The Economic Development of Latin America and its 
Principal Problems,  NY: United Nations.  
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access to loans and investments. The main prescription of Prebisch to this subordinate 
incorporation of the Third World into the global economy is a focus on industrialization 
as a means to catching up and joining in with the core economies84.    
 
1.3.3.2: Marxism 
 
Dependency Theory also sought theoretical aspirations from Marxism85, from which it  
derived the thesis that development emerges from conflicts, notably those stemming from 
changes in the material conditions of life86. Since imperialism, furthered by 
Euro/American bourgeoisie capitalism, is at the core of Third World under-development, 
a socialist revolution is necessary: “development [in the Third World] requires the 
profound alteration of the economic, social and political relationships in the overthrow of 
the market and the mobilization of domestic populations in a nationally oriented effort 
[towards] the creation of a socialist context for development87”.  
 
This is significant, in the light of the view of some commentators on development 
theories, indicated in section 1.1, that the government of the USA financed the forging of 
Modernization theory mainly to promote the liberal capitalist system in the Third World 
and to halt the spread of communism because it recognized the appeal of communism to 
the newly independent states of the world (or for the indigenous political elite agitating 
for independence in colonized countries).  
 
1.3.4: Common Assumptions of Dependency Theory 
 
Like the modernization school, members of the dependency school tend to share certain 
basic assumptions and methodology. We wish to highlight two of these. First, 
dependency theorists present two methodologically inconsistent approaches. One of these 
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tends to generalize the condition of dependency, which creates the impression of 
downplaying national variations and historical complexities in the construction of the 
concept of dependency and underdevelopment in the Third World. In apparent contrast to 
this is the theory’s structuralist emphasis on the historical linkages between the capitalist 
West and the Third World. This emphasis generates another assumption, that dependency 
is a condition that results from externally imposed factors, prominent among which are 
the legacy of colonialism and the unequal international division of labour. This latter 
emphasis accords with our concrete universalist stance. However, its involvement in 
economism weakens this merit and highlights, rather, its generalizing tendency. 
 
The second strand in dependency theory is its economism. As stated above, dependency 
is analyzed mostly as an economic condition which arises from the flow of economic 
surplus from the Third World to western capitalist countries. This economistic outlook 
derives from Marx’s contention that the economic structure is the basic structure of a 
society by which all other structures (the super structure) are sustained88. For these 
theorists, therefore, all other dimensions of dependency, such as political, social and 
cultural dependency, are contingent upon economic dependency. The taking of such a 
position weakens the theory in as much as it erodes the merit of providing a historical 
account of the origins of under-development. 
 
1.3.5: Criticisms of Dependency Theory 
 
Dependency theory also commits the fallacy of composition by equating economic 
development with development. This is partly because it deems import substitution 
industrialization as a key pathway to development. Secondly, its core/periphery 
dichotomy serves merely to analyze the structure of economic relationships between the 
developed and the Third Worlds. This economistic orientation is in consonance with its 
Marxist underpinnings, since a central claim of Marx’s materialist conception of history 
is that the laws of history are economic in nature. Consequently, ‘the mode of production 
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of material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual 
processes of life”89. 
 
Another feature of the theory exposed to criticism is its uni-directionality. This is also 
inspired by Marx, who employed evolutionary theory in describing social change. 
According to Marx, societies move through four distinct phases: the Asiatic, ancient, 
feudal, and bourgeois phases; and that transition to a subsequent phase is inevitable when 
the conditions for it are fulfilled90.  As we mentioned in section 1.1.4, the process of 
social change need not be linear. The Eurocentrism of Dependency theory is easily 
gathered from Marx’s description of the phases of social change. The most advanced 
phases corresponded to European experiences, and Africa was outside of the historical 
processes of change.  
  
1.3.6: The Influence of Dependency Theory on African Development Practice  
 
The doctrine of African Socialism and its attendant development strategies91 can be 
strongly associated with the Dependency School. Prominent among African leaders who 
advocated it are Leopold Senghor of Senegal, Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana, Julius Nyerere 
of Tanzania, Sekou Toure of Guinea, Ahmed Ben Bella of Algeria, Habib Bourguiba of 
Tunisia and Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia92. Due to the constraints of space, I limit myself 
to the theoretical and practical espousal of this doctrine by Nkrumah and Nyerere, and 
shall consider these as fair representation of the group.   
 
1.3.6.1: Nkrumah’s Communalism and Development Preoccupations 
 
Nkrumah’s latest and sustained pronouncement on the doctrine occurs in his “African 
Socialism Revisited”93. In this he claims that the doctrine merely reflects the concrete 
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forms that socialism might assume in Africa. The aim of African socialists is to remold 
African society in such a manner that the quintessence of the humanist purposes of 
traditional African societies is reenacted in modern society. The doctrine urges humane 
development: 
 
Consequently, socialism in Africa introduces a new social synthesis in which 
modern technology is reconciled with human values, in which the advanced 
technical society is realized without the staggering social malefactions and deep 
schisms of capitalist society94.  
 
According to him, the view that traditional African society was classless cannot be 
attributed to African socialism. Neither can the doctrine be based on a metaphysics of 
knowledge that disdains the rational and critical capacities of traditional Africa95. 
However, the basic organization of African societies in different periods of history 
manifested communalism. Humanism founded on egalitarianism, was the philosophy 
underlying this communalism. This philosophy aimed at the reconciliation of the 
individual’s aspirations with group welfare. Consequently, African socialists share two 
postulates. The first is that each human being is an end in him/herself, not a means; and 
second, that it is necessary to guarantee each human being equal opportunities for his/her 
development. This permits an intuitive connection between socialism and communalism 
because “in socialism, the principles underlying communalism are given expression in a 
modern setting”96.  It would seem therefore that for Nkrumah, the theoretical ancestor of 
“scientific socialism” (or Marxism) is communalism.  
Nkrumah’s ‘communalism’ is the conceptual equivalent of  ‘communitarianism’ which is 
a theory of social organization that has been formulated variously by its adherents.   
There is consensus amongst a number of African philosophers that the communitarian 
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ethic underlies social organizational principles and practices in the indigenous African 
setting97.  
Underlying this ethic is the ontology of the human being as an integral part of the 
community. The individual person is conceived, ontologically, as an integral and 
inalienable strand in the social fabric. Therefore, there is a demand on social 
organizational principles, structures and practices to give weight to the claims of society 
in its relationship with the individual. The communitarian ethic is expressed in the Akan 
language by the maxim: “yewo nnipa a yewo no to kurom”98; and in Sotho as “motho ke 
motho ka batho”.  Underlying this conception of the relationship between the individual 
and community is the view that the individual’s participation in society cannot be 
optional. The need of community is an essential attribute of human being-ness.  
As a natural part of community, an individual has a natural relation to other members of  
the community.  As such, one must pay regard to the role that one’s life may play in the 
welfare and interests of others. Thus the Akan will say of an individual whose conduct 
lacks compassion, generosity or concern for others, that “onye nnipa!99”. Societies that 
adhere to communalism tend, therefore, to seek the cooperation of human beings rather 
than conflict, and consensus in the making and implementation of decisions rather than 
dispute100. 
Nkrumah’s communalism, thus, led him to socialism. In practicing this, his development 
programs were geared basically towards diversification of the Ghanaian economy 
through import substitution industrialization. This was to be achieved by the active 
participation of the state in economic planning in a socialist framework. These programs 
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did not necessarily have as their sole aim macroeconomic prudence. In fact, they did raise 
the levels of medical and educational facilities; improve the road and rail network; 
construct Tema harbor and the township together with related industrial facilities; and 
built the Akosombo dam to generate power to primarily cater for industry101.   
 
Further, Nkrumah was generally noted to be opposed to capitalist ideas and ventures. 
Writing in 1973, he noted that “individuals who can command capital use their money 
not in productive endeavour but by the purchase and re-sale at high prices, of such 
commodities…which are in demand by the people. This type of business serves no social 
purpose and steps will be taken to see [to it] that our banking resources are not used to 
provide credit for this type of business102” Another important aspect of Nkrumah’s 
development strategy was the liberation struggle against colonialism and neocolonialism. 
This is exemplified, practically, by his prominent role in the formation of the 
Organization of African Unity, and theoretically by his authorship103. 
 
1.3.6.2: Nyerere’s Ujamaa 
 
Nyerere’s African socialism was guided by three main principles: equality and respect for 
human dignity, sharing of the resources which are produced by the efforts of all, and 
work by everyone in an agriculturally based economy, and exploitation by none104.  This 
was sustained by the notion of “family-hood”, which conveys the same denotations as 
communalism does. For Nyerere, Ujamaa, as the practical expression of the doctrine of 
African socialism, means first and foremost the building of society on the traditional 
African value of family-hood. An African need not convert to socialism or to European 
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conceptions of democracy, since her own traditional experience is socialist and 
democratic: 
The true African socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethren and 
another as his natural enemies. He does not form an alliance with the ‘brethren’ 
for the extermination of the ‘non-brethren’. He regards all men as his brethren – 
as members of his ever-extending family. Ujamaa, then, or ‘familihood’ describes 
our socialism105.  
 
Ujamaa, then, rejects both capitalism and Marxism. Capitalism is rejected because it 
seeks to build society on the basis of exploitation of man by man, and Marxism because it 
seeks to build society on the philosophy of inevitable conflict between men.   
 
The Arusha Declaration demanded true commitment to self-reliance in Tanzania's 
development process, and its implementation de-emphasized industrial development and 
centered on the concept of ‘ujamaa’. The ethics of ujamaa prescribed cooperating for the 
common good instead of competing for individual private gain. Allied to this was also a 
rejection of material wealth for its own sake. The pursuit of individual or collective 
wealth must be abandoned if it clashes with human dignity and social equity. 
Nkrumah’s communalist thrust and Nyerere’s ethic of cooperating for the common good 
are two sides of the same coin of “the humanist essence of our [ie. African] culture”106. 
The point of departure for this humanism is abhorrence of unbridled capitalism as well as 
subscription to the communalist ethic which, as discussed above, prioritizes human 
dignity. Accordingly, it recognizes and reinforces the “other-ness” of other individuals. 
This is in sharp contrast to the economistic doctrines driven by the ethic of competition.  
The communalist ethic is incongruent with capitalist competition because in competition, 
human life is instrumentalized, as the “other” becomes an entity that stands in the way of, 
or serves as a tool for, the achievement of “my” goals107.  The communalist ethic, then, 
would seem to be pivotal for the struggle against poverty, as we shall see in Chapters 
Four and Five. 
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African humanists adhered to some of the prescriptions of dependency theory in their 
conceptions and practice of development. Thus they upheld the imperative of the state 
determining socio-economic development through ownership and control of central 
sectors of the economy; and self-sufficiency was a prominent goal of their development 
strategies. However, from the perspective of their subscription to indigenous African 
philosophical thought, they depart substantially from the economistic and Marxist thrusts 
of dependency theory.  
 
Notwithstanding this, it is of critical importance for us to note the distinction between 
humanism and humaneness, and our subscription to the latter and rejection of the former. 
In our preference we follow Ramose in his adoption of the rheomode, the philosophical 
language of ubuntu, which he conceives as “a critique of a thought and language structure 
which assumes and imposes a strict and a necessary sequence in terms of subject-verb-
object. It is an appeal for the understanding of entities as dimensions, forms and modes of 
the incessant flow of simultaneously multi-directional motion”108. The rheomode 
therefore acknowledges be-ing rather than ‘be’. By so doing, it negates the fixation of be-
ing and introduces motion and dynamism into the nature of reality. Hence its adoption 
implies rejecting the impression given by the –ism suffice, that verbs and nouns must 
“function as fixations to ideas and practices which are somewhat dogmatic and hence 
unchangeable”109. We will consider these issues fully in section 4.2.3 below.  
 
1.4: The Neo-Liberal Perspective and its Basic Claims 
 
Since the 1980’s, a new perspective evolved from the work of the neo-liberal theorists. 
This has been characterized as a counter-revolution whose aim has been to undermine 
and replace earlier orthodox notions of Third World development110. These theorists have 
argued that the ‘Third World’ only exists as a figment of the guilty imagination of First 
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World scholars and politicians111. This could constitute one of the reasons for classifying 
this school as counter-revolutionary. 
 
Neo-liberalist theorists reaffirmed economic liberalism with its central role for the free 
market112. Their central claim is that the free-market capitalist system is maximally 
effective in producing and equitably distributing the economic, social, political and 
intellectual necessities of life in a developed society. The free market comprises of 
atomistic rational individuals who know their needs and wants and who contract with 
other individuals through the mechanism of the marketplace to satisfy those needs and 
wants. Based on classical methodological individualist notions, neo-liberal theorists 
argue that these needs and wants motivate self-interested actions. Consequently, self-
interested individuals active on a free market within and beyond their national boundaries 
become the most competent agents of development because the free market is able to 
enhance their economic status and that of their nations as a whole. 
 
The state must therefore retreat from management of the economy. Its legitimate role is 
only to provide a basic legal and security system to underpin the individual contractual 
pursuit of private goals. According to this school, this model represents the essential 
character of all human economic activity in society113. 
 
Two major policy measures were advocated in furtherance of the retreat of the state. The 
first concerns reducing the state’s role in the economy. To achieve this deregulation and 
privatization of state assets were prescribed. This required the liberalization of the market 
typified by reduction in government planning and regulation of economy, and the 
abolition of tariff regimes, a more hospitable approach to foreign investment regulations 
and curbing of trade unions114.  The second measure was the achievement of 
                                                 
111 Preston, P. W. 1997, Development Theory,  op. cit., p. 260 
112 Friedman, M. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago.  
- See also Bauer, P. T. 1981. Equality, The Third World and Economic Delusion. London: Wiedenfeld and 
Nicholson.  
- Also Lal, D. 1983. The Poverty of Development Economics. London: Institute of Economic Affairs 
113 Preston, P. W. 1997, Development Theory, op. cit., p. 256 
114 Stallings, B. (ed). 1995. Global Change, Regional response: The New International Context of 
Development. Stallings, B. (ed). NY: Cambridge University., p. 12 
 51
macroeconomic stability. This required a state reducing its fiscal deficits, and this could 
be done by the abolition of various subsidies, restriction of government spending 
especially on social services.  
 
1.4.1: Theoretical Heritage and Context 
 
In the 1970s the U. S National Bureau of Economic research (NBER) published a variety 
of studies on the advantages of economic liberalism. Key among these was that of Anne 
Krueger, which concluded that countries that did not achieve success with liberalization 
were the ones that had excessive state intervention115. 
 
The presence of neo-liberal economists in strategic positions in international financial 
institutions also helped cement the advent of the counterturn in development theory. 
Three of the scholars associated with neo-liberal orthodoxy (Bela Balassa, Anne Krueger 
and Deepak Lal) held senior level positions at the World Bank.  
 
The World Bank’s 1981 publication entitled Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, spelled out the Bank’s neo-liberal orientation and influence of development 
practice in Africa. According to this publication, the root causes of Africa’s development 
problems are wrong domestic policies leading to overvalued exchange rates, price 
controls, industrial protectionism, poor investment choices, and excessive state 
intervention in the economy116. This publication provided the framework for structural 
adjustment programs, typified as conditionality for assisting African economies by the 
World Bank and IMF in the 1980s117.  
 
In addition to these works, a variety of events contributed to strengthening the hold of 
neo-liberalism on development theory and practice. The first of these was the election of 
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Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher. With their ascendancy to power, “an extensive 
vocabulary of legitimating [capitalism] was developed, and free enterprise was equated 
with free economies, which were equated with the Free West, which in turn was equated 
with freedom”118. According to Presby, the ideology behind the thoughts and actions of 
the Reagan-Thatcher economists is provided by philosophers of capitalism like Ayn Rand 
and Garreth Hardin, who suggest that “the poor must rather starve and die than become 
perennial charity cases for those who are rich”119. The philosophy of capitalism then 
espouses an extreme methodological individualism that amounts to defending selfishness 
as a virtue.   
 
As discussed in sections iii in the previous chapter and 1.3.1.1, competition is a core 
feature of capitalism in that it drives the market upon which the structure of capitalism 
rests. In his analysis of the ethics of competition, Arnsperger compares competition with 
warfare and “victory” with “murder”. This is because  
 
“ pushing the other aside as I would a material obstacle as part of the “totality” 
which obstructs my passage is, ontologically speaking, a form of killing, even if 
biological life is not in all cases threatened. In a metaphorical sense, firms can 
“kill” one another on a market; customers can “kill” a firm by arbitrating away 
from it in favour of another firm; and people can “kill” one another in competing 
for jobs or positions. In a much more literal sense, a firm can kill people if it 
decides to relocate and to move from one country to another almost overnight, 
leaving all its former employees with the choice between being jobless and 
uprooting their current way of life by moving”120 
 
 
Thus competition implies rivalry that makes human beings mere tools in the quest for the 
self interest of the competitor. In this quest the taking of life and of human dignity are 
justified if it will result in ‘victory’. As such, this methodological individualism can 
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hardly be ethically justifiable. Yet the realm of development is the realm of the ethical121. 
For this reason, a development paradigm epitomized by an economic system based on the 
principle of killing other human beings cannot be desirable for Africa’s development. 
Hence the need to resort to indigenous African knowledge and values, with particular 
reference to the ethics of humaneness, that enjoins solidarity and mutual aid. We will 
return to this in Chapters Four and Five. 
 
Second, was the uneven performance of import substitution industrialization policies in 
both Latin America and Africa. By the early 1980s, most of these countries were plagued 
with debt and foreign exchange crises122. The experience of these two continents stood in 
sharp contrast to that of the four East Asian “tigers” (Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, 
South Korea) that followed a model which was at the time misleadingly interpreted as 
liberal in orientation123.   
 
1.4.2: Shared Assumptions  
 
A number of interlinked assumptions are made by adherents to this school. Economically, 
the assumption is that as free markets act efficiently to distribute knowledge and 
resources in the economic system, human welfare will be maximized. Bound to this is the 
claim that as action and responsibility for action reside with the individual, liberal social 
systems will ensure that moral worth is maximized.  Further, as liberalism offers a 
balanced solution to problems of deploying, distributing and controlling power, liberal 
polities will ensure that political freedom is maximized. In short, liberal capitalism is a 
                                                 
121 Ramose, M. B. 2004. “Poverty: A Creature of Politics and a Question of Justice”. In International 
Journal of Humanistic Studies. Vol. 3, pp 36 – 53. This is one of Ramose’s conclusions to this paper. We 
discuss the relevance of this to our thesis in Chapter six below. 
122 World Bank. 1981, Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action, 
Washington D. C.: World Bank  
123 Earlier accounts of the success of the East Asian tigers stressed how they had shunned state intervention 
in favour of an export driven economy which envisaged the whole globe as a potential market. In the early 
1990s, revisionist work by such scholars as Robert Wade (1990: Governing the Market: Economic Theory 
and the Role of Government in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press) 
showed that the economic success of these countries resulted from a combination of export orientation and 
state intervention.  
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necessary condition of political freedom124. This is because the separation of economic 
power from political power would enable the former to act as a check on the overbearing 
tendencies of the latter.  Finally, there is the assumption that these economic, social and 
political packages are grounded in positive scientific knowledge, which maximized 
knowledge production and dissemination.  
 
The economic assumption is refuted by the failure of the Structural Adjustment 
Programmes (SAPs), to reduce poverty in Africa. These programmes emerged in the 
early 1980s as strategies which countries must follow in order to either qualify for World 
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans or receive concessions on repaying 
older debts owed to commercial banks, Western governments and the World Bank. 
Although meant to correct economic imbalances, some commentators have argued that 
these adjustment policies “made absolutely no economic sense”125. One main reason for 
this is that the conditions of the majority of the population in implementing countries 
were in fact better before the programmes than afterwards126.  
 
With regard to the second assumption, our discussion of Ansperger’s critique of 
competition sufficiently indicates that the methodological individualism of liberal social 
systems diminishes rather than maximizes moral worth. Deep-seated doubts attend to the 
assumption that liberal systems maximize political freedom in view of the claims of 
Deepak Lal and the World Bank and IMF’s silence on it127.  Finally, the connection 
between scientific knowledge and the maximization of knowledge production and 
dissemination is overstated. If this connection were authentic, the least knowledgeable 
person in the positivistic liberal system will have more knowledge than the most 
knowledgeable person in societies which uphold other conceptions of science. But such a 
                                                 
124 See Friedman, M. 1962, Capitalism and Freedom,  Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
125 Abudu, A. O., 2000, “Counterproductive Socio-Economic Management in Ghana”, in Lauer, H (ed.), 
Ghana: Changing Values Changing Technologies: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, II Washington D. C.: 
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, p. 93 
126 See Ninsin, K., 1991, “The Impact of the PNDCs Economic Reform Policies on Ghanaian Society and 
Politics 1983 – 88” in Legon Journal of Humanities, Vol 5.  
- Also Abudu, A. O,  2000, “Counterproductive Socio-Economic Management in Ghana” op. cit., p. 93  
127 See section 3.4.3.2 for a discussion of these claims. 
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claim can only amount to a vulgar statement of Western epistemological ethnocentrism128 
founded in Aristotle’s conception of the rational129.   
 
1.4.3: Influence on African Development Plans and Practices: 
 
In this section we examine five development strategies and plans that draw inspiration 
from the neo-liberal school. These can be classified into two types. The first comprises 
plans formulated by African leaders by consensus and meant to have a continent-wide 
application. The second type consists of strategies supposedly130 initiated and driven by 
individual countries but in truth prescribed by the IMF and World Bank. Those of the 
latter type that will be examined here are the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
and the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSs). 
 
1.4.3.1: Common Approaches to Africa’s Development 
 
Besides the advocacy of African intellectuals such as Kwame Nkrumah131 and Cheik 
Anta Diop132, concrete and practical steps for a common approach to Africa’s 
development can be gleaned from the infancy of the Organization of African Unity 
(OAU). The first conference of the Heads of State of independent Africa, held in May 22-
25 1963, adopted a resolution called Areas of Cooperation in Economic Problems. 
Consequently, a committee was established to “study the ideas of a common tariff 
system, to protect Africa’s infant industries, [set up] a commodities stabilization fund, 
                                                 
128 Mudimbe uses this term to describe the European belief that scientifically, there is nothing to learn from 
“them” unless it is already “ours” or comes from “us”. See Mudimbe, V. Y. , 1988, Invention of Africa, op. 
cit. p 15. 
129 This refers to the particularization of Aristotle’s definition of “man” as a rational animal. This 
universalist definition was particularized to refer only to Western “man”, who then assumed both primacy 
and superiority in the right to reason. Accordingly, the use of reason of the African, Asian and Australasian 
was doubted. This position has been disproved by Ramose, M. B. 2002. African Philosophy through 
Ubuntu, op. cit. p. 1-2; 6-7 
130 See a discussion of the World  Bank and IMFs influence in SAPs and PRSs  at section 2.4.3.3 
131 Nkrumah, K., 1998, Africa Must Unite, London: Panaf Books. This is the central thesis of this book. 
132 See Diop, C. A., 1987, Black Africa: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State, Salemson, 
H. J.(trans), Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books 
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[work towards] the restructuring of international trade in Africa’s favour, and the 
harmonization of African development strategies”133. 
 
The economistic perspective of development implicit in this view is unambiguous, and 
yet it forms the kernel from which subsequent continental perspectives on Africa’s 
development evolves. Ake points out that the continuity of this perspective is evident in 
documents such as The African Declaration on Cooperation, Development, and 
Economic Independence134, adopted by the OAU Assembly of Heads of States and 
Governments in 1973, The Revised Framework of Principles for the implementation of 
the New International Economic Order in Africa, adopted by the OAU Heads of States in 
1977; The Monrovia Declaration of Commitment of the Heads of States and 
Governments of the Organization of African Unity on Guidelines and Measures for 
National and Collective Self-Reliance in Social and Economic Development for the 
Establishment of a New International Economic Order, also adopted by the OAU Heads 
of States and Governments in 1979.  
 
1.4.3.2: The Lagos Plan of Action 
 
Such was the trend of the OAU’s thinking on development that culminated in The Lagos 
Plan of Action for the Implementation of the Monrovia Strategy for the Economic 
Development of Africa (henceforth to be referred to as “The Plan”). It was adopted by an 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organization of African Unity in 
April 1980 and, before the adoption of New Partnership for Africa’s Development135, is  
rightfully considered “ the most comprehensive and systematic statement of the Vision of 
Africa’s leaders on the development of Africa”136.  
 
Although The Plan stemmed from the conviction of African leaders that Africa’s poor 
development record resulted from the inadequacy of exogenous development strategies, it 
                                                 
133 Ake, C., 2001, Democracy and Development, Ibadan: Spectrum Books, p. 21 
134 Also referred to as “The Addis Ababa Declaration” 
135 See section 1.4.3.5 
136 Ake, C. 2001, Democracy and Development, op. cit., p 22 
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nevertheless has a distinctively economistic orientation, and this is sufficiently captured 
in the preamble:   
 
“Indeed, rather than result in an improvement in the economic situation of the 
continent, successive strategies have made it stagnate and become more 
susceptible than other regions to the economic and social crisis suffered by the 
industrialized countries. Thus Africa is unable to point to any significant growth 
rate, or satisfactory index of general well-being, in the past 20 years. Faced with 
this situation, and determined to undertake measures for the basic restructuring of 
the economic base of our continent, we resolved to adopt a far-reaching regional 
approach based primarily on collective self-reliance”137. 
 
Thus two principles underlay the plan: self-reliance and self-sustaining development, but 
these were to predominantly, if not exclusively, serve the restructuring of African 
economies. The Plan considered Africa to have virtually rid itself of political domination. 
What remained to be sought after was economic liberation, and this could be achieved by 
“exploiting the strength inherent in our economic unity”138. To this end, certain basic 
guidelines needed to be adopted. These included: 
 
a) Changing Africa's almost total reliance on the export of raw materials. This required 
Africa mapping out its own strategy for development and vigorously pursuing this139. 
 
b) Africa cultivating the virtue of self-reliance. “This is not to say that the continent 
should totally cut itself off from outside contributions. However, these outside 
contributions should only supplement our own effort: they should not be the mainstay of 
our development140” 
 
c) working towards African economic integration, which would serve as the framework 
within which continent-wide economic co-operation for development, based on collective 
self-reliance, would be pursued141. 
 
                                                 
137 OAU, 1980, The Lagos Plan of Action. Addis Ababa: OAU, p. 1. Emphasis is mine 
138 Ibid., p. 6 
139 Ibid., 7 
140 Ibid., 7 
141 Ibid., 7 
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In view of these, three features of the plan deserve commentary. First, is its blend of the 
ideas of dependency theory and neo-liberalism. The aspiration to transcend the status of 
perpetual raw material supplier on the international market and become self-sufficient is 
clearly derived from Dependency Theory which, as discussed in section 1.3.2, prescribes 
an autocentric economy as the way out of poverty for developing countries.  However, 
the call for convergence of African economies adumbrates key tenets of the neo-liberalist 
perspective, which was emerging at the time of the plan’s formulation. In fact, one of the 
key objectives of the Plan was to facilitate the setting up, by the year 2000, of an African 
Economic Community which shall aim to promote collective, accelerated, self-reliant and 
self-sustaining development of Member States; co-operation among these States; and 
their integration in the economic, social and cultural fields142. To achieve this ultimate 
objective, the implementation strategies specified for both the 1980s and the 1990s by the 
document advocated harmonization of economic and development plans at various levels 
in the continent143. 
 
Next is the prominence it purports to give to African cultural values in the planning of 
development. The guidelines quoted above were meant to steer the achievement of 
certain objectives144 two of which were:  
 
1. ensure that African development policies reflect adequately indigenous socio-
cultural values in order to reinforce our cultural identity; and 
 
2. take into account the dimension of the future in the elaboration of development 
plans including studies and measures aimed at achieving a rapid socio-economic 
transformation of African States. 
 
What is striking about these aims is that the document never mentions indigenous socio-
cultural values again after the statement of these objectives. Yet one would have expected 
this insight to be re-iterated and elaborated in a “Plan of Action” which essentially is a 
                                                 
142 Ibid., 99 
143 Ibid., 99-100 
144 The OAU,  1980, Lagos Plan,  op cit., pp 4 - 5 
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strategy for development. This failure raises the question whether the authors of the 
document really believed in what they preached.  
 
The third feature worth attention is the document’s realization of the need for Africa to 
map out its own strategy for development. Guidelines (b) and (c) as well the two aims 
above sufficiently state this. However, shortly after these guidelines, the document 
unveils its main object, which was “….to be devoted to the economic problems of our 
continent [ie. Africa]145”. This, and the fact that the plan basically plans towards an 
African Common Market, sufficiently displays its economistic intent and spirit. It is 
indeed difficult to reconcile this spirit with any serious wish for Africa’s self-reliance. 
This is because although The Lagos Plan of Action echoes some of the insights of 
Kwame Nkrumah and Cheik Anta Diop regarding Africa’s development, which we 
endorse, significant differences exist at the levels of both insight and approach between 
these authors and the Plan, and we believe this spells a great weakness of the Plan. 
 
For Diop, there is an urgent need for an African renaissance, led by the African 
intellectual. What this entails is the concurrent recovery of political sovereignty, 
economic sovereignty and psychic autonomy146. An essential task of this renaissance is 
for Africa to re-establish connections with the intellectual products of its past and 
integrate these into modern thought for the movement into its future of self-development. 
Toward this, Diop prescribes a two-fold exigency. First is the need to demonstrate what is 
common to African civilization, and this is its common heritage in Ancient Egypt. 
According to him, “without a systematic reference to Egypt there can be no true cultural 
renaissance in Africa”147.  
 
The second arm of Diop’s twin exigency is that Africa should draw from this common 
intellectual heritage, guided by notions of what is useful and effective, to construct a 
Federal States of Africa. Thus, in his view  
 
                                                 
145 Ibid., p 5 
146 . Diop, C. A., 1987, Black Africa, op. cit.,  pp. 115-116 
147 Ibid.  
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“enlightened [Africa’s] self-interest itself argues for the adoption, before late, of a 
federal system. …The upshot is that only a continent-wide or a subcontinent-wide 
federated state can offer a safe political and economic area, stable enough for a 
rational formula covering the development of our countries with their infinitely 
varied potentials to be put into effect”148.  
 
 
Because a federated state involves a real surrender of sovereignty, it is an irreversible 
structure which is the only viable vehicle for Africa’s renaissance and authentic 
liberation. We will like to quote extensively from the argument supporting this 
conclusion, as it exemplifies the entire intellectual legacy of Diop on Africa’s unity and 
development.  
 
“Once again, we are putting the cart before the horse. We want to create regional 
economic organizations from which member states can draw maximum benefits, 
yet we refuse to relinquish even an inch of our respective national sovereignties. 
There is a serious contradiction here. My opinion is that all such regroupments are 
bound to fail. In the past, each attempt at regional economic regropument [in 
Africa] was short-lived. The reason they have failed and continues to fail is 
simple: the links uniting the parties to all such regional agreements have never 
been irrevocably binding; nor have the terms of economic cooperation ever been 
indissoluble”149. 
 
 
The point in contention is that economic and social development requires decisive 
political action. Therefore the structure of regional economic development requires an 
executive organ that is able to take political decisions that will bind all participating 
groups. Hence political unification, in the form of a federal political entity, must precede 
attempts at rational organization of Africa’s economies.  
 
We wish to highlight a few points flowing from Diop’s position. First, it adopts a 
historical approach to the question of African development, which inherently counters the 
Eurocentism of Western philosophy that enthrones Western civilization at the apex of 
human development. Secondly, he projects a universal history of which Africa is an 
integral part and to which Africa has contributed. Thirdly, he insists a healthy sense of 
                                                 
148 Ibid., Foreword. 
149 Ibid. p 95 
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self-identity involves a reconstruction of history, and that Africa needs to undergo this 
reconstructive exercise. Finally, he highlights common features in the African cultural 
experience as, according to him, Africa “reveals a consistent cultural unity, resulting 
from similar adaptations to the same material and physical conditions of life”150.  
 
Although it is uncertain whether one of thee authors influenced the other, and if so who 
was the pioneer and who the adherent, as they are contemporaries who wrote at about the 
same period, the works of Kwame Nkrumah and Sheikh Anta Diop coincide at many 
points. As indicated in sections 1.3.5.1 and 1.3.5.2, Nkrumah considered 
communitarianism as a prominent feature of the African cultural past, and a causal 
ancestor of socialism. In Consciencism, he stressed the continuity of pre-colonial Africa 
into the present and the future. Further, he stressed that Africa’s progress is contingent 
upon its total liberation from imperialism151, and Africa’s political unity is required to 
secure this liberation152.  In fact in his mind, the urgency of such unity could not be 
understated: “There is no time to waste. We [Africans] must unite now or perish”153. 
These ideas were clearly matured in Nkrumah quite early in his political career, as 
evinced by his exhortation to Africans to “seek ye first the political kingdom and all 
things shall be added unto thee”154.   
 
Both authors thus acknowledge the multifarious nature of Africa’s developmental 
problems, confer a proper historical dimension to the development problems of Africa by 
highlighting the significance of Western injustice as their cause, advocate a more 
comprehensive approach than economic solutions to these problems and stress the 
exigency of constructing the African future on the intellectual products of its pre-colonial 
                                                 
150 Ibid. p 7 
151 Nkrumah, K, 2004, Neo-colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism, London: Panaf, p. ix-xx, and pp. 
255-259 
152 Nkrumah, K., 1998, Africa Must Unite, London: Panaf, p. 217 
153 Nkrumah, K, 1997, “We Must Unite Now or Perish”, A Speech delivered at the First Conference of 
Independent African Heads of State and Government at Addis Ababa, 24th May 1963, In Obeng, S. (ed), 
Selected Speeches of Kwame Nkrumah, Vol. 5, Accra: Afram Publications 
154 Nkrumah reputedly uttered these words in a speech entitled “Poverty versus Plenty” on the campaign 
trail in Northern Ghana on March 6th 1949. A record of that speech is not known to be extant, but in his 
book I Speak of Freedom, London: Heinemann, 1961, p. 16, Nkrumah acknowledges this aphorism by 
claiming that “Economic freedom, I told them [i.e. the audience], would follow political freedom”. 
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setting thereby highlighting the relevance of indigenous African knowledge and values in 
solving them. The thinking of both men has been given some substance of late, from two 
directions, at least. The first is through Julius Nyerere’s plea to the new generation of 
African leaders to “work for unity with the firm conviction that without unity, there is no 
future for Africa”155; and the second is through the transmutation of the OAU into the AU 
in July 2002, and the decision by the 10th Ordinary Summit of the AU’s Executive 
Council to accelerate discussion on an “African union government” and “African high 
command”156. We will have recourse to further discussion of the significance of this 
desire for a “union government” in Chapter Five. 
 
What then are the differences between these authors and the Plan? First, the plan 
proclaims Africa’s substantial political independence. This is something that both 
Nkrumah and Diop deny. Secondly, although both Nkrumah and Diop as well as the 
authors of the Plan believe that strength in ‘unity’ can propel Africa’s development, 
Nkrumah and Diop advocate unity at a more comprehensive level than the economic 
unity exemplified by the establishment of a common market, which the Plan aims at. This 
narrow conception of unity, as well as the lack of faith in the Plan displays the relevance 
of indigenous knowledge and value systems for Africa’s development.  
 
1.4.3.3: Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs) 
 
In 1981 the World Bank published Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Agenda for Action, a report of a study requested by the African governors of the IMF and 
World Bank. According to this report, “the remedy for Africa’s ailing economies lies in 
giving market forces freer play to bring about dynamism and efficiency”157. It is from this 
point of view that the report has been widely acknowledged as the conceptual genesis of 
the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs), which emerged in the early 1980s as 
strategies which countries must follow in order to either qualify for World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) loans or receive concessions on repaying older debts 
                                                 
155 Quoted from New African, February 2006, No. 448, p 23 
156 The New African Magazine, March 2007, p. 12 
157 Ake, C., 2001, Democracy and Development, op. cit., p. 24 
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owed to commercial banks, Western governments and the World Bank. Although SAPs 
are supposedly designed for individual countries, they promote the following invariant 
demands: devaluation of the country’s currency against the dollar; lifting restrictions on 
imports and exports; balancing the national budget by reducing government spending on 
social services; encouraging countries to focus on the production and export of primary 
commodities; and removal of price controls and state subsidies158. The abstract 
universalist and Eurocentric orientations of these programmes are evinced by the fact that 
they pretend as if there is an infallible and immutable structure to which all economies 
must adjust159.  
The SAPs tended to encourage anti-democratic, anti-labor and other anti-poor 
governments, in that “effective adjustment in practice has required a strong, determined 
and a relatively autonomous state, whether democratic or not”160. Ghana in the 1980s 
provides a case in point. Here, the authoritarian political climate created by the PNDC 
has been strongly linked to the need to sustain the adopted SAP161. Pan-African 
opposition to the SAPs was vehemently expressed in The Khartoum Declaration, which 
totally rejected the SAPs for aggravating the human condition in Africa because they are 
“incomplete, mechanistic and of too short a time perspective”162. 
In spite of the documented negative effects of the adjustment programme on the poor in 
Africa, the Bank published, in 1989, Africa’s Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s, a 
publication that was meant to demonstrate the soundness of SAPs163. In addition to this 
insensitivity to the plight of African leaders and people, the fact that the IMF and World 
Bank willingly connived with repressive regimes willing to do their bidding casts doubts 
                                                 
158 Preston, P. W., 1997, Development Theory, op. cit.  p 259-260. See also  
- Ake, C., 2001, Democracy and Development, op. cit., p. 24, and 
-  www.whirledbank.org/development/sap.html 
159 Ramose, M. 2002, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, op. cit. p. 4. 
160 Nelson, J. 1990. “Introduction”. In Nelson, J (ed) Economic Crisis and Policy Choice., pp. 9-10 
161 See Boafo-Arthur, K . 1999, “Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) in Ghana: Interrogating PNDC’s 
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162 UNECA, 1988, The Khartoum Declaration: International Conference on the “Human Dimension of 
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163 One central claim of the publication was that African economies improved with their commitment to 
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on their commitment to democracy and poverty reduction. In fact, these repressive 
policies seem to have fallen directly in line with the position and thinking of high level 
operatives of these institutions. For instance, Deepak Lal, a World Bank economist is 
credited with the view that “courageous, ruthless and perhaps undemocratic government 
is required to ride roughshod over the newly created interest groups”164. Lal's position 
appears to be that a ruthless government, whether military or civilian, will secure the 
political preconditions needed for economic development through adjustment policies. 
Since this view was not disowned by The Bank and IMF, one is justified in concluding 
that Lal’s position had their support.  
 
1.4.3.4: Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRSs) 
 
Initiated by the IMF and World Bank in 1999, Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers 
(PRSPs) are meant to provide the basis for Fund and Bank concessional lending and for 
debt relief under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative165. They describe 
the macroeconomic, structural and social policies and programs that a country will pursue 
over several years to promote broad-based economic growth and reduce poverty. They 
further indicate the country’s external financing needs and project the sources for this. As 
of end-August 2005, 49 full PRSPs had been presented to the IMF Executive Board, 
whereas an additional 11 countries have completed preliminary, or “interim”, PRSPs166. 
Of these, thirty two are African countries167.  
  
                                                 
164 Quoted in Boafo-Arthur. 1999, “Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) in Ghana..”, op cit., p. 9 
165 The HIPC Initiative was first launched in 1996 by the IMF and World Bank as a comprehensive 
approach to debt reduction for heavily indebted poor countries pursuing IMF- and World Bank-supported 
adjustment and reform programs. By year 2004, 38 countries had gone HIPC, of which 32 are from sub-
Saharan Africa. Of these, the following countries had received approval for debt reduction by September 
2006, according to the IMF (see http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/hipc.htm): Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Burundi, Cameroon, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, the 
Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, 
Niger, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia 
166 IMF External Relations Department, at www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/prsp.htm 
167 These are: Benin, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, 
Djibouti, Ivory Coast, Democratic Republic of Congo, Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, Mauritania, Mozambique, Niger, 
Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia. See 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/prsp/prsp.asp 
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Although these strategies are supposed to be country-owned, the framework that guides 
their formulation is largely derived from the World Bank’s ‘Economic and Sector 
Work’168. Further, the Bank and IMF staff has to sanction the strategy before it will be 
eligible for Bank or IMF funding. This is because in spite of the insistence by the Bank 
and IMF staff that a government can present whatever plan it wants, the Bank staff writes 
a “joint staff assessment” (JSA) which highlights areas of disagreement and perceived 
weaknesses in a government’s PRS Paper presented to the Bank.   A positive JSA 
indicates the judgement of the bank staff as to whether the PRSP is a ‘credible’ 
framework within which the World Bank and IMF will provide financial and other 
support. Without this, which forms the basis of the assessment of the World Bank’s 
Board, the government in question will not get Bank or IMF funding and will be unlikely 
to get bilateral funding. Thus it is ultimately questionable to what extent a programme 
can be truly government or nationally owned. To this extent “there is a contradiction 
between the rhetoric on ownership and the request for WB/IMF Boards to endorse the 
PRSP169” 
 
A consequence of this contradiction is that governments opt for programmes that they 
know will be accepted by the Fund and Bank even if these conflict with national interests 
and those of the poor.  Both in theoretical orientation and assumptions, PRSs are new 
versions of SAPs. Even the Bank and the Fund have acknowledged that PRSPs “have not 
differed much from previous adjustment programmes as far as the core economic policies 
are concerned170”.   
 
The SAPs and PRSPs, are premised on the universal applicability of the basic theorems 
of neoclassical economics. Consequently, they prevent concrete analysis of historically 
specific interrelations in particular societies. Undoubtedly, this underlies the conclusion 
of a number of studies to the effect that crucial policy prescriptions within the PRSPs 
                                                 
168 The Bank either carries out these studies itself, or commissions them, in its client countries. 
169 Brettonwoodsproject. 2003. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A Rough Guide. At 
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/adjustment/PRSP, p 5 
170 Brettonwoodsproject. 2003, ibid, 6 
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may impair the ability of countries to effectively realize their goals of alleviating poverty 
and achieving economic growth171. 
 
1.4.3.5: The New Partnership for African Development (NEPAD) 
 
In October 2001, African Heads of State and Government meeting in Abuja endorsed the 
New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) the main development agenda for 
Africa presently172. NEPAD purports to constitute a ‘partnership’ at two levels. Firstly, it 
is a partnership of African countries with the governments and owners of capital in the 
Western world. Success at this trans-continental partnership is desirable for two reasons. 
First, it is envisaged that it would change the historical relationship between Africa and 
the West in order to dispense with the “dependency through aid” that underpins it173. 
Next, this type of partnership is desirable to the extent that it holds the prospect of 
generating “capital flows to Africa, as an essential component of a sustainable long-term 
approach to filling the resource gap”174. Secondly, NEPAD aspires to build a partnership 
among African countries principally for the purpose of implementing ‘the Programme of 
Action’. This programme essentially seeks to derive maximum gain from the anticipated 
capital flows175. 
The NEPAD document diagnoses the challenge for Africa to be one of understanding the 
fact that development is a process of empowerment and self-reliance. Africans must not 
be wards of benevolent guardians; rather they must be the architects of their own 
sustained upliftment176. Consequently, NEPAD assumed the status of an “African-owned 
                                                 
171 See Nyamugasira, W and Rowden, N., 2002,  “New Strategies Old Loan Conditions: Do the New IMF 
and World Bank Loans Support Countries’ Poverty Reduction Strategies? The Case of Uganda” 
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/adjustment/ugandaanalysis.pdf, p. 4 
172 The Africa Union has adopted NEPAD as its development plan. See The AU’s The Strategic Plan at 
www.au.org.   
173 Paragraph 5 
174 Ibid. Paragraph 153 
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and African-led development programme” and, on this basis, claimed difference from all 
previous initiatives and approaches to Africa’s development177. 
 The document recognizes that Africa’s “malaise of underdevelopment and exclusion in a 
globalizing world” stems from “centuries of unequal relations between Africa and the 
international community, especially the highly industrialized countries”178.  This 
relationship has occasioned “the credit and aid binomial” which underlies the logic of 
African underdevelopment179. Section V of the document then outlines a ‘Programme of 
Action’, for restoring the integrity of Africa in its relations with the world, and stipulates 
the objectives, goals and strategies for achieving these. The main objective of the 
programme is to enable the continent catch up with developed parts of the world180; and 
its goals are:  
a) To achieve and sustain an average gross domestic product (GDP) growth rate of 
above 7 per cent per annum for the next 15 years;  
b) To ensure that the continent achieves the agreed International Development Goals 
(IDGs)181. 
NEPAD is certainly a document open to many criticisms. First, for a document which 
claims to be African-owned and African-led, it is surprisingly oblivious of the role 
African culture can play towards development. Although it acknowledges “Africa's rich 
cultural legacy”, the only role it assigns to this culture is that it “should serve both as a 
means of consolidating the pride of Africans in their own humanity and of confirming the 
                                                 
177 Ibid. paragraph 60 
178 Ibid. paragraph 8 
179 Ibid. paragraph 3 
180 Ibid. paragraph 65 
181 Ibid paragraph 68. The IDS are: (1) to reduce the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by half 
between 1990 and 2015; (2) to enroll all children of school going age in primary school by 2015; (3) to 
make progress towards gender equality and empowering women by eliminating gender disparities in the 
enrolment in primary and secondary education by 2015; (4) to reduce infant and child mortality ratios by 
two-thirds between 1990 and 2015; (5) to reduce maternal mortality ratios by three-quarters between 1990 
and 2015; (6) to provide access for all who need reproductive health services by 2015; (7) to implement 
national strategies for sustainable development by 2005, so as to reverse the loss of environmental 
resources by 2015. 
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common humanity of the peoples of the world”182. Clearly, this is scarcely congruent 
with “a rich cultural legacy”.  
Secondly, the anticipated outcomes of its proposed strategies are economic growth, 
increased exports and enhanced competitiveness in the international economy, increased 
African integration, especially of economies, reduction in poverty and inequality. Now, 
except for the last, all these outcomes are related to economic growth. Therefore, it is 
legitimate to conclude that NEPAD is, principally committed to economic growth. If it 
claims the status of a development framework, therefore, then it can only be categorized 
as an economistic conception of development.  This is surely in line with the 
programme’s objective of enabling Africa to “catch up” with the developed world. 
The theoretical underpinning of the programme is clearly neo-liberalism, whose policy 
prescriptions have repeatedly been shown not to work in Africa. Its neo-liberal 
orientation includes its endorsement of opening up African economies to external 
investors and securing the property rights of foreign capital. This is exhibited in some of 
the key responsibilities for which the signatories promised to undertake. These are:  
(a) Restoring and maintaining macroeconomic stability, especially by developing 
appropriate standards and targets for fiscal and monetary policies, and introducing 
appropriate institutional frameworks to achieve these standards;  
(b) Instituting transparent legal and regulatory frameworks for financial markets and 
auditing of private companies and the public sector;  
(c) Promoting the development of infrastructure, agriculture and its diversification 
into agro-industries and manufacturing to serve both domestic and export 
markets.  
(d) Strengthening mechanisms for conflict prevention, management and resolution at 
the regional and continental levels, and to ensure that these mechanisms are used 
to restore and maintain peace 
                                                 
182 Ibid. paragraph 182 
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Clearly, (a) to (c) furthers neo-liberalist policies. It is suggested that the achievement of 
(d) may not even be for its own sake but to provide “an enabling environment183” for 
business. 
Given this, the capability of the programme to address the needs of the Africans or deal 
with the core problems hindering Africa’s development is doubtful.  NEPAD’s emphasis 
on integrating Africa’s economy into the globalization process, free markets and free 
movement of capital were rejected by Nigeria and other countries at the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) meeting at Doha, Qatar. It is most likely that its success would be 
heavily contingent upon support of imperial interests. This greatly undermines its ability 
to address local needs and therefore secure local ownership and support184 
Further, NEPAD distinguishes itself from all previous plans and initiatives by conceiving 
itself as an agenda reached through participatory processes involving ordinary Africans. 
However, it does not seem that the African leaders who proclaimed this ideal of 
participation meant to practice it, as they did not deem it necessary to consult the African 
people before formulating and adopting the programme. In fact, this disregard for the 
people’s participation is consistent with the document’s conception of democracy which 
states emphatically: “Africa undertakes to respect the global standards of democracy, 
which core components include political pluralism, allowing for the existence of several 
political parties and workers' unions, fair, open, free and democratic elections 
periodically organized to enable the populace choose their leaders freely”185. That an 
“African-owned and African-led development programme” committed to the self-reliance 
and sustained upliftment of Africa186  should affirm the philosophy, aims, and processes 
of globalization, is rather perplexing. As indicated in 1.4.1, this is precisely because the 
aims and philosophy of globalization vary from the African perspectives on the human 
                                                 
183 This is a term frequently used in World Bank and IMF documents to refer to the state of security in a 
country, and the level of development of its liberal democratic practice and regulative instruments for 
investments. 
184 Lehulere, O. 2003. “NEPAD, The Program of South African Capital”. In Khanya: A South African 
Journal for Activists, 4, November 
185 NEPAD. op. cit. paragraph 79 
186 Ibid., paragraph 27 
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being and society. We will argue fully, in Chapter Five, for the position that this global 
form of democracy is unable to uphold real participation and consultation. 
Finally, the supposition that a ‘partnership’ with the West could be achieved to rectify the 
existing unequal relations borders on fantasy. The Akan maxim, that ‘the hand that 
receives is always beneath that which offers’ succinctly explains why such a supposition 
is illusory, for if one takes the philosophy of capitalism seriously, one would hardly come 
to the conclusion that capitalists will offer someone resources in aid to enable the person 
ascend to the position where you can compete with them! 
 
1.4.3.6: APPER, UNPAAERD and NEPAD 
 
It would be worth our while, at the close of this discussion of NEPAD, to conduct an 
excursus into earlier attempts by African leaders at a continental development agenda, 
and consider how these relate to the NEPAD. Towards this, we wish to recall that The 
Lagos Plan was published in 1980, and a year later the World Bank’s Accelerated 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action appeared. These publications  
signaled Africa’s struggle for the control of its development agenda, a struggle which was 
considerably exacerbated in 1981 when African ministers responsible for economic 
development and planning published a document entitled Declaration of Tripoli on the 
World Bank Report Entitled: “Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An 
Agenda for Action”. In this publication the ministers rejected Accelerated Development 
and endorsed The Lagos Plan as the authentic and authoritative statement on Africa’s 
development objectives.  
 
However, the Bretton Woods institutions and the West refused to accept the approach of 
the Lagos Plan, which had stated that “Africa was directly exploited during the colonial 
period and for the past two decades; this exploitation has been carried out through neo-
colonialist external forces which seek to influence the economic policies and directions of 
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African states”187. The rejection, though not explicitly stated, constituted in the West’s 
ignoring the Plan and “refusing to re-orient their economic relations with Africa so as to 
connect with and address the programs and policies of the Plan”188. 
 
Unable to make headway with generating resources to finance the Plan, the OAU Council 
of Ministers adopted, in March 1986, a document prepared for submission to a 
prospective special session of the UN general Assembly meant to “focus in a 
comprehensive and integrated manner, on the rehabilitation and medium-term and long-
term development problems and challenges facing Africa”189. The document was entitled  
Africa’s Submission to the Special Session of the United Nations General Assembly on 
Africa’s Economic and Social Crisis, and its program of action, known as Africa’s 
Priority Program for Economic Recovery, 1986-1990, (APPER), was approved by the 
Assembly of African Heads of States and Governments of the OAU in July 1985.  
 
Although APPER claimed, among others, to “lay the basis for durable structural change 
and an improved general level of productivity [of African economies]”, in fact, it “largely 
embraces the critical assumptions of Accelerated Development while discarding those of 
the Lagos Plan”190. Two facts justify this statement. First, like Accelerated Development, 
APPER placed emphasis on investment in the traditional export sectors like agriculture, 
where Africa had a “comparative advantage”. This sector was now to lead the way to 
Africa’s economic development as well as its self-reliance191. Secondly, APPER 
advanced the view that good policies and good economic management were those that 
encouraged market forces192. 
 
                                                 
187 OAU, 1982, Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980-2000, Geneva: 
International Institute for Labour Studies, p. 3 
188 Ake, C., 2001, Democracy and Development, op. cit., pp. 25-26 
189 United Nations, 1986, United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and 
Development, 1986-1990, New York: UN 
190 Ake, C., 2001, Democracy and Development, op. cit. p., 27 
191 United Nations, 1986, United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and 
Development 1986-1990, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/S-13/2, Paragraph11 (a) and (b) 
192 Ibid., paragraph 11e (i-ii) 
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We share Ake’s view that APPER, popularly called Africa’s Submission, was indeed a 
submission, in the sense of a capitulation to the demands of the West193. The crux of the 
capitulation was Africa’s acknowledgement of its culpability for its developmental woes, 
by exonerating the unjust historical relations between the West and Africa from blame, as 
well as adopting the prescriptions of Accelerated Development. However, the capitulation 
may have been born of a utilitarian calculation, the outcome of which was expected 
financial contribution from the West. This expectation was also obvious in the United 
Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-
1990 (UNPAAERD), a programme which was almost identical in scope and emphasis 
with APPER. The West, however, did not provide this financial support. It was from this 
background that the UN Secretary-General, in his first Progress Report on the 
implementation of UNPAAERD to the General Assembly in 1991, mentioned this 
disappointment by the donor community as having diminished the chances of the 
successful implementation of the programme194. Consequently, “developments during the 
period of the United Nations Programme of Action reinforced the commodity-dependent 
trend of the 1980s, a decade that many think of as a period of stagnation and reversal for 
most African countries”195. 
 
The salient point in this excursus is that there is a remarkable similarity between Africa’s 
capitulation to the West through APPER and NEPAD. Both of them are Neo-liberal in 
economic orientation with considerable emphasis on export-driven economic 
development. Further, both APPER and NEPAD seek partnership with Western donor 
agencies for financial contribution towards their implementation. Yet Africa’s experience 
with donor promises throughout the decades questions the prudence in basing the  
development aspirations of a whole continent on projected financial help from the G8 and 
its affiliates. 
 
 
                                                 
193 Ake, C. , 2001, Democracy and Development, op. cit.  p. 29 
194 Ibid., p 30 
195 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1991, Final Review and Appraisal of the 
Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic Recovery and 
Development, 1986-1990, New York: U.N., pp 35, 36. Emphasis is mine. 
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1.4.4: Criticisms of the Neo-Liberalism and its Development Practices in Africa 
 
Generally, the criticisms of economism and Eurocentrism leveled against the 
modernization and dependency perspectives apply as well to the neo-liberal perspective.  
Economism preoccupies itself with differences in the wealth of nations and persons 
generated through an autonomous market constituted by competition. This makes persons 
expendable or nuisances if they lack the capacity to compete on the market196. However, 
poverty is an existential fact in Africa and its eradication must be the topmost priority of 
a development perspective for Africa. Therefore, Neo-liberalist development practices 
lack the humanist impulse that needs to be incorporated into African development 
agendas197. This is both unethical and irrational, because “there is no need for humanity 
to imagine itself the humble footservant of an autonomous economic system…..humans 
make economies, so they can also change them198”.  
 
Further, the worship of market forces has led some neo-liberalist theorists to conceive the 
“Third World” as a myth peddled by guilty scholars and politicians. This denial of the 
existence of a deprived world whose deprivation was basically caused by the process of 
wealth accumulation in the rich world disregards the historical relationship between 
Africa and the West. Surely, this flouts the requirements of scholarly sensitivity and 
rigour.  
 
1.5: Similarities of Neo-Liberalism with earlier Theories 
 
Substantial similarities exist in the research focus and methodologies of all three schools. 
As with the earlier two schools, neo-liberalism is concerned with “Third World” 
                                                 
196 Presby, G. 2002, in Thought and Practice in African Philosophy,  op. cit., p. 295 
197 This point will be more fully argued in Chapters 3 and 4. It is stated in Ramose, M. B. 2002. African 
philosophy through Ubuntu. Harare: Mond Books, 114-115.  
- Also Mkhwanazi, E. F & Ramose, M. B. 2005.  “Review Article: Thought and Practice in African 
Philosophy” in Tydskrift vir Letterkunde. 42 (2), p. 173  
198 Ibid., p. 296 
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development; and conducts its discussions on this subject at an abstract level199. 
Secondly, all three theories maintain a polar theoretical framework. In modernization, 
this is articulated as ‘tradition versus modernity”, dependency theorists call it 
“core/metropolis versus periphery/satellite” and neo-liberalism distinguishes between 
“the free world/capitalism” and a host of terms ranging from “communist” to “evil 
empire”200 to denote otherness.  Further, all three schools respond to the charge of 
economism, and a homogenizing and universalizing tendency derived from Eurocentrism.  
 
One cannot fail, therefore, to observe that the more things changed in terms of ideas for 
Africa’s development, the more things remained the same. The abstract universalist 
tendencies and economism pervading all three schools continued to ignore the full 
human, historical, social and ethical content of development, which for certain cultures 
are more important than growth of wealth established by macro-economic indicators201.  
 
This questions the claim, so often made, that ‘development’ has failed in Africa since the 
1960s. As Claude Ake rightly remarked, ‘the problem is not so much that development 
has failed as it was never really on the agenda in the first place’202.  But if economism is 
not, a priori immutable, then which alternatives are open to Africa? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
199 As stated in subsection 2.3.3 above, this applies to only some aspect of dependency theory. 
200 Like Reagan’s characterization of the erstwhile Soviet Union as ‘the evil empire’ and a host of countries 
as constituting ‘the axis of evil’. 
201 Cox, R. W. 1996. “Perspectives on Globalization” in Mittelman, J. H (ed) Globalization – Critical 
Reflections,  London: Lynne Reiner Publishers, p. 28 
202 Ake, C., 2001, Democracy and Development, op. cit., p. 1 
 CHAPTER TWO: ‘ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES’ TO DEVELOPMENT 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
As indicated in sections 1.4.2 and 1.5 of the preceding chapter, proponents of economism 
consider growth in real incomes of a country as sufficient yardstick of development. This 
chapter examines a range of conceptions and approaches, with shared ideas and period of 
flourishing, which converge into a body of criticism of economistic theories. Hettne 
summarizes these criticisms under the heading of ‘alternative approaches’ to 
development1, and traces their genesis to the Cocoyoc Declaration2.  
 
These alternatives arise because of the much discussed ‘crisis’ in development research 
and practice alluded to in the introductory chapter. The crisis is reflected in the fact that 
the mainstream theories considered in the previous chapter have failed to provide 
desirable results for intended beneficiary African countries. A major unifying point for 
these alternative views is their insistence that increased wealth creation, reflected in 
bigger national income, is not an end in itself but a means to the improvement of human 
welfare, which they conceive as the essence of development3. While we stress the 
diversity of these perspectives in the following sub-sections, we concede that what we 
erect as their boundaries are not impermeable and are easily amenable to reflect 
similarities among them. We begin with the Basic Needs Strategy. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Hettne, B. 1990. Development Theory and the Three Worlds. London: Longman. pp. 152-167 
2 Adopted by the participants in the UNEP/UNCTAD Symposium on "Patterns of Resource Use, 
Environment and Development Strategies" held at Cocoyoc, Mexico, from 8 to 12 October 1974 and 
circulated, in accordance with the decision taken by the Committee at the meeting of the general Assembly 
of the United Nations, on 1 November 1974. 
3 Martinussen, J., 1997, Society, State & Market, London: Zed Books, p. 37 
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2.2 The Basic Needs Strategy (BNS) 
 
This approach is usually considered to have been first formulated by a United Nations 
International Labour Organization (ILO) publication in 19764. While its exponents have 
varied in emphasis, there is a broad consensus among them that a key component of the 
strategy is the understanding of development as not only implying economic growth but 
also persistent and measurable social improvements for the poor and resource-weak 
groups in society5. Principally, these must be improvements of the range of poverty 
associated symptoms listed in section ii above. Such improvements would constitute the 
provision of basic needs, and help the poor to exit the vicious circle of poverty. 
 
The proponents of the BNS are generally agreed that, fundamentally, three sets of needs 
qualify as basic. These are, firstly, the need for food, shelter, clothes and other necessities 
of daily life; secondly, access to public services such as drinking water, sanitation, health 
and education; and thirdly, participation in, and ability to exert influence on, community 
and national political decision making6.   
 
These sets of needs were not all included in the ILO formulation but developed gradually. 
One addition to the initial ILO formulation was the Cocoyoc Declaration. As well as 
accepting the ILO definition of human basic needs, this declaration acknowledged the 
satisfaction of social, political and cultural needs as the purpose of development: 
According to the Declaration,  
 
 
“Development should not be limited to the satisfaction of basic needs. There are 
other needs, other goals, and other values. Development includes freedom of 
expression and impression, the right to give and to receive ideas and stimulus. 
There is a deep social need to participate in shaping the basis of one's own 
existence, and to make some contribution to the fashioning of the world's future. 
Above all, development includes the right to work, by which we mean not simply 
                                                 
4 ILO. 1976. In Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem. Geneva: ILO 
5 Preston, P. W, 1997, Development Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell, p. 245 
6 Martinussen, J. 1997. Society, State & Market, op. cit.,  pp. 298-299 
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having a job but finding self-realization in work, the right not to be alienated 
through production processes that use human beings simply as tools”7.   
 
It seems to us then that the real value in the need to participate in, and influence, local 
community and national political decision making8 seems to be instrumental, in that the 
satisfaction of this need serves as a condition for the satisfaction of the other two needs. 
This is because the ability to influence decisions that affect one’s livelihood is likely to 
address factors which work, in a mutually reinforcing manner, to keep people in the 
poverty trap. Martinussen9, lists three such factors. According to him, the poor remain 
thus trapped because firstly, they lack the necessary economic resources to change the 
mechanisms that keep them in extreme poverty.  Secondly, in spite of their large 
numbers, they have very few opportunities to influence and affect decision making within 
the political system, even in a democracy10, and have no access at all to the centers of 
power in the corporate world. Thirdly, the poor are divided into several distinct social 
groups. This makes it difficult for them to act collectively and to organize themselves 
politically. In view of the above, most proponents of the BNS consider cooperation with 
the poor in development planning and implementation pivotal for the satisfaction of their 
basic needs11.  
 
It is clear that the Cocoyoc Declaration’s extension of the notion of Basic Needs implies 
a just distribution of wealth, which in turn requires an egalitarian allocation of natural 
resources globally. But what would be the ultimate justification for a redistribution of 
global resources? Such an ultimate ground has been found in the right to life12. According 
to this position, this right belongs to all humans qua human. Therefore, the poor in Africa 
are within their rights to demand that others who have a surplus provide for their 
minimum needs. Clearly, Oruka sends us into the realm of the ethical with this view. But 
                                                 
7 United Nations, 1974, The Cocoyoc Declaration, A/C. 2/292,  New York, paragraph 2 
8 Presby, G. M. 2002. “African Philosophers on Global Wealth Redistribution”, in Presby, G., Smith, D., 
Abuya, P. & Nyarwath, O (eds) Thought and Practice in African Philosophy. Nairobi: Konrad Adenaurer 
Foundation, p. 290 
9 Martinussen, J., 1997, Society, State & Market, op. pp 300 - 301 
10 We refer to Western-inspired liberal democratic systems, as distinct from the consensual democratic 
systems of indigenous African communities. 
11 Martinussen, J. 1997, Society, State & Market, op. cit. p 301 
12 Presby, G, M, 2002, “African Philosophers on Global Wealth Redistribution”, op. cit. p. 289. Here, 
Presby attributes this view to Odera Oruka.  
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in a world dominated by the Eurocentric philosophy of competitive wealth creation for 
self-interest, this ethical argument will need strengthening.  
 
In our view, the right to life argument may be further fortified by the view that 
redistribution of global wealth to provide basic needs in sub-Saharan Africa is a 
necessary remedy for the adverse human and economic effects of the unjust wars of 
conquest and colonization. The argument that reparation must be rejected because all 
poverty in the world cannot be linked to the colonial legacy is untenable. Equally 
vacuous is the claim that not all countries participated in colonization13.  
 
The reasons for this are twofold. First, consider that except for Ethiopia and Liberia, all 
the countries in sub-Saharan Africa were European colonies or part of them. And all sub-
Saharan countries, except for Cape Verde which is number one hundred and five, rank 
between one hundred and twenty and one hundred and seventy seven (the last country) on 
the Human Poverty Index of the 2005 Human Development Report14. What this suggests 
is that even if not all poverty in the world can be linked to the colonial legacy, most 
poverty can. This is because even Liberia and Ethiopia, which escaped the physical 
occupation of territory, suffered the ravages of colonialism, in that the policies of the 
neighboring colonial administrations deprived them of economic and political 
independence, thereby compelling them into ‘alliances’ with the colonizers, under terms 
which were grossly unfair to these ‘independent’ African countries15.  
 
In like manner, although some Western European countries and Canada neither directly 
participated in the slave trade nor had colonies in Africa, it can be legitimately argued 
that the influx of labour and capital into Europe and North America during the slave trade 
and colonialism, and the expansion of markets beyond these continents during 
colonialism, contributed to the economic growth of the whole Western world. 
                                                 
13 In his preference for the right to life as the basis for redistribution, Oruka rejects reparation. See Presby, 
G. M. op. cit. p 289. 
14 UNDP, 2005, Human Development Report, pp 228 - 229 
15 Akpan, M. B, Jones, A. B, & Pankhurst, R, 1990, “Liberia and Ethiopia, 1880-1914: the survival of two 
African states”, in Boahen, A. A. (ed), General History of Africa, VII: Africa Under Colonial Domination 
1880 – 1935, Paris: UNESCO, pp. 129-131 
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Consequently, it would be unjust of Western countries not to provide some of their 
surplus to those who are suffering the effects of poverty that was and continues to be 
caused by the mechanisms that provide them with surplus.  
 
In fact it is doubtful if the question of reparations can be plausibly de-linked from the 
authentic liberation of Africa. Certainly such liberation will not come from the self-
interested conceptions and economic calculations of the ostensible financial aid provided 
by the West for Africa’s development. An enduring consequence of these calculations, 
which fuelled and sustained the slave trade and colonization in Africa, is the self-
abasement of the African16. Another is the instrumental value, at best, that is allotted 
Africans and their contributions to human civilization in the prevailing global economic 
and political order. This self-abasement and external scorn on anything African has 
created misunderstanding and self-doubt in the African.  
 
Undoubtedly, philosophy’s contribution to the search for Africa’s development must 
comprise its call for liberation from oppression in all its forms. In this regard, the 
philosophical attention to the African experience by Africans has diagnosed the need for 
philosophy to correct African’s misunderstanding of her condition and make her the 
subject in the struggle for its liberation from these17. The ethos18 of liberation is 
structured around an axis that is neither compassion nor sympathy, but subverting an 
established unjust order19. 
 
Reparation becomes subversive in this sense as it quantifies the pain of slavery and 
colonialism’s domination of physical space, dehumanizing of Africans and their culture, 
and the integration of the economic histories of Africa into a perspective (the Western) 
                                                 
16 Gyekye, K, 1997, Tradition and Modernity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 246. Here, Gyekye 
provides us with a categorical example of this self-ridicule in his insistence that traditional Akan beliefs 
and social norms discourage scientific curiosity and perpetuate a superstitious preoccupation and irrational 
fear of the supernatural for reasons that are “not fully known or intelligible”.   
17 Mudimbe, V. Y., 1988, The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge, 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press pp. 142-143 
18 Dussel, E, 1985,  Philosophy of Liberation, Martinez, A and Morkovsky, C (trans.), Eugene, Oregon: 
Wipf & Stock; p. 56. Here Dussel defines ‘ethos’ as the structural whole of attitudes that predetermine 
action. We adopt this meaning.  
19 Ibid. pp. 64 - 65 
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that continues to deride it.  Accordingly, proponents of the BNS can mount a frontal 
attack for wealth distribution if their argument based in the right to life is strengthened by 
the right to reparation.   
  
2.3 Criticisms of the BNS: 
 
The version of the Basic Needs Strategy advocated by the Cocoyoc Declaration suggests 
increasing the buying power of the poor as a way out of the vicious circle of poverty20. 
The view here is that the effects of the increased buying power of the poor, and therefore 
their demand for economic goods, will stimulate the economy21. Thus the owners of 
capital will eventually benefit by “helping” the poor meet their basic needs. In this wise, 
the BNS is essentially economistic in spirit.  
 
Further, oftentimes “expert guided intervention”22, which bestows the right to define 
problems and solutions to technocrats of institutions such as the World Bank and United 
Nations agencies, becomes the preferred approach to satisfying basic needs. That the 
Bretton Woods institutions exhibit characteristics of Eurocentrism and economism has 
been discussed already. It is difficult to disengage this ‘expert guidance’ from the power 
relations pertaining between African societies and the capitalist-led global system. Since 
the latter, invariably provides the financial resources for ‘developmental activities’ in 
Africa, they have reserved the right to direct on the disbursement of these resources. 
Accordingly, the focus on defining and providing for the basic needs of the poor in Third 
World countries has entailed greater reliance on, and sustaining of, Eurocentrism and 
economism than the BNS should admit as appropriate.  
 
Further, this reliance on “expert guided intervention” de-emphasizes real people and their 
choices as proper determinants of action. This brings to light the abstract nature of the 
                                                 
20 Cocoyoc Declaration, op. cit. paragraph 2.  
- Also, Martinusen, J. 1997, Society, State & Market, London: Zed Books, p. 300 - 301 
21 Ibid.,  p. 301 
22 Preston, P. W, 1997, Development Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell, p 246 
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BNS. In these respects, the BNS is far from being a radically new departure in 
development theorizing and management. 
 
2.4    Human Development  
 
Another dimension on development emerged with the publication of the first Human 
Development Report in 1990, which declared at its onset that people are the real wealth 
of nations23. Upon this basis, development is identified with ‘human development’. The 
report discusses the meaning and measurement of human development, and defined it as 
a process of enlarging people’s choices. The choices initially defined were the 
opportunity to lead a long and healthy life, the opportunity to acquire knowledge, and the 
opportunity to have access to resources needed for a decent standard of living24. The goal 
of development then becomes creating the conditions for people to be able to make these 
choices. The report also defines three key indicators for measuring human development. 
These are life expectancy at birth, access to quality education, and command over 
resources needed for a decent living standard25.  
 
The report declares that this conception of the nature, goals and measurement of 
development is inspired by philosophers such as Aristotle and Immanuel Kant, as well as 
by political economists such as Adam Smith, Ricardo and Marx26. We believe that if a 
person does not explicitly disown parts of his or her work, then that person implicitly 
affirms the views expressed therein. The various outputs of an author must then be 
considered strands of the person’s thinking. As such we have no right or reason to read 
that person in fragments. With this in mind, we consider as unfortunate the Report’s 
reliance on the ideas of the above-mentioned philosophers and economists. This is 
because these authors held firm views that are inconsistent with Africa’s development. 
The positions of Adam Smith, Ricardo and Marx in connection with this have been 
discussed already. Those of Aristotle have been sufficiently discussed by African 
                                                 
23 UNDP. 1990, Human Development Report, p. 9 
24 Ibid., p. 9-10 
25 Ibid. pp 11 - 12 
26 Ibid. p 9 
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philosophers and need not be repeated here27, and Kant’s condescension on Africa will be 
amplified in section 2.9.3 below. For now, we would like to conduct a fuller exploration 
of the concept and approaches to Human Development by elaborating on two dimensions 
of it. These are People-managed Development and Participatory Rural Appraisal.  
 
2.4.1 People-Managed Development  
 
This approach considers civil society as the main actor and vehicle in the process of 
development.28 As such, its point of departure is the ordinary citizen. In this wise, it is 
difficult to overlook the influence of both the Cocoyoc Declaration and the BNS on this 
approach. As stated in 3.2 above, basic needs strategists highlight the importance of 
people’s participation to the success of development processes, as does the Cocoyoc 
Declaration, which declares self-reliance as a basic strategy and aim of development, and 
continues:  
 
 
“above all, it [self-reliance] means trust in people…. reliance on the capacity of 
people themselves to invent and generate new resources and techniques to 
increase their capacity, to absorb theses and to put them to socially beneficial use, 
to take a measure of command over the economy, and to generate their own way 
of life”29.   
 
 
In view of this need for self-reliance, leading proponents30 of people-managed 
development approaches contend that the level of consciousness needed to influence 
decisions and resource allocations that affect one’s conditions of life becomes a basic 
need.  
This position coincides with the views of the ‘alternative economics’ school, a prominent 
member of which is the Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen, who considers political and civil 
                                                 
27 Ramose, M.,  2002,  African Philosophy through Ubuntu, Harare: Mond Books, Chapter 1 
28 Martinussen, J. 1997, Society, State & Market, op. cit p 332 
29 Cocoyoc Declaration. 1974. op. cit. paragraph 3 
30 Gran, G. 1983. Development by People. Citizen Construction of a Just World, New York: Praeger;  
Chambers, R. 1983. Rural Development. Putting the Last First. New York: John Wiley; Friedman, J. 1992. 
Empowerment. The Politics of Alternative development. Cambridge: Blackwell 
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rights expressed through democracy as pivotal to the process of generating informed and 
considered choices. According to him, political and social participation has at least three 
values for human well being. First, it has intrinsic value in human life. What this means 
is that to be prevented from participation in the political life of the community is a major 
deprivation. Second, it has an important instrumental value in enhancing the possibilities 
of giving political attention and support to people’s expressions. Further, the 
conceptualization - even comprehension - of what are to count as "needs" requires the 
exercise of political and civil rights31. In this sense, it has constructive importance. 
In a later work, Sen amplifies this position into the thesis that the whole range of human 
liberties – social, political, economic and cultural – is a constitutive component of 
development32.  On this view, development may be seen as the process of expanding real 
freedoms that people enjoy. Accordingly, it requires the removal of major fetters on 
freedom, such as poverty, tyranny, poor economic opportunities, systemic social 
deprivation and intolerance33. 
 
In seeking to enhance people’s choices, the PMD approach emphasizes participatory 
rights as essential to self-determination, which it considers as both a requirement and goal 
of development. One fundamental assumption underlying this position seems to be that 
governments would not use resources on mass welfare unless the poor, who are in the 
majority, are sufficiently powerful to force such a policy on the government. From this 
point of departure, proponents of this approach criticize mainstream economistic theories 
for leaving development management in the hands of existing authorities or large 
organizations such as governments, the World Bank, the IMF or multilateral 
organizations, bilateral donor organizations or companies34.  
 
A number of factors support this criticism. First, bureaucratic institutions operate from 
the top downwards and are so control-oriented that they isolate the people whose 
conditions they seek to advance. The decision makers and staff of international 
                                                 
31 Sen, A. 1999. “Democracy as a Universal Value”, in Journal of Democracy, 10. 3 (1999), p. 9 - 10 
32 Sen, A. 1999, Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 5 
33 Ibid. p.3 
34 Martinussen, J., 1997, Society, State & Market, op. cit., p 331 
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organizations like the World Bank and official bilateral aid agencies are both 
institutionally and culturally removed from the people they try to assist. Because they 
remain thus isolated, they are, secondly, incapable of motivating people and mobilizing 
human resources in a society. Oftentimes this results in these institutions pursuing 
objectives that bear little relation to the development concerns of the societies in need. 
 
For the proponents of this approach, then, what is at stake in development is not only the 
satisfaction of is material needs but also social, political and cultural needs. The 
satisfaction of these furthers one’s human development, and through this one’s dignity as 
a human being35. If this is taken seriously, then a community’s prioritization among its 
needs cannot be decided a priori or by outsiders, since this hinders the acknowledgement 
of community members as human beings. What their needs are, which needs to be 
satisfied first and to what extent, have to be decided through people’s participation. 
Hence for Sen and other people-managed development theorists, participation is not just 
a means to an end in the development process. It is a goal in itself and as equally 
important as other development goals.  
 
2.4.2 Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) 
 
Another off-shoot of the thinking that favours giving communities more responsibility in 
development management is the Participatory Rural Appraisal (RPA) Approach. This 
encourages communities to reflect on their situation, diagnose and analyze their problems 
and identify possible solutions to these36 with a view to enhancing the achievement of 
self-reliance and social justice through improvements in the quality of people’s 
participation37.  
 
The African Network on Participatory Approaches enumerates some objectives for 
different participants in the development process. According to the Network 
                                                 
35 Ibid,  p. 337.  
- Also Gran, G., 1993, Development by People, op. cit., chapter 15 
36 Royal Tropical Institute/World Bank. 2000. Village Participation in Rural Development. p. 18-19 
37 JICA. 2001. Participatory Development and Good Governance. http:www.jica.go.jp/E-
infopart/MBp011.html  
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participation, for communities, should be a way to identify, prioritize and implement 
development activities through better use of existing resources. It is also a principal 
vehicle to social justice because it is a most reliable way to ensure that the poor will 
acquire ownership of the processes and resources for development. For government, the 
use of participatory approaches ultimately generates development programs that respond 
to local demands and needs. For donors and service providers, participation means 
becoming more accountable to communities. The strategies devised by the communities 
become the terms of reference for future assistance to them. Moreover, the members of 
the community influence how these service providers organize their work in the 
community38. Thus strengthened, the community is better able to evaluate the services 
received, and indicate how it can be improved in the future. 
 
2.4.3 Criticism of People-managed Development and PRA Approaches 
 
The people-managed development approach articulates many aspects of both the Human 
Development perspective and the Basic Needs Approach, both of which emphasize the 
centrality of the participation of beneficiaries in the conception of development and 
implementation of its strategies. However, in development practice in Africa, this concept 
of participation is often hollowed out by Eurocentric top-down “banking model39”. This 
is often achieved by defining problems and formulating their solutions beforehand, and 
then holding ‘consultations’ with beneficiary communities to secure their endorsement of 
these decisions. As such, the vitality of the self-organization, self-management and self-
rule emphasized by the people-centered development and PRA approaches is trivialized.  
 
A well-known example of this contempt for beneficiary communities is implied in the 
notion of ‘development catalysts’, advanced by Guy Gran, one of the most fiery 
advocates of people-centered development. According to him, many obstacles impede the 
self-organization and collective action of poor people. There is therefore a critical need 
                                                 
38 Royal Tropical Institute/World Bank, 2000, op cit.  p. 17 
39 In his Pedagogy of the Oppressed, 1990, Paolo Freire uses this term to refer to a pedagogical model in 
which the teacher is seen as the repository of knowledge with the responsibility to transmit it into the 
learners who are seen as passive recipients. 
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for a catalyst – a person or persons who can take the initiative and facilitate the processes 
of self-organization and nurture them until the community can sustain them. These 
catalysts need not be recruited from the community; they can be recruited from other 
countries, including the developed countries, preferably from NGOs40.  
 
Gran’s position amounts to the thought that the techniques needed for successful 
organization and action against poverty cannot be extracted from within the culture 
seeking to be developed. This supports the contention that the same arrogance and 
Eurocentrism of the Modernization perspective has re-surfaced in the people-managed 
development and PRA approaches. It is necessary to note how this displays inspiration 
derived from Aristotle and Kant. The Eurocentrism of this inspiration ignores the fact that 
techniques of organization affect the mode of structuring a question within that 
organization, and that the mode of questioning presupposes a constrained set of answers. 
Therefore, by bringing in outsiders to organize, one would have decided, a priori, a 
conceptual direction of development and its concomitant practices.  
 
This direction usually furthers the institutional initiatives of donors41. In this manner, 
participation fails in its attempt to lead development management away from dependence 
on donors, to mutually respectful partnership and collaboration with them. This 
undermines the basis of participation upon which both the people-centered development 
and PRA approaches are supposed to be built. 
  
2.5 The Rights-Based Approach 
A rights-based approach to development is a framework that is normatively based on 
international human rights standards and directed to promoting and protecting human 
rights42. The right to development has been asserted as a fundamental human right in 
                                                 
40 Martinusen, J. 1997, Society, State & Market, op. cit. p. 338 
41 Matshabaphala, J. D. M. 2001. An Open Systems Critique of the Macro Theories of Development. 
Unpublished dissertation submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the award of  D. Litt et Phil in 
Development Administration to the University of South Africa. p. 91-92 
42 http://www.unhchr.ch/development/approaches-01.html 
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various provisions of the United Nations43. Nonetheless, the Declaration on the Right to 
Development made an explicit connection between development and human rights44.  In 
1995, the Copenhagen Declaration45 reaffirmed this link between human rights and 
development by establishing a new consensus that places people at the centre of concerns 
for sustainable development46. Thus a rights-based approach to development, then, 
integrates the norms, standards and principles of the international human rights system 
into the plans, policies and processes of development, and would usually include the 
following four features: 
First, they would invariably define the objectives of development in terms of human 
rights as legally enforceable entitlements.  It considers the whole range of these rights - 
civil, cultural, economic, political and social - as indivisible, interdependent and 
interrelated47. Secondly, they usually focus on raising levels of accountability in the 
development process by identifying claim-holders (and their entitlements) and 
corresponding duty-holders (and their obligations). In this regard, they look both at the 
positive obligations of duty-holders (to protect, promote and provide) and at their 
negative obligations (to abstain from violations)48; and call for the translation of universal 
standards into locally determined benchmarks for measuring progress and enhancing 
accountability.  
Rights-based approaches also give preference to strategies for empowerment. They focus 
on beneficiaries as owners of rights as well as directors of development. Accordingly, 
they aim at giving people the power, capacities, capabilities and access needed to change 
                                                 
43 Such as the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. 
44 United Nations, 1986, General Assembly Resolution 41/128. Paragraph 1. 1 of the Declaration states that 
the right to development is an inalienable human right by virtue of which every human person and all 
peoples are entitled to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political 
development, in which all human rights and fundamental freedoms can be fully realized 
45 United Nations, 1995, The Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and Programme of Action of 
the World Summit for Social Development. New York.  
46 Ibid., Paragraphs 8 and 26a. 
47 United Nations, 1993, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, as adopted by the World 
Conference on Human Rights (on 25th June 1993). Paragraph 5 
48 Thus under the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, States are required to 
take immediate steps for the progressive realization of the rights concerned, so that a failure to take the 
necessary steps, or any retrogression, will flag a breach of the State’s duties. 
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their own lives, improve their own communities and influence their own destinies. 
Therefore attention is given, in the empowerment process, to discrimination, equality, 
equity and vulnerable groups49.  
Finally, the RBA strongly recognizes participation as a necessary condition for 
empowerment. Paragraph 2.3 of the Declaration on the Right to Development 
recommends that such participation must be "active, free and meaningful". Participation 
includes access to development processes, institutions, information, and mechanisms for 
redress or complaints. This means, among others, the need to situate these mechanisms in 
proximity to partners and beneficiaries. Participation, then, counts against mere formal or 
ceremonial contacts with beneficiaries, as well externally conceived "quick fixes" by 
‘development catalysts’, for instance. 
2.5.1 Criticism of the RBA 
The RBA is inextricably linked with the Basic Needs Strategy and the Human 
development approaches. It undoubtedly aims at the active, free and meaningful 
participation of people in development strategies, and in the fair distribution of the 
resulting benefits among them. It attempts to achieve this by putting beneficiaries in 
charge of development. 
However, this approach exhibits noteworthy demerits. First, the optimism of the RBA 
seems to pay little regard to the convergence of factors such as the ethics of global 
capitalism and corruption, which relentlessly conspires to marginalize the ability of the 
poor to assume their rights.  
Secondly, the RBA advocates basing national development processes on agreed and 
universal standards of the international human rights instruments. However, the rich and 
militarily powerful nations have continually disregarded and flouted these instruments. A 
case in point is the military attacks on Lebanon by Israel with the explicit backing of the 
                                                 
49 Although there is no universal checklist of who is most vulnerable in every given context, recently in 
Africa, these groups have included women, minorities, orphans, HIV infected persons and prisoners. 
Rights-based approaches require that such questions be answered locally: who is vulnerable here and now; 
and why? 
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United States and most of Western Europe, which began in July 2006. Clearly, such 
aggression against a vulnerable country offends against provisions of the United Nations 
Charters and Declarations referred to in this chapter, and question the validity and 
viability of these international standards.  
The RBA conceives of rights as justified claims to the protection of persons’ important 
interests50. This protection is owed persons for their own sakes. Such a conception of 
rights and freedoms is clearly individualistic in spirit. This makes the owner of rights an 
atomistic individual pursing one’s interests rationally in an environment of conflicting 
interests51. Such a conception polarizes individual interests and community welfare52. As 
indicated in sections 1.4.1 and 1.4.3.2, it is doubtful that such a conception of rights, and 
the individual’s place and responsibilities in society, can provide the basis for 
development thinking and practice in sub-Saharan Africa. This position will be more 
fully argued in Chapter Five.   
2.6 The Millennium Development Goals 
 
The Millennium Declaration53 set forth quantified and time-bound goals to free the world 
“from the abject and dehumanizing conditions of extreme poverty”, and make “the right 
to development a reality for everyone”54. It was adopted by 147 heads of state and 
government at the Millennium Assembly in September 2000. The resolutions of the 
                                                 
50 This is understood to be the strongest sense of ‘rights’. See Honderich, T (ed.), 1995, The Oxford 
Companion to Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p776 
51 Locke, J. 1946, The Second Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration,  Gough, J. 
W. (ed.), Oxford, Basil Blackwell. At p.8, of this work, Locke discusses some features of the state of 
nature, where every man “has the executive power of the law of nature in his hands….”. At p. 44, we are 
told that for the same rational self-interests, this executive power of the state of nature may be surrendered 
at will for the formation of civil society. For further discussion of Locke’s theory of individual rights see 
section 4. 3.2 below 
52 This polarization is the quintessence of Locke’s distinction between ‘a state of nature’ and ‘civil society’ 
in The Second Treatise. The point is poignantly stated at page 74 of the work, where the tensions between 
the “liberties and properties of the subject”, and the action of the commonwealth “for the preservation of 
the community” are brought into sharp focus.  
53 United Nations. 2000. Resolution 55/2: Millennium Declaration 
54 Paragraph 11, Millennium Declaration 
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Declaration subsequently became the MDGs. There are eight of them, which break down 
into 18 quantifiable targets55. These are:   
The first goal is to eradicate extreme poverty and hunger. Two targets will serve to 
achieve this goal. These are first, to reduce by half the proportion of people living on less 
than a dollar a day; and second, to reduce by half the proportion of people who suffer 
from hunger. The second goal is to achieve universal primary education. The target for 
this is to ensure that all boys and girls complete a full course of primary schooling. The 
third goal is the promotion of gender equality and empowerment of women, and the 
target is to eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education preferably by 
2005, and at all levels by 2015. 
The fourth goal is to reduce child mortality, and the target for this is to reduce by two 
thirds the mortality rate among children under five. The fifth goal is to improve maternal 
health. The target here is to reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio. The 
sixth goal, which is to combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases has two targets. The 
first target is to halt and begin to reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS; and the second is to 
halt and begin to reverse the incidence of malaria and other major diseases.  
The seventh goal, which is to ensure environmental sustainability, has multiple targets. 
The first of these is to integrate the principles of sustainable development into country 
policies and programmes; and to reverse loss of environmental resources. Secondly, this 
is the commitment to reduce by half the proportion of people without sustainable access 
to safe drinking water; and finally to achieve significant improvement in lives of at least 
100 million slum dwellers, by 2020. 
The final goal is to develop a global partnership for Development. This goal would be 
considered reached when seven targets are met. The first of these is to develop further an 
open, rule-based, predictable, non-discriminatory trading and financial system.  The next 
target is to address the special needs of the least developed countries. This includes: tariff 
                                                 
55 http://www.undp.org/mdg/goallist.shtml.  
- See also Sachs, J. D., 2005,  The End of Poverty, How we can make it happen in our Lifetime, New York:  
Penguin Books 
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and quota free access for least developed countries’ exports; enhanced programme of 
debt relief for HIPCs and cancellation of official bilateral debt; and more generous ODA 
for countries committed to poverty reduction. The third target under this goal is to 
address the special needs of landlocked countries and small island developing States.  
The fourth target is to deal comprehensively with the debt problems of developing 
countries through national and international measures in order to make debt sustainable in 
the long term. The fifth is the objective to develop and implement strategies for decent 
and productive work for youth in cooperation with developing countries. The next target 
is to provide access to affordable essential drugs in developing countries in cooperation 
with pharmaceutical companies. The final target is to make available the benefits of new 
technologies, especially information and communications technologies, to developing 
countries in cooperation with the private sector.   
2.6.1 Criticisms of the MDGs: 
 
The eighth goal (the idea of a global partnership for Development) commands a foremost 
position among the MDGs, since its achievement is undoubtedly essential for the 
achievement of the others. Now, this global partnership is envisaged to revolve around 
the prevailing global economic system, which has the international trading and financial 
system as its core. In this sense, the eighth MDG is rooted in the assumption that liberal 
economics is the route to development. Its first target sufficiently reveals this.  
 
Here, then, we encounter a revival of the economics of Adam Smith and David Ricardo, 
as they underpin the law and policy of the World Trade Organization and its precursor56. 
When sufficiently probed, this assumption yields the view already noted in section i of 
the introductory chapter, that the WTO oversees an impartial international trading and 
investments system globally, where participating countries fully maximize their 
comparative advantage over others57. As such, countries are liable to benefit from 
                                                 
56 This is The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 
57 Hoekman, B. M and Kostecki, M. M, 2001, The Political Economy of the World Trading System, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 24 - 25 
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participating in this system than opting out of it. Therefore it is in the interest of every 
country to join the WTO. Undoubtedly, this argument is open to refutation.  
 
If indeed a system of trade can be beneficial to all of its participants, then the regulative 
instruments of such a system must benefit, or at least intend to benefit, all participants. 
But the assumption of a comparative advantage under unbiased competitive market 
conditions does not exist in the real world of international trade58. In fact, the main aim of 
establishing the post Second World War economic system was to remove the economic 
causes of friction which were believed to have caused the Second World War59.  
Accordingly, developing countries have been at the margins of the deliberations of the 
trading system since its inception.  
 
This is well illustrated by the history of the negotiations of the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Most developing countries were not involved in the 
negotiations that resulted in the Tokyo Round under the GATT. The most conspicuous 
cost of their nonparticipation was that negotiated results often excluded improved access 
to industrial country markets for the competitive agricultural and manufactured exports of 
developing countries60. In other words, they had to accept the maintenance of high 
foreign trade barriers against their most competitive exports. In fact it is unlikely that 
their participation would have made a difference. This disadvantage for poor countries 
has pervaded the Uruguay Round and the Doha Development Agenda, which constitute 
the negotiated policies of international trade since the formation of the WTO. Therefore, 
the aims of the trade policies of the WTO are far from universal advantage to 
participating countries in general and sub-Saharan Africa in particular. Two factors 
support this:  
 
The first has to do with the WTO’s policies on agriculture, which is the largest economic 
sector in most sub-Saharan African countries. In this sector, the power dynamics amongst 
                                                 
58 Jackson, J. H. 1997. The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International Economic Relations, 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, The MIT Press, p. 18  
59 Hoekman, B. M and Kostecki, M. M, 2001, Political Economy,op. cit.  p. 24 
60 Schott, J. J, 2004, “Reviving the Doha Round”, In Speeches, Testimonies, Papers, May 2004, 
Washington, D. C.,  Institute for International Economics, p. 2  
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members of the WTO has prevented negotiation of a balance of concessions among its 
members, and more often than not, sub-Saharan farmers suffer most from this. This is 
vividly exemplified by the impact on sub-Saharan farmers of the impact of subsidies that 
America pays its cotton farmers. By encouraging over-production and export dumping, 
U. S. subsidies to its cotton farmers, which in 2001/02 amounted to 3.9 billion dollars, is 
driving down world prices that stand now at their lowest levels since the 1930s61. These 
subsidies are destroying the livelihoods of vulnerable farmers in Africa62, but this does 
not seem to be the concern of the American government63.   
 
The United States and the European Union persist in providing billions of dollars in 
subsidies that protect their agricultural sector from exports from countries that may have 
a comparative advantage in the sector. This protectionism has survived eight previous 
rounds of multilateral trade negotiations, and led to the collapse of negotiations on the 
Doha Round64 at Cancún in September 2003 and by the Ministers from the G6 group 
(Australia, Brazil, India, Japan, the European Union and the United States)65 in Geneva in 
July 200666. At Cancún, this US-EU alliance provoked the formation of the G-20, an 
                                                 
61 Watkins, K., 2002, Cultivating Poverty: The Impact of US Cotton Subsidies on Africa, Oxfam Briefing 
Paper 30,London: Oxfam International, p. 3 
62 Watkins, ibid. p. 4, observes that no region is more seriously affected by unfair competition in world 
cotton markets than sub-Saharan Africa 
63 Ibid, p. 1. Here, Watkins reports President George W. Bush remarking on 13 May 2002, after signing of 
the Farm Bill, that “I told the people, I said if you give me a chance to be the President, we’re not going to 
treat our agricultural industry as a secondary citizen when it comes to opening up markets. And I mean 
that… The farm bill is important legislation… It will promote farmer independence, and preserve the farm 
way of life. It helps America’s farmers, and therefore it helps America”  
64 The Doha Round of talks is the latest trade negotiating round of the WTO. It was launched by the 
adoption of the Doha Ministerial Declaration at The Fourth WTO Ministerial Conference held in Doha, 
Qatar from 9 to 14 November 2001. This declaration provides the mandate for negotiations on a range of 
subjects. The Declaration, as well as the plans and structures for its implementation are cumulatively 
referred to as “The Doha Development Agenda”. 
65 This group is reputed to account for more that three quarters of global trade. See 
http://money.cnn.com/2006/07/24/news/international/bc.trade.talks.update.reut 
66 The failure in Cancun was followed by talks in Geneva in August 2004, in Paris in May 2005, and in 
Geneva in July 2006.  The Geneva talks achieved a framework agreement on opening global trade. The 
U.S., EU, Japan and Brazil agreed to end export subsidies, reduce agricultural subsidies and lower tariff 
barriers. Developing nations agreed to reduce tariffs on manufactured goods, but gain the right to specially 
protect key industries. But the underlying problems resurfaced in Paris, as the developing countries wanted 
high state subsidies and import tariffs slashed so they can sell more of their produce abroad. However, the 
rich nations refused to grant this concession unless developing markets open up their markets more to their 
own industrial products and services.  
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alliance of developing countries (led by Brazil, China, India, and South Africa) which 
continues to agitate for the United States, Europe, and Japan to liberalize their barriers to 
agricultural trade.  
 
The July 2006 talks in Geneva failed to reach an agreement about reducing farm 
subsidies and lowering import taxes on products of export interest to developing 
countries. The point of view that this has to do with inequality on the global agricultural 
market is reflected in the fact that even if the United States had conceded to the terms of 
WTO Director General's compromise on cutting its domestic support, this would still 
have left it with $20 billion worth of allowable subsidies to its farmers and agricultural 
companies. Further, if the European Union had agreed to phase out its export subsidies, 
this would still have left it with 55 billion euros in other forms of export support. In 
return for such minimal concessions, the US, EU, and other developed countries wanted 
radically reduced tariffs for their agricultural exports to developing country markets67. 
 
It is uncertain when negotiations will resume. In fact a successful outcome of the Doha 
Round is becoming increasingly unlikely precisely because of the internal politics of the 
United States. The trade authority granted under the Trade Act of 2002 to the U.S. 
President expires in 2007. Any trade agreement reached after this period will need the 
approval of the U. S Congress with the possibility of amendments, and this prospect 
decreases the willingness of other countries to pay heed to the success of the Round.  
 
The idea that the Doha Round is a "development round" could not be farther from the 
truth. At the very outset of the Doha negotiations in November 2001, the governments of 
the rich world rejected the demand of the majority of countries that the talks focus on 
modalities for implementing past commitments, especially the Uruguay Round, and avoid 
initiating a new round of trade liberalization. Some commentators advance the view that 
this rejection is firmly linked with the aim of the developed countries to have greater 
access to the markets of the developing countries while making minimal concessions on 
                                                 
67 Bello, W, 2006, “Afterthoughts: Doha Round Collapse Best for Developing Countries”, INQ7 
Viewpoints/Columns, http://opinion.inq7.net/inq7viewpoints/columns/view_article.php?article_id=11543  
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their part68. Invoking development was simply a cynical ploy to implicitly make 
participation in the Doha Round linked to development assistance, and hence make the 
process more acceptable to the poor world.  
 
The second factor that shows the WTO’s insensitivity to favorable terms of trade and 
development aspirations of Africa is its position on intellectual property rights. The 
WTO, invoking its agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 
(TRIPS Agreement), effectively asks developing and least-developed countries to allow 
for pharmaceutical companies to enforce their rights provided under TRIPS, until January 
201669. But what are the development implications of this? First, what this means is that 
it will be more difficult for these countries to have the support of the WTO to purchase 
essential drugs to address the public health problems that they face. Now, the 
achievement of the fourth, fifth and sixth goals are directly contingent on the success of 
public heath sectors in poor countries. Besides, the success of first three goals is as well 
dependent, albeit indirectly, on effective public health services. This greatly questions the 
WTO’s commitment to the welfare of the poor parts of the world. Further, considering 
that most of its countries are the most afflicted with HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, malaria, it 
is easy to understand that this provision overlooks the development aspirations of sub-
Saharan Africa.  
 
Apart from the negative effect on public health, another effect of TRIPS is that it 
condones the high cost of technology. Today, the main beneficiaries of intellectual 
property protection are largely transnational corporations, which use intellectual property 
laws to own and control research and development70. In doing so, they constrain access to 
technology that can facilitate key aspects of development in Africa.  
 
Finally, TRIPS makes possible the plagiarism of African creative inventions. According 
to the document, traditional knowledge is not ‘new, does not involve an inventive step 
                                                 
68 ibid.  
69 WTO, 2001, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN (01)/DEC/2, paragraph 7 
70 UNDP, 2003, Making Global Trade Work for People, Earthscan Publications Limited, p 207 
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and is not necessarily capable of industrial application’71. The point here seems to be that 
since this knowledge has often been in use for generations and is community-based, it is 
not owned by an individual whose creative input can be demonstrated and in whom 
therefore the right of ownership must be solely vested. What this means is that the 
community which owns such knowledge cannot own a copyright to it or patent it. This 
makes such intellectual output available for the use of everyone without the payment of 
royalties. The advantage of this to Western economies is evidenced by the use of African 
indigenous art in textiles and household products by European and American 
manufacturers. 
 
So far, our appraisal of the eighth MDG has concentrated on its dependence on “trade” 
and its regulatory structures and political dynamics. We would now like to consider the 
concept underlying that goal (development partnership) from a broader perspective. What 
is ‘partnership’ in this context, and in what sense can it further Africa’s development 
aspirations? In our view, the ‘partnership’ sought by the eighth MDG is the same one that 
the NEPAD seeks72. This refers to some form of continuous relationship between the 
wealthy West and sub-Saharan African countries that is considered desirable to the extent 
that it holds the prospect of generating “capital flows to Africa, as an essential component 
of a sustainable long-term approach to filling the resource gap”73. Existing global 
arrangements such as the Bretton Woods institutions and the WTO regime are envisaged 
to reflect the authenticity of this development partnership.  
 
It has been sufficiently argued in the preceding chapters of this work that these 
institutions have no intentions of forging a development-friendly partnership with Africa. 
Such a partnership must be mutually respectful and beneficial. However, the supposition 
that a partnership could be built that would rectify the existing abusive and unequal 
relations between the West and Africa borders on fantasy. The Akan maxim, that ‘the 
hand that receives is always beneath that which offers’ succinctly explains why such a 
supposition is illusory. For, if the philosophy of capitalism is taken seriously, one cannot 
                                                 
71 Ibid. p 225 
72 See Section 1.4.3.2  
73 Ibid. Paragraph 153 
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ignore its understanding of the nature and purpose of competition which, as stated in 
section 1.4.1, justifies the taking of human life and dignity if these obstruct ‘victory’ in 
the quest for wealth accumulation. Therefore if one takes this philosophy seriously, then 
one would hardly come to the conclusion that capitalists will offer someone resources in 
aid to enable the person ascend to the position where you can compete with them!  
 
The final critical comment on the MDGs that we wish to make is that most of them repeat 
long-held commitments of the international community that are yet to be fulfilled74, and 
one wonders what special circumstances have now emerged to enhance their fulfillment. 
The Report on the 2005 World Summit on the MDGs acknowledges that Africa is the 
only continent not on track to meet any of the goals of the Millennium Declaration by 
201575. And even the NEPAD clearly supposes that the meeting of these targets by Africa 
depends on financial support from the rich world. Whatever the merits of this 
presumption, any optimism for such financial support has been considerably diminished 
by the decision of the American government and its allies to commit money to a ‘war on 
terrorism’ in the aftermath of the September 11 attacks on the United States. Financing 
the war on terror has become the opportunity cost of the willingness of the rich world to 
meet their ODA targets pledged at Monterrey76. Yet the Monterrey Consensus stated 
explicitly that one of the goals for setting these targets is to promote sustainable 
development77. In view of these, the Millennium declaration’s commitment to assisting 
Africa to realize the stipulated goals78 is questionable. 
 
2.7     Sustainable Development 
 
In 1987, the World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) published a 
report entitled “Our Common Future”. This document came to be known as the 
“Brundtland Report” after the Commission's chairwoman, Gro Harlem Brundtland. In 
                                                 
74 Sachs, J. D., 2005, The End of Poverty, op. cit. p 213 
75 United Nations, 2005. Revised Draft Outcome Document of the High-Level Plenary Meeting of the 
General Assembly of September 2005, Document Number A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev.2; paragraph 44  
76 Sachs, J., 2005, The End of Poverty , op. cit., p. 214-218 
77 United Nations, 2002, Report of the International Conference on Financing for Development, New York, 
Paragraph 1 
78 United Nations 2000. Millennium Declaration, op. cit. paragraphs 27 - 28 
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consonance with the theories discussed in this chapter, the report held that fulfilling 
human needs and aspirations for a better life is the most important goal of development, 
and that poor people have a justified right in having these needs and aspirations 
fulfilled79. Toward this goal, countries must pursue ‘sustainable development’, defined as 
development that meets the needs of the present without endangering the opportunities of 
future generations to meet their own needs80. Essentially, this meant that current human 
needs and aspirations must be fulfilled by promoting levels and types of production and 
consumption that do not destroy the ecology.   
 
Since the publication of this report, the discourse on the objectives and strategies of 
development has been characterized by the concept of sustainability. But to what extent 
does this concept provide inspiration for practical remedies for the excesses of 
economism, and for poverty eradication? We take a closer look at the report on the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg in 2002, to determine this.  
In line with the Brundtland Report, the report of the Johannesburg Summit considered 
economic development, social development and environmental protection as “the 
interdependent and mutually reinforcing pillars” of sustainable development81. One of the 
conditions for achieving this is to gain access to financial resources and open up markets 
for underdeveloped countries82. This, according to the report, is easily done by 
participating in globalization, which it defines as “the rapid integration of markets, 
mobility of capital and significant increases in investment flows around the world”83.  
The Report adopts the MDGs84, and participatory approaches to development85. It also 
welcomes and supports NEPAD86, and yet re-affirms the vital role of indigenous people 
                                                 
79 United Nations, 1987, Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, New York, p. 
24 - 25 
80 Ibid. p. 24 
81 United Nations. 2002. Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, Johannesburg. New 
York. Paragraph 5 
82 Ibid. paragraph 18 
83 Ibid. paragraph 47 
84 Plan of Implementation of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, paragraph 1 
85 Ibid. Paragraph 26 
86 Ibid. paragraph 22 
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in sustainable development87.  Further, it “acknowledges the importance of ethics for 
sustainable development88” 
 
Paragraph 7 of the Plan of Implementation of The Report identifies poverty as the 
greatest challenge facing the world today and its eradication as an indispensable 
requirement for sustainable development. To achieve this, development strategies at the 
national and international levels must be geared towards:  
 
(a) Halving, by the year 2015, the proportion of the world’s people whose income is less 
than 1 dollar a day and the proportion of people who suffer from hunger and, by the same 
date, to halve the proportion of people without access to safe drinking water;  
(b) Establishing a world solidarity fund to eradicate poverty and to promote social and 
human development in the developing countries pursuant to modalities to be determined 
by the General Assembly,  
(c) Developing national programmes for sustainable development and local and 
community development to promote the empowerment of people living in poverty and 
their organizations. These programmes should reflect their priorities and enable them to 
increase access to productive resources, public services and institutions, in particular 
land, water, employment opportunities, credit, education and health;  
(d) Promoting women’s equal access to and full participation in, decision-making at all 
levels, mainstreaming gender perspectives in all policies and strategies, eliminating all 
forms of violence and discrimination against women and improving the status, health and 
economic welfare of women and girls through full and equal access to economic 
opportunity, land, credit, education and health-care services;  
(e) Developing policies and ways and means to improve access by indigenous people and 
their communities to economic activities and increase their employment through, where 
appropriate, measures such as training, technical assistance and credit facilities.  
                                                 
87 Ibid. paragraph 25 
88 Plan of implementation, ibid., Paragraph 2 
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(f) Delivering basic health services for all and reduce environmental health threats, taking 
into account the special needs of children and the linkages between poverty, health and 
environment, with provision of financial resources, technical assistance and knowledge 
transfer to developing countries and countries with economies in transition;  
(g) Ensuring that children everywhere will be able to complete a full course of primary 
schooling and will have equal access to all levels of education;  
(h) Providing access to agricultural resources for people living in poverty, especially 
women and indigenous communities, and promoting, as appropriate, land tenure 
arrangements that recognize and protect indigenous and common property resource 
management systems;  
(i) Building basic rural infrastructure, diversifying the economy and improving 
transportation and access to markets, market information and credit for the rural poor to 
support sustainable agriculture and rural development;  
(j) Transferring basic sustainable agricultural techniques and knowledge, including 
natural resource management, to small and medium-scale farmers, fishers and the rural 
poor, especially in developing countries, including through multi-stakeholder approaches 
and public-private partnerships aimed at increasing agriculture production and food 
security;  
(k) Increasing food availability and affordability, including through harvest and food 
technology and management, as well as equitable and efficient distribution systems, by 
promoting, for example, community-based partnerships linking urban and rural people 
and enterprises;  
(l) Combating desertification and mitigating the effects of drought and floods through 
measures such as improved use of climate and weather information and forecasts, early 
warning systems, land and natural resource management, agricultural practices and 
ecosystem conservation in order to reverse current trends and minimize degradation of 
land and water resource. 
(m) Increasing access to water sanitation in national sustainable development strategies  
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2.7.1 Criticisms of Sustainable Development: 
Strategies (a) to (m) are undoubtedly reformulations of the MDGs and elements of the 
recommendations of Brundtland Report. In this wise, the aspirations of the summit are 
admirable. However, the report contains a number of noteworthy inconsistencies that 
deserve critical attention.   
As indicated above, the report supports NEPAD, and yet purports to affirm the vital role 
of indigenous people in sustainable development. We understand this reference to 
indigenous people to include their cultural products. If so, then we encounter an 
inconsistency. We argued in section 1.4.3.2 that NEPAD cannot rightfully claim to be 
African-owned and African-led because of the miserly role it assigns to African culture in 
the quest for Africa’s development. We pointed out that the role that NEPAD assigns to 
African culture is incongruent with significant contribution to development. Accordingly, 
the Johannesburg report cannot consistently adopt NEPAD and consider indigenous 
cultures as assets for sustainable development in Africa. 
Secondly, the NEPAD is deeply rooted in neo-liberalism; yet the policy prescriptions of 
neo-liberal economics have repeatedly been shown not to work in Africa. Further, neo-
liberal democratic politics is not consistent with the social theory and organization in the 
indigenous African setting89.  Consequently, a programme that wholeheartedly adopts 
NEPAD will be saddled with intractable tensions when it insists on employing 
indigenous knowledge and values towards its aims.  
 
Further, the report acknowledges the importance of globalization for sustainable 
development. As stated in section 2.7 above, it defines globalization as the rapid 
integration of markets, mobility of capital and significant increases in investment flows 
around the world. So granted, the neo-liberal economic orientation of globalization will 
hardly need substantiation. This paves the way for asking whether globalization can ever 
be in harmony with sustainable development in Africa.  
                                                 
89 We will argue this point fully in the final chapter. 
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2.8 The “African Alternative Framework” 
 
A discussion of the African Alternative Framework for Structural Adjustment Programs 
for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation90 (Alternative Framework) ought, 
perhaps to have ensued soon after the discussion of the SAPs in section 1.4.3.3. We chose 
to present this framework here because of its proclamation to be an ‘alternative’. It would 
be useful therefore to read this in conjunction with section 1.4.3.3 in order to have a 
clearer insight into the genesis and objectives of this framework.  
 
Soon after the World Bank’s publication of Africa’s Adjustment and Growth in the 1980s 
which, as indicated in section 1.4.3.3 claimed implementation of SAPs were improving 
African economies, African opposition to the SAPs moved beyond criticism to the search 
for an alternative framework. In 1989, African ministers of finance, meeting under the 
auspices of UNECA, adopted Alternative Framework which, unlike the SAP, sought to 
deal “with the root causes of underdevelopment in Africa”91.  
 
Claude Ake points out various ways in which Alternative Framework differs from the 
SAPs92. First, its point of departure is solutions to the root causes of Africa’s 
underdevelopment. Accordingly, it places the origins of the structural deformities in 
African economies partly in the colonial period. Further, it conceives of the problems of 
Africa not as short-term ones to be corrected by monetarism but those that need a long-
term agenda from a comprehensive perspective.  
 
These differences move “beyond policies and strategies and agendas and assume an 
ideological form”93. As the then Executive Secretary of UNECA has argued, this is 
                                                 
90 United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 1989, African Alternative Framework to Structural 
Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation, Document E/ECA/CM, 
15/6/Rev.3, Addis Ababa: UNECA 
91 Ake, C., 2001, Democracy and Development, Ibadan: Spectrum Books, p. 36 
92 Ibid. pp 36-39 
93 Ibid. p. 38 
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exemplified in four major ways94. First, it is human centered, in the sense that “it 
distances itself completely from the orthodox mechanistic models or approaches that 
have reduced the entire business of adjustment to the attainment of a few balances… 
without any regard to the implications of the social sectors and the overall welfare of the 
people”. Secondly, it is a comprehensive approach to socioeconomic change to the extent 
that it situates change in a broader context of social, political, cultural and economic 
values and institutions. Thirdly, its policies derive “their validity and legitimacy from the 
very structural nature of the African political economy”; and finally, it is sensitive to 
specificity to the extent that it proposes a program to be applied in Africa. 
 
In spite of this, Alternative Framework did “not appear to have emerged as a credible 
alternative policy”95, as it was unable to stem the tide of the adoption of structural 
adjustment by African governments. The question that must be answered then is why so, 
in spite of the African-centeredness of its program? Could it be because African leaders 
suffer akrasis, knowing what is right and yet lacking the political will to do it? If there is 
a gap between what African leaders want to do to address the effects of poverty on the 
continent and what they in fact do, then what other ‘alternative’ is there to end poverty? 
 
2.9 The End of Poverty 
 
Clearly, the aspirations of the World Bank, IMF, and countries that have formulated 
Poverty Reduction Strategies as vehicles for development are surpassed by both the 
Brundtland Report and the Johannesburg Report. This is because these reports espouse 
the vision of eradicating poverty, whereas the PRSs and the Bretton Woods institutions 
seek the limited goal of poverty alleviation or reduction. Two notable standpoints, since 
the Johannesburg summit, have sided with the vision of the Reports. First, at the initiative 
of President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva of Brazil, the leaders of France, Chile and Spain, 
as well as United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan rallied representatives of 110 
Member States, including the more than 50 heads of State and government, to adopt the 
                                                 
94 Adedeji, A., 1990, “Dimensions of the African Crisis”, Keynote Address to the Conference on the 
Economic Crisis in Africa, October 25-28; cf. Ake, C., 2001, Democracy and Development, op. cit., p. 38 
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Declaration on the Action against Hunger and Poverty on the 20th of September 
2004. The Declaration considered hunger eliminable and its persistence “the greatest 
scandal” in the World96. Then in 2005 Jeffrey Sachs, in his acclaimed book97, proposed 
measures for ending extreme poverty in the world by the year 202598. The key to these 
measures is what he terms ‘clinical economics’99. Because of their significant influence 
on the debate on poverty, we want to turn our attention to Sachs’ ideas.  
 
2.9.1 Clinical Economics and the End of Poverty 
 
According to Sachs, ‘clinical economics’ replaces the “structural adjustment era100”, 
which was based on “a simplistic, even simpleminded, view of the challenge of poverty”. 
This simple-mindedness is reflected in both the assumption that the responsibility for 
poverty reduction lay entirely with the poor countries themselves; and the view that this 
responsibility would be adequately met by private-sector-led economic development101. 
 
Sachs outlines five tenets of clinical economics. The first is its acknowledgement of the 
complexity of economies, and that “the failure of one system can lead to cascades of 
failure in other parts of the economy”102. This leads to the need for, secondly, differential 
diagnosis and the prescription of appropriate remedies that are well suited to each 
country’s specific conditions”. This would require the practitioners of clinical economics 
to consider the inter-relatedness of economic and fiscal policy, patterns of governance 
and culture, as well as the physical geography and human ecology of the context they are 
working in103. By contrast, the IMF, in diagnosing the problems of countries, has focused 
on a very narrow range of issues, such as corruption, barriers to private enterprise, budget 
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deficits, and state ownership of production. It has also standardized and universalized its 
prescriptions without regard to the specific context104.   
 
The third aspect of clinical economics, therefore, is that it views solutions in “family” 
terms. This means that it does not, like the World Bank and IMF conceive of entirely 
internal solutions such as trade liberalization and fiscal policy, but understands that 
internal solutions could be ineffectual if not combined with reforms in the rich countries, 
debt cancellation, increased foreign financial assistance for investments and support to 
maintaining peace105.  
 
Fourthly, clinical economics endorses a monitoring and evaluating framework that judges 
policy and project outcomes rather than their inputs. According to Sachs, this compares 
with the IMF and WB’s practice of evaluating performance solely by inputs. “ A 
government may be told to cut its budget deficit by 1 percent of GDP. It is judged by 
whether or not it carries out that measure, not on whether the measure produces faster 
growth or a reduction of poverty, or a solution to a debt crisis”106.  
 
Finally, the approach applies the requisite ethical and professional standards that the 
development economics community hitherto lacked. This deficiency is exemplified by its 
inattention to the context in defining problems of impoverished countries and prescribing 
solutions to them107.  
 
2.9.2 Clinical Economics in Action 
 
The success of clinical economics, we are told, depends on founding a global network of 
connections between rich and poor countries that can secure Official Development Aid 
(ODA) and key investments to finance Millennium Development Goals-centered poverty 
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reduction strategies in poor countries108. This position is not new; it goas back at least to 
the Cocoyoc Declaration. Recently, the Paris Declaration of 2005, adopted by Ministers 
from ninety one countries as well as Heads of multilateral and bilateral development 
institutions109, recognized that increasing the volume of aid and other development 
resources is crucial for the achievement of the MDGs. Likewise, the five-year review of 
the Millennium Development Goals by the United Nations General Assembly in 2005 
(the Millennium + 5 Summit) acknowledged the need for substantial increases in ODA, 
especially meeting the pledges at Monterrey, if the goals and targets of the MDGs are to 
be met by 2015110.   
 
Sachs points out, and I think correctly, that the effort required of the rich world toward 
ending poverty is so little that doing less questions its humaneness. This is because 0.6% 
of the income of the twenty-two members of the Development Assistance Committee111 
(DAC) of the OECD in 2004, for instance, would in theory have provided for the basic 
needs of 1.1 billion of the world’s extreme poor112. Further, the money needed to meet 
the MDGs by 2015 is 0.5% of the GNP of the DAC members; yet in 2004, only five 
members of the DAC (Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, Norway and Sweden) met this 
target113. One of the lowest contributors, the United States, is as well the richest economy 
in the world. It contributed 0.15% of its 2004 income. During that year, the U. S spent 
about 2.5 billion dollars in two weeks to support its war on terror in Iraq. This is as much 
it spent for an entire year of economic development assistance to Africa114. One needs 
only to compare this amount with the country’s $150 billion of military spending in the 
fiscal year 2005 to appreciate the seriousness with which the U. S attaches to the effort 
toward ending poverty globally!  
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That these calls have largely fallen on deaf ears is less perplexing if one considers that the 
predominant guide of social and economic organization in the West is self-interest driven 
by competition. As noted in the introductory chapter, the ethic of competition is hardly 
reconcilable with humaneness. It is worth recalling that after passing of the Economic 
Cooperation Act of 1948, which embodied the Marshall Plan, the United States provided 
more than one percent of its GNP from 1948-1952 to rebuild Europe115; and the main 
reason for this was to bolster America’s own economic progress and security interests by 
establishing properly functioning international trade and markets in Europe, and 
undermining the advance of the Soviet Union on the East of the continent116. Recent 
events, like the invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the perennial support of the U. S. to Israel 
suggest that not much has changed in this policy since the end of the Second World War. 
This tradition of pursuing self-interest to the detriment of global poverty eradication and 
justice suggests that for the United States of America and many of its allies in the G8, 
‘development aid’ is another way of investing for self-interest! This in fact fortifies the 
arguments, discussed in section 1.1, that the catalyst to a multilateral thinking on 
development in the West was the immediate political interests of the United States of 
America. It also questions the veracity of Harry Truman’s view, recorded also in section 
2.1, that America’s aim with assisting the poor world to develop is not based on 
“exploitation for [self] profit” but on fair dealing. 
 
2.9.3 A Critique of Sachs 
 
Sachs’ clinical economics advocates a wide-ranging approach to defining development 
problems and solutions. In this sense it adopts the sustainable development paradigm and 
must accordingly answer to the criticisms of that paradigm outlined in section 2.7.1.  
Sachs also adopts the MDGs. In fact he serves as Director of the Millennium Project, 
which seeks to realize the MDGs in selected poor countries by applying appropriate 
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technologies. Accordingly, his clinical economics is also answerable to the criticism 
leveled against the MDGs in section 2.6.1 above. 
 
Besides these, an infamous weakness in Sachs’ views is his suppression of the role of 
colonialism and the wars of conquest in the prevalent global disparities in wealth. He 
insists that exploitation of other regions by Europe and the U. S. is insignificant in 
explaining wealth creation and accumulation in the West. As regards this, he asserts:  
 
“Let me dispose of one idea right from the start. Many people assume that the rich 
have gotten rich because the poor have gotten poor. In other words, they assume that 
Europe and the United States used military force and political strength  during and 
after the era of colonialism to extract wealth from the poorest regions, and thereby to 
grow rich…… However, the real story of modern economic growth has been the 
ability of some regions to achieve unprecedented long-term increases in total 
production to levels never before seen in the world, while other regions stagnated, at 
least by comparison. Technology has been the main force behind the long term 
increases in income in the rich world, not exploitation of the poor”117.  
 
This claim, that current disparities in wealth globally are due essentially to technology is 
dubious. Economic growth necessarily required the employment of productive resources, 
and the siphoning of vital human and economic resources out of sub-Saharan Africa 
during the slave trade, colonialism and their aftermath to the West, has been sufficiently 
documented118. This transfer of resources from Africa to the West merits prominence in 
explaining the differences in economic growth which Sachs records among these regions. 
Further, this exploitation of the colonies, which produced excess income for investment 
in the Western countries, may also partly account for the financing of technological 
innovation. Therefore the de-emphasis on exploitation in accounting for wealth creation 
and accumulation in the West is unjustified.  
 
Further, this claim that colonialism bears insignificant blame for the poverty of the Third 
World invokes a certain level of inconsistency in Sachs. This is because he makes at least 
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three assertions in his work that clearly contradict the above claim. First, he 
acknowledges that “Africa’s development crisis reflects the interactions of history, 
geography, domestic policies and geopolitics119”. Secondly, he asserts that “almost every 
African political crisis has a long history of Western meddling among its many causes. 
The length of the meddling extends to the colonial era in that most of these conflicts 
reflect the economic interests of investors from former colonial masters”120. Finally, 
Sachs asserts that “far from lifting Africa economically, the colonial era left Africa bereft 
of educated citizens and leaders, basic infrastructure and public health facilities”121. It is 
difficult to understand how these three assertions square up with the de-emphasis of 
colonialism and neo-colonialism as causes of poverty in sub-Saharan Africa. In view of 
these, it is defensible to charge Sachs with inconsistency. 
 
In so far as his desire and approach for an end of poverty in Africa is concerned, another 
problem we encounter in Sachs is his claim to inspiration by the Enlightenment. He 
mentions philosophers such as John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith, Immanuel Kant 
and Francis Bacon as providing the basis for the notion that “science and technology, 
fuelled by human reason, can be a sustained force for social improvements and human 
betterment”122.  In this respect, he loyally follows the Human Development Report of 
1990. Two points are worth noting about this source of inspiration. The first is that it 
projects the Eurocentric character of Sachs’ project. We share Serequeberhan’s view that 
the Enlightenment, as a project of critical and rational emancipation, cannot further the 
emancipation of non-Europeans, especially sub-Saharan Africans. This is so because 
according to some of its prominent philosophers, especially Immanuel Kant, reason and 
rationality are not endowed to black Africans123. Secondly, the racism and condescending 
attitude of many of the European thinkers on whom Sachs’ draw towards Africa and 
Africans, are well documented124. It is easily inferred from the evidence that their ideas of 
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social improvements and human betterment did not include those of Africans. In fact, 
these ideas embodied epistemologies and applied philosophies that fostered the 
subjugation and brutality meted out to Africans during the slave trade and colonialism125. 
Another crucial point of criticism of Sachs is, philosophically, that his “clinical 
economics” solution revolves within the epistemological paradigm of economic science 
in the West. Accordingly, it cannot be an ‘alternative’ in the strict sense. As proposed in 
section 1.1, a framework of development must be based on the specificity and historicity 
of the culture seeking to be developed if it hopes to succeed in application. Consequently, 
it is difficult to see how notions that are contemptuous of the reality and humanity of 
Africans can simultaneously serve to advance their welfare and dignity.  
 
2.10 Concluding Remarks 
 
Although they differ in significant ways from the mainstream perspectives considered in 
Chapter One, the conceptions and theories discussed in this chapter do not provide 
fundamental alternatives to Western thinking on development. Many of them merely 
elaborate on a set of theories “that can be understood within the framework of Western 
rationalism with roots in the philosophies of the European Enlightenment126”. They 
constitute “a confusion of agendas”127, based on decisions and choices which are seldom 
adopted on the basis of a conscious reflection on the needs and aspirations of Africans. 
As such they can hardly be said to be motivated by a quest for Africa’s development.  
 
One exemplification of this obliviousness to the needs and aspirations of Africa is that the 
theories and programmes adhere, in various degrees, to the Eurocentic or economistic 
core of mainstream economic development theory. In fact none of the strategies 
considered in this chapter directly criticize the conceptions and theorizing of the 
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mainstream economistic theories. Rather, they establish, in various ways, that these 
theories can go wrong in practice128.  
 
The viability and anticipated success of most of the strategies and perspectives 
considered in this chapter, especially the MDGs and Sachs’ Clinical Economics, as well 
as the NEPAD, are premised on optimism about the benefits of globalization. However, 
articulating the view of many commentators, Awoonor argues that the nature and purpose 
of ‘globalization’ as presented in official Western discourse and by the Bretton Woods 
institutions is a myth129. In fact, “the globalization agenda today is part of the most recent 
mutation of the capitalist ideology resurgent after the collapse of the Soviet Union”130. 
Within the context of African economic reality, globalization “defines a plethora of 
factors including the brutal exploitation of our [Africa’s] raw materials and the 
consolidation of a chronic dependency syndrome”131.  
 
Hardly, then, can perspectives that tout the ‘virtues’ of globalization, as those presented 
in this chapter amount to an alternative paradigm that can successfully mount a frontal 
attack on poverty in Africa and for Africa’s development. Little wonder, then, that the 
consequence of their application in sub-Saharan Africa is increasing poverty. 
Conceptions and practices of development are applications of social science. What is 
needed for Africa’s development is a paradigm that reflects the specificity and historicity 
of Africa. We insist that such a social scientific paradigm must necessarily be rooted in 
the philosophical soil of the continent for it to succeed. The question arises then as to 
why a science that is not fixed in the intellectual disposition of a culture must in practice 
fail in that context? We turn our attention to the exploration of this question in the next 
chapter.  
                                                 
128 Martinussen, J., 1997, Society, State & Market, op. cit., p 333 
129 Awoonor, K., 2006, “Humanities and Globalization: An African Perspective”, in Legon Journal of the 
Humanities: Special Edition 2006, Legon: University of Ghana, p. 5. Here Awoonor argues that 
globalization, thus presented, “connotes, at the most benign level, the integration of the world into a unified 
trading, resource use regime, the sharing of technology which confers on all its corners of the globe, the 
benefits of free trade and an equal share in the good things that science and technology bring in their 
wake.” 
130 Ibid. 
131 Ibid, p 7 
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CHAPTER THREE: SCIENCE AND AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT 
 
3.1 Is Science a Universally Valid Knowledge System? 
 
For most of its career, modern Western science has portrayed itself as the only 
universally valid framework for the explanation and prediction of natural and social 
phenomena. It has endeavored to retain and promote this self-made image by proclaiming 
its knowledge as constituted of a level of objectivity and rationality that makes it 
universally valid. The point of departure for this view is the claim of science to have 
secured control over ‘the principle of the uniformity of nature’. This principle states that 
what has once happened will, all things being equal, under similar circumstances, happen 
again1. Thus if the events of nature do not happen at random but follow an unvarying 
pattern, then the primary aim of science is to discover and apply the laws that govern 
these regularities in order to successfully predict and explain regularities in nature and 
social phenomena2. Science has met this aim sufficiently to make its explanations 
universally valid, it is claimed. This achievement of science, it is further claimed, stems 
from its internal procedures that enable scientists to transcend their own interests as well 
as the interests and values of the cultures in which they work. Sandra Harding 
characterizes this as upholding an “internalist epistemology”, and rejects it. In her view, 
this amounts to claiming that “scientific knowledge and its effects are consequences of 
‘internal’ epistemological features of modern scientific processes, such as their inherent 
rationality, unique logic of justification, universal language and objectivity-achieving 
method3. Harding objects to this internalist epistemological stance because in her view, a 
social context determines not only the presence of scientific ideas and practice, but also 
their nature. Scientific theories and practice are thus socially constructed and ordered. 
                                                 
1 Jeans, J., 1942, Physics and Philosophy, New York: Dover Publications, p. 3-4 
2 There is a clear affinity of the natural sciences with the social sciences. This is affirmed by Auguste 
Comte’s claim, reported by Sir James Jeans, that the abstract sciences could be arranged in a hierarchy, in 
the order: mathematics, astronomy, physics, chemistry, biology, sociology. (see Physics and Philosophy, 
ibid. p 5).  
3 Harding, S., 1997, “Is Modern Science an Ethnoscience? Rethinking Epistemological Assumptions”, in  
Eze, E. C., (ed), Post-colonial African Philosophy, A Reader, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, p 46 
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This order, although it is relative to society, appears to the Western scientist as an 
objective truth about the world.  
 
The aim of this chapter is to share in the rejection of the internalist epistemology of 
modern science, and to affirm the dependence of science on particular ontologies, 
epistemologies and sets of values. Further, we will advance the view that the 
development theories and their approaches considered in chapter two, as applications of 
social science, have failed to succeed in Africa because they impose Western ontologies 
and epistemologies. We begin with an exploration into the basis of the claim to 
objectivity and universality of scientific knowledge. 
 
3.2 Modern Science: Initial and Current Preoccupations 
 
The insistence on a unique rationality and logic of justification for the explanatory 
framework of modern Western science is a relic of its origins and initial preoccupations. 
These origins are located in the Copernican Revolution4, the essence of which was the 
rejection of the geocentric view of the universe which had dominated European thought 
for 1500 years, for the heliocentric view 5. The geocentric view held that the earth was the 
center of the universe, and that the stars, sun, moon and planets revolved around it. 
Aristotle, the most influential proponent of the geocentric view, formulated teleological 
explanations of both the natural and social world. This type of explanation purports to 
make an event intelligible by ascribing a purpose to it. Accordingly, the physical 
behaviour of objects was explained in terms of the purposes associated with their material 
constitution; and the concepts of purpose and design were also applied in understanding 
and classifying human activity6. In fact even contemporaneously, the explanatory power 
of geocentric science remains. Undoubtedly, purposes constitute reasons, in the social 
                                                 
4 Although Copernicus bears the name of this shift of scientific paradigm, three works by three persons, 
stretching from the mid 16th century to the mid 17th century are recognized as being responsible for 
solidifying its foundations. These are Nicolaus Copernicus’ De Revolutionibus, which appeared in the 
1530s, Johannes Kepler’s Mysterium Cosmographicum which appeared in 1596, and Galileo Galilei’s The 
Two Chief World Systems, published in 1632. 
5 Doyal, L and Harris, R., 1986, Empiricism, Explanation and Rationality: An introduction to the 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 27 
6 Ibid. p. 29-30 
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sciences, why people behave in particular ways. Further, “every time the expressions 
‘sunrise’ and ‘sunset’ are employed it is testimony to the lingering explanatory power of 
geocentric system”7.  
 
On the other hand, proponents of the Copernican Revolution theorized the sun as center 
of the universe, around which all celestial objects revolved8. A key outcome of this 
Revolution was acceptance that nature should be theoretically and experimentally 
explored with reference to its observed and supposed regularities. Hence the aim of 
science became the discovery of laws – universally valid descriptions of the fundamental 
structure and patterns of the physical and social world, or “the ways things are!”. In 
fulfillment of this, explanations in modern natural sciences are deductive-nomological. 
They are deductive in the sense that their premises (or explanans)9 logically entail their 
conclusions (or explanandum); and they are nomological in that at least one of their 
premises is a law. These explanations are therefore contingent on the canons of 
mathematics and formal logic.  
 
As footnote 2 indicates, there is a strong affinity between the natural and social sciences. 
This is exemplified by a number of facts. One is the insistence of many contemporary 
philosophers and theorists of the social sciences that the basic theories of the social 
sciences are reducible to some suitable theory in the natural sciences10. This means that 
nomological explanatory principles are applicable to both physical events and human 
actions11. In short, the criterion for the recognition of a theory as worthy of acceptance, 
for these philosophers and theorists, is the same in both the natural and social sciences. 
Thus causal necessity is required by explanations in both branches of science. Another 
fact is the extrapolation of the mathematical and logical methods to the social sciences. 
We will discus this more fully in section 3.4. 
                                                 
7 Ibid. p. 28 
8 This is what is commonly referred to as the heliocentric view of the universe 
9 Generally, this consists of one or more general laws, one or more ‘initial conditions’ which describe the 
experimental situation, and an ‘assumption’ which is usually stated as ‘all things being equal’ 
10 Morgenbesser, S., 1970, “Is it a Science?”, in Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis, Emmet, D 
and MacIntyre, A. (eds), London: Macmillan, p. 20 
11 Harris and Doyal,, 1986, Empiricism, Explanation and Rationality, op. cit.  p. 52. Also Habermas, J.,  
1970, “Knowledge and Interest”, in Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis, op. cit. p. 52. 
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The preoccupation with causal necessity based on a unique logic of justification seeking 
certainty is easily traceable to the origins modern science, which are characterized by two 
exceptional events.  The first is the replacement of the geocentric view with the 
heliocentric view. The second is the Reformation, which refers to a series of events in the 
first half of the sixteenth century, initiated by the posting by Martin Luther of the “Ninety 
five theses” on the church at Wittenberg. These events collapsed the Catholic Church’s 
hold on the production and dissemination of knowledge. Before the Reformation, the 
monasteries of The Church were centers of excellence for theorizing a unified worship of 
God, as well as for Aristotelian metaphysics which underlay geocentric science. In spite 
of its strong connections with geocentric thought, the Church suppressed innovative 
scientific thinking by branding thinkers as Galileo Galilei and Giodarno Bruno12 as 
heretics deserving of anathema and death. In the 1500s, the reformation challenged and 
overthrew the Vatican as the exclusive seat of religious authority and political 
dominance. The certainty of geocentric science, accumulated over 1500 years, as well as 
the hierocratic thinking and ordering of society embedded in the suppression of 
innovative thought, crumbled with the demise of this unity and authority of The Church 
and led to the emergence of modern Western science.  
 
The collapse of these two foundations of the production and dissemination of knowledge 
before the Reformation occasioned “disdainful mistrust and extreme skepticism toward 
any new system of justifying and authorizing knowledge about nature”13. Accordingly, 
the new scientists promoting the heliocentric view “had an uphill battle presenting 
themselves as creditable to a nervous, skeptical intelligentsia comprised of intellectual 
Church officials and scholarly gentlemen affiliated with Royal Courts”14.  
 
The earliest theorists and practitioners of modern science, then, needed to adopt a unique 
self-validating posture in order to generate confidence in their methods and results. This 
                                                 
12 Burnt at the stake in the year 1600 at the instigation of The Church 
13 Lauer, H., 2004, “Cause and Effect between Knowledge Traditions”, in Transactions of the Historical 
Society of Ghana, New Series No. 8, 2004, Legon: University of Ghana, p. 261 
14 Ibid. 
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is exemplified by the overriding aim of Descartes’ hyperbolic doubt and inquiry in the 
Meditations15, and his discovery of cogito ergo sum16 as the flawless foundation of all 
knowledge. What is implicit in the Cartesian enterprise is that rationalism, nurtured by 
the canons of logic and mathematics, is the only infallible source and justification for 
knowledge. All competing techniques of knowledge production and justification are 
rejected as quackery and nonsense. Yet to the extent that the ‘truths’ of deductive reason 
could be valid in their own right, i.e., without reference to the empirical world, Descartes’ 
rationalism was a metaphysics.  
 
3.3    The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Natural Sciences 
 
If science is culture-dependent, then a metaphysics and cultural values are necessarily 
prior and foundational to its knowledge claims. This must be the case since ontology17 
and epistemology are intimately and inextricably linked by mutual implication. If 
ontology is the theory of being, and epistemology a theory of the justification of 
knowledge, then each must imply the other because claiming that something exists 
rationally implies the question: “how do you know”?; and claiming to know that x 
implies admitting the existence of x.  
 
In the Western tradition of knowledge production, three special cases that illustrate the 
profound influence of metaphysics on the natural sciences18 deserve mention here. The 
first is Sir Isaac Newton’s works, which held exclusive sway as the paradigm of the 
                                                 
15 Descartes, R., 1998, Discourse on Method and The Meditations, London: Penguin, p. 95. At the onset of 
his Meditations on First Philosophy, Descartes informs us that the main purpose of his enquiry is to rid 
himself of belief in things “which are not entirely certain and indubitable” as well as those that are 
“manifestly false”, and “to begin afresh from the foundations” in the quest for “something firm and 
constant in the sciences”. Later on in the Meditations (at p 103-105), we are assured that this pervasive 
doubting is a prerequisite for the quest for a type of foundation for knowledge that is so certain that any 
attempt to doubt it further proves the truth of it.   
16 “I think, therefore I am”. This is the principle, advanced in the Second Meditations, (that the existence of 
a thinker, and of the whole world, incontestably depends on “clear and distinct” thought.  
17 The transition to ‘ontology’ in this sentence from ‘metaphysics’ in the previous one is a conscious one, 
informed by the fact that in Western philosophy, ontology is held to be the centre of metaphysics (see 
Honderich, T. (ed), 1995, Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p 634. 
Whether this is the case in African philosophy is debatable, but we reserve a discussion of this for the next 
chapter.   
18 Burrt, E. A., 1932, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. , London, Routledge & 
Kegan Paul. Burrt traverses this territory in this historical and critical essay. 
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natural sciences until the theories of quantum mechanics and Einstein’s theories of 
Relativity gained currency in the early twentieth century. As discussed in section 3.1, 
Aristotle was unparalleled in providing the metaphysical and theoretical basis of 
geocentric science. Newton has been considered by many as the equivalent philosopher 
and theoretician for modern (heliocentric) mechanistic science19. His ‘discovery’ of the 
laws of motion and the law of universal gravitation was considered to be the ultimate 
realization. This was sufficiently displayed by his contemporaries and posterity. Thus 
Locke spoke of the “incomparable Mr. Newton, an under-labourer, employed in clearing 
the ground and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge”20. Burrt 
records Henry Pembleton, the editor of the third edition of Newton’s Principia 
Mathematica, in which these ‘discoveries’ were published, declaring that “…my 
admiration at the surprising inventions of this man [Newton], carries me to conceive of 
him as a person, who not only must raise the glory of the country which gave him birth, 
but that he has even done honour to human nature, by having extended the greatest and 
most noble of our faculties, reason, to subjects which, till he attempted them, appeared to 
be wholly beyond the reach of our limited capacities21”. Further, the French scientist, 
Laplace, is reputed to have remarked that “Newton was not only the greatest genius that 
ever had existed, but also the most fortunate; inasmuch as there is but one universe, and it 
can therefore happen to but one man in the world’s history to be the interpreter of its 
laws”22. 
 
So far as objects were masses, moving in space and time, under the impress of forces as 
Newton had defined them, their behaviour was now, as a result of his theories, “fully 
explicable in terms of exact mathematics”23.  We need to emphasize that central to 
Newton’s work was his finding a precise mathematical use for concepts like force, mass 
and inertia; and employing mathematics to assume definite answers to such fundamental 
questions as the nature of space, time, matter and motion. In this respect, it is legitimate 
                                                 
19 This opinion is affirmed by Burrt, ibid., p. 16 
20 Locke, J., 1995, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Note 11 
to the ‘Epistle to the Reader” 
21 Burrt, E. A., 1932, The Metaphysical Foundations, op. cit ibid., p. 18 
22 ibid. 
23 ibid. p. 20 
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to conclude that Newton’s greatest contribution to the growth of knowledge is his 
reduction of “the major phenomena of the whole universe of matter to a single 
mathematical law”24. For Newton, then, science was composed of laws stating the 
mathematical behaviour of nature. It is the exact mathematical formulation of the 
processes of the natural world. This reduction clearly implies authentication of Galileo’s 
and the Descartes’ doctrine that reason, exemplified by mathematics is, indisputably, the 
most reliable discoverer and explainer of the laws of nature25.  
 
The philosophy that is recipient of the florid eulogies above, then, is nothing short of 
Newton’s affirmation of rationalism as groundwork for the metaphysics of science. The 
metaphysics of rationalism is displayed in its claim that the “truths” of reason could be 
valid in their own right, i.e., without reference to the empirical world. It is this 
metaphysics of science, and its concomitant belief in uniform patterns in nature, that 
underlie the arbitrary universalism of internalist epistemologies 
 
Another metaphysical presupposition which Newton bequeathed to modern science is the 
doctrine of primary and secondary qualities of objects, inherited from Locke. That he 
inherited this from John Locke has been sufficiently argued by historians and 
philosophers of science alike26. Locke's distinction between primary and secondary 
qualities is set out in Book 2, Chapter 8 of his Essay Concerning Human Understanding. 
According to this doctrine, the primary qualities of bodies are qualities that belong to, and 
inhere in the object itself, and as such, cannot be detached from the object. These 
qualities are solidity, extension, figure, situation, motion or rest, and number. In 
connection with this, Locke writes: 
 
 
                                                 
24 ibid., p. 204. Here, Burrt quotes Newton, in his preface to the Principia stating his intention to 
“….investigate the forces of nature, and from these forces to demonstrate the other phenomena”. Clearly, 
the phrase “to demonstrate” suggests the pivotal role of mathematics in Newton’s method. 
25 Galileo rejected explanation of natural phenomena in terms of the teleology of physical events as did 
geocentric scientists in favour of explaining them in terms of a mathematical formula expressing their 
processes and motions.  Ibid., p. 203. Descartes also employs the geometrical method in his Meditations on 
First Philosophy to arrive at the pre-eminence of reason as a source and justification for knowledge 
26 Mackie, J. L., 1976, Problems from Locke, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp 22 – 23. Also, Burrt, E. A. 
Metaphysical Foundations, op. cit. p. 20 
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“Take a grain of wheat, divide it into two parts; each part has still solidity, 
extension, figure, and mobility: divide it again, and it retains still the same 
qualities; and so divide it on, till the parts become insensible; they must retain still 
each of them all those qualities. For division (which is all that a mill, or pestle, or 
any other body, does upon another, in reducing it to insensible parts) can never 
take away either solidity, extension, figure, or mobility from any body, but only 
makes two or more distinct separate masses of matter... These I call original or 
primary qualities of body, which I think we may observe to produce simple ideas 
in us, viz. solidity, extension, figure, motion or rest, and number”27.  
 
 
Locke believed that the world of primary qualities allows us a solid foundation for 
knowledge. Secondary Qualities, however, could give us no such knowledge, and are 
nothing more than the effects of the primary qualities on our senses. Thus he writes  
 
 
“Qualities which in truth are nothing in the objects themselves but power to 
produce various sensations in us by their primary qualities, i.e. by the bulk, figure, 
texture, and motion of their insensible parts, as colours, sounds, tastes, etc. These 
I call secondary qualities...”28.  
 
 
For Newton too, the world of matter was composed ultimately of absolutely hard and 
indestructible particles equipped with the following qualities: solidity, mass, hardness, 
impenetrability, motion, size and shape29. From these are to be distinguished the 
secondary qualities, which, for Newton, “have no real existence outside of human brains, 
save as a disposition of the bodies or the rays to reflect or propagate certain motions”30. 
Just as for Locke, then, the secondary qualities for Newton are not qualities that inhere in 
the objects themselves.  
 
The metaphysics of the distinction between primary and secondary qualities was 
criticized by Berkeley. He argued that the distinction is untenable to the extent that Locke 
insists both that the material world was a mind-independent reality, and also that all we 
could ever know were our perceptions (or ideas) of it. According to Berkeley, this is 
                                                 
27 Locke, J., 1975, Essay op. cit.,  Book 2 Chapter 8 Paragraph 9. 
28 ibid., Book 2 Chapter 8 Paragraph 10 
29 Burrt, E., A., 1932, Metaphysical Foundations, op. cit. pp. 228-229 
30 ibid. 233 
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flawed because “An idea can be like nothing but an idea”31. The point at issue here is that 
there is way of determining, a priori which qualities of objects are primary and which 
secondary. If secondary qualities are subjective, then how do we know that the primary 
qualities are not as well? Insisting nevertheless on this distinction constitutes 
metaphysics. 
 
Another of Newton’s metaphysical assumptions that informed modern science is his 
conception of the role of God in the existence and sustenance of the world, as well as in 
the production and validation of knowledge.  Newton speaks of God as “containing in 
himself all things as their principle and place32”. Also, “the Father is immovable, no place 
being capable of becoming emptier or fuller of him than it is by the eternal necessity of 
nature. All other things are movable from place to place”33.  
 
In light of this pronouncement it is justifiable to claim that when Newton spoke of bodies 
or of the center of gravity of the solar system moving in absolute space, he was not only 
referring to mathematical and mechanical laws. He also meant they were moving in God, 
that is, in the eternal and omniscient presence of the creator of all things. For, him, the 
role of God in the cosmic order is to impel, by his34 will, the whole material universe in 
some direction. This results in motion but no change in place.  
 
But for Newton, absolute space is not only the omnipresence of God. The world is 
subject to God’s absolute dominion and his willful control of the events in it. It is, in 
other words, the infinite scene of divine knowledge and control35.  God actively controls 
the world because He, “being in all places, is more able by his will to move the bodies 
                                                 
31 Berkeley, G., 1988, Principles of Human Understanding/Three Dialogues between Hylas and Plotinus, 
London: Penguin Books, 55 
32 Brewster, Memoirs, II, p. 154, Cf Burrt, ibid., p 257 
33 Brewster, Memoirs, II, p. 349, cf. Burrt, ibid. 
34 This pronoun is used advisedly here, to highlight Newton’s sexist depiction of God in the immediately 
preceding quotations. It is clear that Newton’s God is the same as Aristotle’s who made only the European 
‘man’, a ‘rational animal. God is the ultimate rational animal because Newton combines, among his 
attributes, those which have reference to the mathematical order and harmony f the world. 
35 Burrt, E. A., 1932, Metaphysical Foundations, p. 258. Here Burrt refers to Newton’s Opticks, (p. 344 ff.,) 
where Newton describes space as “the divine sensorium”, a place where the intellect and will of God 
comprehend and guide events in the world. 
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within his boundless uniform sensorium, and thereby to form and reform parts of the 
universe”36. God is thus both infinite knowledge and Almighty Will.  
 
For Newton, then, the world moves in accordance with divine energy, and whenever 
divine intelligence is cognizant of this movement, absolute motion is added to the system 
of the world. This reference to God’s creative energy as the basis of events in the world is 
metaphysics. And so is the ascription of perfect knowledge to God. Two remarks may be 
made on this. The first is that arguably, this quest for an all-encompassing custodian of 
knowledge and reality, capable of certain self-justification of its own reality, underlies the 
internalist epistemological claim of universality. Secondly, the concept of divine energy 
as the source and sustenance of events in the world, seemingly believed by some, is not 
incontestable in African cultures. A number of African philosophers argue that the 
concept of energy does not necessarily require “divine” provenance or qualities in 
African culture. Thus Gyekye’s claim that that the source of sunsum is necessarily 
divine37 has been questioned by our position elsewhere that the ontology of sunsum is 
plausibly conceived as “a force of nature”38.  The same is true of “the life force of the 
world”39 the “perpetual exchange of forces” pronounced by Ogotemmeli. We will explore 
these points further in the next chapter.    
 
Another influence of metaphysics on science is the theory of causation, which comprises 
of the following two principles: 
 
a) the cause of an event (x) must necessarily precede the event (y)  
b) the relationship between x and y is causal in the sense that it is non-coincidental 
and is necessary 
 
                                                 
36 Newton, Opticks, p 377, ff. Cf. Burrt, ibid., p. 359 
37 Gyekye, K., 1995, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme, 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 72-73 
38 Ajei, M. O. 2000, The Paranormal: An Inquiry into some Features of Akan Metaphysics and 
Epistemology, A Thesis presented in  part-fulfillment of the requirements for the M. Phil Degree to the 
Department of Philosophy, Legon: University of Ghana. 
39 Griaule, M., 1965, Conversations with Ogotemmeli, An Introduction to Dogon Religious Ideas, London: 
Oxford University Press, pp 18-19 
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David Hume strenuously attacked the metaphysical basis of this conception of causation. 
He argued that the physical existence of causal necessity is demonstrable neither on 
purely rational nor empirical grounds. This, according to him, is the case since no logical 
contradiction is involved in assuming that the relevant correlation between ‘cause’ and 
‘effect’ will cease to occur: 
 
“when we look about us towards external objects, and consider the operation of 
causes, we are never able, in a single instance, to discover any power or necessary 
connection; any quality which binds the effect to the cause, and renders the one an 
infallible consequence of the other.  We only find that the one does actually, in 
fact, follow the other.  The impulse of one billiard ball is attended with motion in 
the second.  This is the whole that appears to the outward senses.  The mind feels 
no sentiment or inward impression from this succession of objects: consequently, 
there is not in any single, particular instance of cause and effect, anything which 
can suggest the idea of power or necessary connection. This is the whole that 
appears to the outward senses.  The mind feels no sentiment or inward impression 
from this succession”40.  
 
The plausibility of Hume’s challenge deepens in the context of Newton’s lifelong 
dissatisfaction with gravity41. This dissatisfaction was due to its paradoxical nature in his 
system: paradigmatically, Newton understood gravity as action at a distance, a mode of 
causation which seemed to have no place in his comprehensive system of mechanics42. In 
other words, Newtonian physics, which has shaped the theories and practice of science 
from the seventeenth century onwards, admitted at least two characteristic modes of 
causality both of which cannot be supported by “the idea of power or necessary 
connection”. All of these cast doubts on the legitimacy of the claim of the possibility of a 
purely objective, value-free and universal knowledge, especially in the behavioral 
sciences.  
 
Finally, Einstein’s Special Theory of Relativity also infuses metaphysics into 
contemporary science. The metaphysical foundation of this theory is the claim that any 
                                                 
40 Hume, D., 1975, Enquiries, Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 63.  
41 Newton, I., 1958, Papers and Letters on Natural Philosophy, Cohen, I. B. (ed), Cambridge, Mass: 
Harvard University Press. In this work, Newton was at pains to explain that he did not consider gravity to 
be a primary power of matter since it acted at a distance.   
42 Newton’s laws of impact describe the redistribution of velocities and changes in direction that takes place 
when two or more things collide. This is the very essence of Action by Contact 
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system of objects has equal title to the claim to be ‘absolutely at rest’ and hence any of 
them can be chosen as the frame of reference by which the motions of all other systems 
are determined43.  
 
3.4 The Metaphysical Basis of the Social Sciences 
 
To fully appreciate the nature of our discussions in this section, it is necessary to precede 
it by a discussion on the relationship of the various branches of the sciences. As regards 
this, we wish to affirm the view that the whole movement of science is essentially of one 
piece. Two reasons justify this claim. The first, provided by Burrt, is that “the later 
biological and sociological branches took over their basic postulates from the earlier 
mechanics [exemplified by Newtonian physics], especially the all-important postulate 
that valid explanations must always be in terms of small, elementary units in regularly 
changing relations”44.  We believe that the meaning of this passage was adumbrated in 
section 3.2, where we discussed the deductive-nomological nature of explanations in the 
natural sciences, and wish therefore to revisit the relevant discussions there.  
 
As explained there, science applies nomological explanatory principles to both physical 
events and human actions45. Further, many contemporary philosophers and theorists of 
the social sciences insist on the reducibility of the basic theories of the social sciences to 
some suitable theory in the natural sciences46. There is, thus, a strong affinity between the 
natural and social sciences, one strand of which is the upholding, by both of them, of the 
validity of explanations that are contingent on mathematical and logical principles.  
 
Burrt also offers us the second reason why modern science is justifiably conceived of as 
of ‘one piece’. This is because, “in all but the rarest cases, the postulate that ultimate 
causality is to be found in the motion of the physical atoms”47, is upheld by all sciences.  
 
                                                 
43 Harre, R.,  1972, The Philosophies of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 15 - 16 
44 Burrt, E. A., 1932, Metaphysical Foundations, op. cit. p. 17 
45 See footnote 9 above 
46 See footnote 8 above 
47 Burrt, E. A., ibid. 
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This affinity between the natural and social sciences has been said to be “fundamentally 
misconceived”48, so it is worth our while to reappraise its validity. When the natural 
sciences explain an event in deductive-nomological terms, then the natural laws and 
initial conditions describing the circumstances which are supposed to have caused the 
event should always be applicable whenever these circumstances are repeated. When 
fully present, the cause becomes sufficient for the event. This accounts for the symmetry 
between explanation and prediction in the natural sciences. It has been argued that what 
conclusively differentiates a natural scientific explanation from explanation in the social 
sciences is that there is no requirement for a general law in the premises of a social 
scientific explanation. As such, social scientific explanations do not have universalist 
pretenses49.  
 
The claim that the social sciences do not employ nomological generalizations is rather 
surprising. The Laws of demand and of supply, which constitute the strongest foundation 
of economic science, are explicitly nomological50. But even where nomological 
generalizations are not explicitly stated in social scientific explanations, they are 
implicitly presupposed. Two related reasons may be deployed to show this. The first is 
that the concept of rationalism is behind the validity of such explanations. In fact, the 
implicit requirement of a social scientific explanation that all events (or actions) must be 
explained with reference to reason amounts to claiming that all actions are rational. This 
is one side of their universalist and rationalist character. 
 
Secondly, the reasons offered in social scientific explanations can legitimately be 
regarded as causes of those events in the natural scientific sense. These reasons are 
believed to be logically sufficient for the action. Accompanying this belief is another; 
hardly extricable from the first, that there exists an entrenched mechanism in the 
reasonable man (the scientist) that converts logical sufficiency of reasons into causal 
                                                 
48 Doyal, L and Harris, R., 1986, Empiricism, Explanation and Rationality, op. cit., p. 61 
49 Ibid., p. 62-63  
50 See Cohen, A. V, & King, H. B., 1997, Microeconomics, Don Mills, Ontario: Addison-Wesley, p. 33. 
Here, the Law of demand is defined as : “Other things remaining the same, the higher the price of a good, 
the smaller the quantity demanded” whereas the law of Supply is said to state that “other things remaining 
the same, the higher the price of a good, the greater the quantity supplied” 
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sufficiency. To the extent that scientific narratives can explain specific events in nature, 
they can similarly account for particular actions in society. What is characteristic in both 
natural scientific and social scientific explanations is that a previously unknown event is 
described which, in conjunction with the occurrence of other known conditions, is 
considered to produce the event/action in question. These reasons, then strongly establish 
the affinity between the natural and social sciences.  
 
There can be little doubt that for at least three hundred years up till our contemporary 
times, except for the challenge of Marxism that spanned almost the whole of the 
twentieth century, the social and political scene in Europe and the Western world has 
been determined almost entirely by liberalism. Liberalism is a nuanced socio-political 
ideology, but is currently best known for its specific economic and political expressions, 
which are capitalism and liberal democracy respectively. “Liberalism” derives from the 
Latin libertas, meaning “liberty” or “freedom”. Consequently liberalism insists on the 
freedom of the individual. It insists on the freedom of individuals from undue external 
and governmental controls, as well as their freedom for the pursuit of their own interests.  
 
As we indicated in section 2.5.1 of the preceding chapter, Locke’s conception of rights 
makes the owner an atomistic individual pursing self-interest rationally in an 
environment of conflicting interests. In that section, we alluded to features of Locke’s 
conception of the state of nature, which invests every man with “the executive power of 
the law of nature in his hands”51. Further, Locke maintains that in the state of nature man 
has “uncontrollable liberty to dispose of his person or possessions” and “the state of 
nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges everyone: and reason, which is that 
law, teaches all mankind, who will but consult it, that being equal and independent, no 
one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty or possessions52”   
 
Reason, then, is the law that governs the life and unbridled liberty of independent 
individuals in a state of nature. Since the rational, self-interested individual should 
                                                 
51 Locke, J. 1946. The Second Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter Concerning Toleration, Gough, J. 
W. (ed.), Oxford: Basil Blackwell, p.8.  
52 Ibid. p. 5 
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relinquish this liberty only at will for the formation of civil society, it is easy to conclude 
that for Locke, the individual, by nature, has priority over society. As such, liberalism 
may also be called individualism, “inasmuch as it affirms the individual over the state, 
which is seen not as the master but as the servant of the individual, and as the guarantor 
of the individual’s interests and rights53”. As stated in section 2.5.1, it is doubtful that 
such a conception of rights, and the individual’s place and responsibilities in society, can 
provide the basis for development thinking and practice in sub-Saharan Africa. This 
position will be more fully argued in Chapter Four.  
 
Another metaphysical assumption that underlies the social sciences is that societies move 
purposefully through time toward a predetermined end54. It is this assumption that feeds 
the conception of Africa’s development as the transformation from ‘primitive’ or 
‘agrarian’ societies to ‘modern’ ones partaking in the global economic and financial 
system with the guidance of Western democracy and technology. This economistic 
conception of development is an application of the notion of human progress, articulated 
in the Enlightenment as the growth of human intellectual capacity and knowledge, and 
after the industrial revolution as “the ‘natural’ tendency of material wealth to grow”55. 
 
Cartesian philosophy nurtured the Enlightenment56 and the emergence of Newton’s 
pricipia mathematica, which underlay mechanistic science. Since the Enlightenment, the 
preoccupation of modern science with legitimizing itself by de-legitimizing all rival 
frameworks of inquiry and belief-legitimization, and the European arrogation to itself of 
the exclusive right to reason, have occasioned vicious attacks on African systems of 
thought and inquiry, particularly in the works of David Hume, Immanuel Kant and Georg 
Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, all of whom have had decisive influence on the course of 
Western philosophy and science57.  
                                                 
53 Miller, E., 1984, Questions that Matter:  An Invitation to Philosophy, N. Y: McGraw-Hill, p. 449 
54 Zein-Elabdin, E. O., 1998, “The Question of Development in Africa: A Conversation for Propitious 
Change, in African Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1998, p. 113 
55 Ibid. p. 115 
56 This denotes an intellectual movement which began in Europe in the seventeenth century. The age in 
which the movement predominated is also known as the Age of Reason 
57 Although we begin our account of the racist and epistemological ethnocentrism in Western thought from 
a philosopher who flourished in the mid-eighteenth century, the roots of this attitude run deeper into 
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We have seen the legacy of Hume’s criticism of the metaphysics of the concept of 
causation on Western philosophy. His racism has had an even stronger impact on 
Western thought, as it influenced both Kant and Hegel. An illustration of this racism is 
apparent in his citation by Kant in support of the view that the Negro is naturally inferior 
to the white man. According to Kant,  
 
“Mr Hume challenges anyone to cite a simple example in which a Negro has 
shown talents, and asserts that among the hundreds of thousands of blacks who 
are transported elsewhere from their countries, although many of them have been 
set free, still not a single one was ever found who presented anything great in art 
or science or another praiseworthy quality; even among the whites some 
continually rise aloft from the lowest rabble, and through superior gifts earn 
respect in the world. So fundamental is the difference between the two races of 
man, and it appears to be as great in mental capacities as in color”58. 
 
Kant deepens Hume’s racism by locating it in ontology. According to Kant, human 
beings gradually work themselves out of barbarity and into ‘Enlightenment’. However, 
people of the non-European world are by nature incapable of the self-reflexive and self-
reflective project of Enlightenment on its own terms, since they are incapable of reason. 
Therefore, ‘civilization’ or ‘Enlightenment’, for the non-European, has to come from the 
outside59.  
 
The upshot of Hegel’s thesis was that sub-Saharan Africa is not part of universal history 
because world history is a rational process to which sub-Saharan Africa doesn’t have the 
capacity to contribute60. One could not, of course, ignore important developments in the 
                                                                                                                                                 
Western philosophical thought. Its most exalted initial statement is Aristotle’s definition of man as “a 
rational animal”. “Man” here was made t exclude – by the interpreters of Aristotle - the African, 
Amerindian and Australasians. By derecognizing the rationality of these peoples, Aristotle’s claim founded 
the “claim that only one segment of humanity [the European] has the prior, superior and exclusive right to 
reason”.( Ramose, 2002. African Philosophy through Ubuntu, Harare: Mond Books,  p vi.) 
58 Eze, E. C. 1997, “The color of Reason: The Idea of “Race” in Kant’s Anthropology”, in Post-colonial 
African Philosophy: A Critical Reader, op. cit. p 122 
59 Serequeberhan, T., 1997, “The Critique of Eurocentrism and the Practice of African Philosophy” in 
Postcolonial African Philosophy, (ed) Eze, E. op. cit. pp 151-152 
60 For a more thorough examination of this thesis and its influence on the history of global knowledge 
practices, see  
- Ramose, M. African Philosophy through Ubuntu,  op. cit 
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northern part of Africa in the achievements of Carthage and Egypt, but this belonged to 
Asia and not the African Spirit, according to Hegel. What he “properly understand[s] by 
Africa is the unhistorical, undeveloped Spirit, still involved in the conditions of mere 
nature, and which had to be presented here only as on the threshold of the world’s 
history”61. For, the Negro has not attained the level of civilized consciousness,  and “as 
we see them at this day, such have they always been62”. In fact childlikeness properly 
characterizes the “negroes”, who are incapable of developing and cultivating their minds. 
Hence “Africa is the land of gold, closed upon itself, the land of children, it is the gold-
land confused within itself – the land of childhood, which lying beyond the day of self-
conscious history, is enveloped in the dark mantle of night”63. For Hegel, reason is the 
basis of history and also the defining characteristic of European philosophy, which is 
situated at the pinnacle of this history64.  
 
The elaborate rationalization of European ethnocentrism by these philosophers “provided 
a powerful philosophical base for the chorus of denigration of the non-white races which 
accompanied and buoyed up the European colonial adventure all through the nineteenth 
and well into the twentieth century”65. This ethnocentrism matured into constructions of 
African mentality as ‘primitive’ and ‘pre-logical’ by Western anthropologists who 
theorized Africa indigenous knowledge traditions in the first half of the twentieth 
century. For instance, Levy-Bruhl repeats the perceptions of Kant and Hume by asserting 
that: 
 
“the two mentalities [i.e. African and European] which are face to face are so 
foreign to each other, so divergent in their habits, so different in their means of 
expression! The European employs abstractions almost without thinking and the 
simple logical operations have been rendered so easy for him by his language that 
they cost him no effort. With the primitives, thought and language are of a 
                                                                                                                                                 
- Irele, A, 1983, “Introduction”, pp 7 – 23, in  Hountondji, P. J, African Philosophy: Myth and 
Reality. London: Hutchison and Co. 
61 Hegel, G. W. F. 1990, The Philosophy of History, Sibree, J. (trans.), New York: Wiley Book Co., p 99 
62 ibid., p 98 
63 ibid. p 91 
64 Hegel, G. W. F., 1953, Reason in History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of History, New 
York: Macmillan, pp 11-25 
65 Irele, A., 1983, ”Introduction”, op. cit. p 12 
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character almost exclusively concrete….. In a word, our mentality is above all 
‘conceptual’, the other barely so”66. 
 
It needs to be pointed out that this ‘orthodox view of rationality’ translates directly into 
the Western paradigm of what a cognitive system should be. According to this, a key 
concern of any cognitive system should be “how to justify as true propositional 
knowledge that which is and must remain secondhand for the individuals concerned. In 
other words how to justify as true information that which we will never be able to test or 
verify in a firsthand manner”67.  The recognition of this as a problem, and the determined 
quest for its solution in the Western epistemological paradigm, defines a cognitive 
system’s rationality and ‘modernity’. From this point of view, the relative lack of 
attempts to define and solve this problem is what makes African mentalities ‘primitive’. 
We will provide a few brief responses to this here, in anticipation of further discussion of 
the issues it involves later in this chapter and in the subsequent ones.  
 
First, proceeding from our concrete universalist methodology, this paradigm can be 
countered with the view that different cultures define cognition in different ways. It has 
been convincingly shown that the limitation of knowledge by the Yoruba to first-hand 
experience, and consigning all information that cannot be verified directly to the realm of 
belief, is an empirically based model that lacks nothing in rationality68. Secondly, a 
number of African cultures empirically legitimate other ways of knowing such as 
telepathy and precognition69. 
 
Further, within the tradition of Western philosophy, this view of rationally derived 
knowledge has been challenged by the Causal Theory of Knowledge, which holds that 
one’s belief is rationally justified if the belief is caused in an appropriate way70.  This 
“appropriate way” of getting a true belief is simply to be able to distinguish the actual 
                                                 
66 Lucien Levy-Bruhl, 1910,  Le functions mentales dans les societes inferieures, Paris: Presses Univer-
sitaires de France, pp. 505-506, cf. Irele, A. ibid. 
67 Hallen, B. 1998, “Academic Philosophy and African Intellectual Liberation”, in African Philosophy, Vol. 
11, No. 2, 1998, p 95. 
68 Hallen, B. and Sodipo, J. O, 1986, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, Analytic Experiments in African 
Philosophy, London: Ethnographica, pp 76-80 
69 Ajei, M. O. 2000, The Paranormal, op. cit. 
70 Appiah, K., 1989, Necessary Questions, Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, p. 52 
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state of affairs in which the belief is true, from relevant possible states of affairs in which 
the belief is false.  This discrimination of the actually true from the possibly false state of 
affairs is best done by a method that is reliable in the circumstances71. 
 
The suggestion that a reliable method for distinguishing true beliefs varies with the 
circumstances means that what constitutes good evidence for a true belief is relative to 
the state of affairs prevalent in the belief situation.  Since a contextually determined 
reliable method justifies a belief, according to the Causal Theory, much of what is 
considered the product of ‘primitive mentalities’ can be rationally validated by the Causal 
Theory, and therefore within contemporary theories of epistemology in Western 
philosophy. From a philosophical point of view, this profoundly challenges the 
plausibility of the cognitive imperialism of science through its internal epistemologies. 
We now turn to criticisms within Western science of the assumptions and cognitive 
imperialism of internalist epistemologies.   
 
3.5 The Challenge of Theoretical Physicists to ‘Internal Epistemologies’ and the 
Metaphysics of Science 
 
It should be observed at the outset that the structure of internal epistemologies is 
predominantly preserved by the explanatory apparatus of the physical sciences, which 
subscribes fully to the doctrine of physicalism72. But at the turn of the 20th century, 
physicalism’s fundamental postulate about reality was questioned by new events in 
physics. These events profoundly diminished the relevance of the metaphysical 
assumptions of the sciences and their attendant methodology and knowledge claims. 
 
The factors that first led physicists to distrust their orthodox faith were two theoretical 
systems developed between 1900 and 1927.  One was Quantum Theory, the other the 
                                                 
71 Goldman, A., 1978, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”, Pappas, G. S. and Swain, M (eds), In 
Essays on Knowledge and Justification, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 124 
72 This is the doctrine that the real world contains nothing but matter and energy, and that objects have only 
physical properties such as spatio-temporal position, mass, size, shape, motion, hardness, electrical charge, 
magnetism and gravity. See Honderich, T., 1995, Companion to Philosophy, op. cit. p 679 
 131
Theory of Relativity. Both of these theories are now accepted pillars of modern 
physicalist thought.   
 
At the heart of the subject matter of quantum mechanics lies the question whether an 
atom is a thing, as the proponents of the primary and secondary qualities of matter will 
have it, or it is just an abstract construct used for explaining a wide range of observations.  
If an atom really exists as an independent entity in Newtonian space and time as claimed 
by the physicalist, then at the very least it should have a location and a definite motion in 
space at all times.  But Quantum Theory denies this.  It states that it is impossible to 
know simultaneously the velocity and the position of an electron orbiting around an 
atomic nucleus.  You can know either position or momentum, not both.  This is the 
celebrated Principle of Uncertainty, formulated by Heisenberg, one of the founders of 
this theory.  This principle asserts that it is impossible with any of the principles now 
known to science to determine the position and the velocity of an electron at the same 
time – to state confidently that an electron is “right here at this spot” and is moving a 
such and such a speed”.  This is because micro particles traverse their path in space 
discontinuously: they move to other parts in space only by disappearing and then 
reappearing at a new location: they change location by “quantum jumps”. In other words 
the most we can know of a particle is its partially defined state.  This is because an 
attempt to arrest a particle at place (p) and time (t) produces such a simplified wave-
structure of it that its particularity is, literally speaking, “loosened” and it spreads 
throughout the configuration of space73. 
 
To give meaning to the wave-like and particle-like representations of nature, Niels Bohr 
proposed another principle: the Principle of Complementarity, which states that 
 
“The particle picture and the wave picture are two complementary descriptions of 
the same reality, each of them only partially correct and only within a limited 
range of application.  For a full account of reality both viewpoints are needed, 
even though they are incompatible and cannot be viewed simultaneously”74. 
                                                 
73 Akyeampong, D., 1993, The Two Cultures Revisited: Interactions of Science and Culture, Accra: Ghana 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, pp. 16-17 
74 Ibid., pp. 20-21 
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In a sustained elaboration on the Principle of Complementarity, Finch writes: 
 
“In quantum theory, the properties of an electron or photon do not exist until they 
are perceived and measured.  Thus, what a photon is going to be – wave or 
particle – depends entirely on how if the most neutral, unencumbered experiment 
imaginable could be designed, the results of the reaction would still be altered by 
the very act of observing it.  This means that the perceiver and the thing perceived 
are indissolubly linked; absolute objectivity is impossible.  Form the quantum 
perspective things exist because they are perceived”75. 
 
From the above considerations, two implications of quantum physics emerge that refute 
the metaphysics of science and its attendant universalizing tendencies. We can infer from 
the Uncertainty Principle that the location of causal events in the micro world cannot be 
completely determined.  If there exists no exact state of the particle, then the idea that a 
real thing is that which can be located at a certain place at a certain time is questionable 
and, with it, the classical notion of causality.  If all explanations and predictions of micro 
phenomena can only be inexact, and it is these micro phenomena that are the ultimate 
constituents of macro phenomena, then events and phenomena at the macro level whose 
cause cannot be determined with mathematical certitude could be plausibly taken to 
illustrate the course of nature or society.  
 
On its part, the Complementarity Principle suggests that the metaphysical barrier that 
separates man the observer from physicalism’s ‘objective reality’, or the ‘primary 
qualities’ of an object, has become obscure.  For whenever Man attempts to spy on the 
‘real’ objective world, he changes and distorts it by the very process of his observation.  
Furthermore, this principle supports the view that there exist phenomena in nature which 
cannot be explained or understood with the current methods of science.  By rejecting all 
absolutes, this principle implies that there are limits to any particular scientific insight.  It 
suggests that we should approach reality from several perspectives, and that these various 
perspectives, taken together, will produce a better understanding of an experience which 
defines thought in a single framework of knowledge. The upshot of the conclusions of 
quantum mechanics is that physicists will be unable to precisely predict future events 
                                                 
75 Finch, C.S., 1998, The Star of Deep Beginnings, The genesis of African Science and Technology, Atlanta 
Khenti Inc., p 263 
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under definite circumstances: “Yes! Physics has given up. We do not know how to 
predict what will happen in a given circumstance, and we believe now that it is 
impossible – that the only thing that can be predicted is the probability of different 
events”76. This certainly refutes the universalizing tendencies of internalist 
epistemologies and affirms the methodology of concrete universalism.  
 
Thus at the dawn of the 21st century, a new scientific worldview, a synthesis of scientific 
insight over the past centuries, emerged.  Instead of strict determinism, this insight 
affirmed the statistical nature of reality, and replaced the insistence on the objectivity of 
the natural world with the view that the behavior of the object under investigation 
changes as we change our point of view.  The present scientific worldview, especially the 
Complementarity Principle, confirms the notion that there are several mutually exclusive 
approaches to reality, and that the methodology of physicalism is only one of these.  
 
The impact of the new scientific world view on phyisicalism’s denial of truth to other 
systems of knowledge production is clear: modern science cannot legitimately maintain 
its position on this issue, for the best that its epistemological paradigm can reveal are 
some truths, but not all the truths, about nature.  Hence it is prudent for the physicalist to 
pay regard to plausible propositions of truth about nature and society from other 
knowledge traditions.  
 
3.6 Science as Culture and Practice: the Challenge of Contemporary 
Philosophers and Historians of Science 
 
The recalcitrance and ubiquity displayed by internal epistemologies have incurred even 
sharper criticism from contemporary Western philosophers and scientists. Since the 
1960s, a sustained focal point of studies in the social and cultural studies of science and 
technology (SCSST) has been to reject science’s proclaimed objectivity and neutrality by 
                                                 
76 Feynman, R. P., Leighton, R. B., & Sands, M, 1965, “Quantum Behavior”, in The Feynman Lectures on 
Physics: Vol. 3. Quantum Mechanics. Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley, p. 10 
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showing that its cognitive core is ultimately determined by social and cultural elements. 
As such, every science is a local knowledge system or an “ethnoscience”77.  
 
Although these studies differ in thematic interest and detail, most of them converge on 
the thesis of Thomas Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Therefore we shall 
devote some time to the views emphasized in this work, as we consider it to be fairly 
representative of the new SCSST studies.  Kuhn advances the thesis that science always 
takes place within a certain conceptual framework, which comprises the theoretical and 
methodological assumptions, operations and interpretations that guide practice. As such, 
the framework provides ‘the lenses’ through which a scientific community, operating 
under a period of ‘normal science’, sees natural phenomena.  It also determines to a large 
extent what questions they may consider as worthy of pursuit, and the kinds of answers 
that might be acceptable to them. Scientists would not disagree about their conclusions 
once they are derived and tested from within the prevailing framework. Kuhn calls such a 
framework a ‘paradigm’, and distinguishes between a broad and narrow sense of it.   
  
3.6.1  The Paradigm as a Disciplinary Matrix (DM) 
 
The broad denotation of a paradigm is the conception of it as the broad theoretical and 
practical background which members of a scientific community share.  It consists of the 
following: 
 
a) Symbolic Generalizations: These include the laws, postulates or hypothesis of a 
science.  Some examples of these in physical science would be Newton’s Laws 
and the Boyle-Charles Law of Gases. 
b) Theoretical and Heuristic Models: A model is an attempt to give a concrete 
picture of how things, according to the scientific theory, work e.g. according to 
the Law of gases mentioned above, molecules of gas are said to behave like tiny 
billiard balls colliding into each other and bouncing away. 
                                                 
77 Harding, S., 1997, “Is Modern science an Ethnoscience?” op. cit. p. 45 
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c) Shared Values: the following are some of the values a scientific community is 
supposed to cherish and share: accurate prediction and quantitative methods, 
adherence to whatever margin of error is accepted as the standard, and the social 
utility/usefulness of the science. 
 
3.6.2 The Paradigm as Exemplars:  
 
Exemplars constitute the narrow sense of ‘paradigm’.  They are the widely accepted 
solutions to old problems that are considered the paradigm’s best examples of ways to 
solve new problems.  These include concrete solutions to problems which students of a 
particular science learn in their education. These shared examples of problem-solving 
techniques constitute important reference points for a scientific community, for the 
exemplars allow practitioners to see a variety of situations as similar in some important 
respects78. 
 
‘Normal Science’, then, is carried out by a scientific community which shares a 
Disciplinary Matrix based on a shared stock of exemplars, i.e; a paradigm, which 
comprises essentially of a world view and its inspired rules. During their education, the 
practitioners of normal science would have internalized the nuances of the paradigm in 
the context of learning the accepted exemplars.  Because they derive from their world 
view, the validity of these rules is taken for granted by the normal scientist working 
within the paradigm79. Further, because a paradigm exemplifies a particular culture, 
resistance to it by a subscriber to another paradigm can be illogical or unscientific80.  
 
In fact, scientific knowledge is culture-based in as much as it is merely the culture of the 
everyday world, but artfully transformed and enhanced. This is illustrated by the fact that 
features of everyday life are employed as epistemic devices in the production of 
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knowledge in the laboratories of science81. Science is deeply and inextricably anchored in 
everyday life. The role of everyday life in science is “ a foundational role which reduces 
everyday life to the common ground science shares with everything else and which 
construes science as a new kind of enterprise connected to everyday life through no more 
than a relationship of ultimate dependence”82. As such, the claim of internalist 
epistemologies to a special scientific rationality or method that fundamentally 
distinguishes the culture of scientific practice and that of ordinary life is totally 
unfounded.  
 
The dependence of science on everyday life and its assumptions and values becomes 
apparent in that the social provides the understanding of how rules (theory) and practice 
are joined together. It provides the possibility for consensus of rule followers (scientists) 
on proper practice: 
 
“New members are socialized (i.e., trained) in these practices and achieve full 
membership through acquiring the relevant competences. Ultimately, such 
competences may become habitual; they turn into smoothly operating and easily 
available dispositions that each individual can call upon at will. Here we have the 
origin of our sense of the rule “guiding” the follower, of it going its own way as a 
matter of course. Nevertheless, it is, ultimately, the fact that these dispositions 
lead to agreement in practice that gives to the rule follower the sense of having 
followed the rule rightly or correctly”83. 
 
The foregoing insights on the cultural and social basis of science lead to the inference of 
the contingent validity of scientific frameworks. This is what makes resistance to one 
paradigm by a subscriber to another never illogical or unscientific. The plausibility of the 
view that the validity of cognitive frameworks is relative to a context is supported by 
Hume’s denial of the conclusiveness and universality of the truth of experiential claims, 
among others. According to Hume, the evidence for the truth of ‘matters of fact’, which 
is the second object of human reason, cannot be conclusive. The contrary of every matter 
of fact is still possible because it can never imply a contradiction. Accordingly, that the 
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sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a proposition, and implies no more 
contradiction, than the affirmation, that it will rise”84.  
 
This amounts to the position that all experience amassed up till today is insufficient to 
conclusively determine what will happen in the future. In view of this, nothing can 
demonstrate the falsehood of the contrary of our most justified experience-based 
knowledge. Since scientific knowledge is largely derived from experimental outcomes, it 
incurs Hume’s restriction, which suggests that claims to universality, trans-cultural 
objectivity and rationality by the modern sciences are based in some context-dependent 
metaphysical assumption.   
 
3.7 African Critique of Internal Epistemologies and Western Science  
 
The concept, practice and utility of science have received the critical attention also of a 
number of African scholars. Notable among these is Theophilus Okere in an article 
entitled “Is there One Science, Western Science?”. Okere premises his critique on the 
observation that the desire to know is natural to all humans. Therefore all cultures have 
developed their forms of knowledge. As such “every form of human knowledge must be 
situated or generated from within a culture or bounded by presuppositions, prejudgments, 
interests etc”85. Science then “remains only one of many [legitimate] forms of 
knowledge, and the West only one of its producers”86. Accordingly there cannot be only 
one universally valid science as internal epistemologies propose.  
 
Towards this thesis, Okere distinguishes three levels and meanings of the term ‘science’. 
In his view, it refers first and foremost to knowledge as such. In this sense it is “ a special 
activity or mode of being of man by which man relates to reality from the perspective of 
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truth [or reality as it is]”87. All human cultures have science in this sense, as all human 
beings desire to know. 
 
Secondly, science could refer to “the building of bodies of systems of truth about 
specified regions of reality, following certain well defined methods of inquiry”88.  
It is this level of knowledge or science that constitutes the disciplines and curricula of 
formal education. The third meaning of science is characterized by a narrow definition of 
both its object (inanimate matter) and method (generality derived from mathematical 
abstractions)89. As such, this conception restricts science to a fraction of the vast subject 
matter of knowledge as well as to a fraction of the pathways to human knowledge90.  
 
Undoubtedly, it is this meaning of science, which owes its origins to Newton, through 
Descartes and Galileo, which has become the core of the sciences and as such 
conceptually nourishes all the other sciences. The preeminence of this meaning of science 
derives from the Enlightenment, whose philosophers and their successors made reason 
the distinguishing feature of human being-ness, and placed it under exclusive Western 
ownership. Through this arrogated ownership, human civilization was virtually defined in 
Western terms and by Western standards. Accordingly, science in this meaning which, 
according to Newton’s admirers quoted above, reflects the epitome of the activity of 
reason, became a unique Western achievement.  
 
Okere points out that it is absurd to claim unique possession of science in any one of its 
three meanings. One cannot claim exclusive ownership of science as knowledge in 
general because, as a matter of fact, all human cultures possess some knowledge.  This 
empirical fact displays the many-sidedness of science. Further, since knowledge seeking 
and gathering is a human activity, it is consequently historical91. This also supports the 
pluralistic view of science.  
 
                                                 
87 ibid. p. 22 
88 ibid.  
89 Ibid. pp 23, 27 
90 Ibid. p 27 
91 Ibid. p. 25 
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Science, as systemic or organized knowledge, cannot but also be plural.  This is because 
“to call them bodies of knowledge is the same thing as to say that there is not just one 
science92”. So although no one can deny the overwhelming contribution of science as 
systematic knowledge, it is absurd to exclude the contributions of other civilizations to 
this activity: “A mathematics, for instance, that has its roots and rudiments in virtually 
every known human culture, that has been on written record in ancient Egypt and 
Mesopotamia for millennia, that develops in ancient Greece, gets re-invigorated by 
medieval, Islamic culture and wins prestige and appreciation from its successful use in 
the 17th and 18th century physics, attaining its present ‘maturity’ in 19th century Europe – 
such a science cannot be claimed for one culture, Western or otherwise”93. As with 
mathematics, the story of the rest of the major branches of science has been a continuum. 
The borrowing from one culture of the products of another and the assimilation of these 
borrowed elements into its knowledge and value systems is rampant and extensive in the 
history of human civilizations94 Granted this history and extent of cultural borrowings, it 
can be presumed that “every scientific revolution has been a revolution on an existing 
state of science95”.  
 
Okere’s critique suggests a number of unattractive features of the type of science which 
promotes internalist epistemologies and universalism. First, because its restrictiveness 
has produced phenomenal successes in technology, it has become “more a science for the 
materially useful and less a science in quest of the true, a know-how rather than a 
knowledge”96.  
 
Further, through its restricted focus and method, this brand of science may also have 
irreversibly compromised the future of mankind. It may have done this by rendering 
knowledge subservient to the sort of power that affirms the assurance of Thrasymachus 
                                                 
92 Ibid. 
93 ibid. p 26 
94 Gyekye, K., 1997, Tradition and Modernity, Oxford: O. U. P., p. 269-270 
95 Okere, T. 2005, “Is There One Science, Western Science?”, op. cit., p. 26-27 
96 ibid. p. 27 
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that “might is right”97. Certain currents in international relations, such as the amassing 
and maintenance of nuclear weaponry to sustain the possible obliteration of humankind 
through the principle of MAD98, the depletion of the Ozone layer, and the refusal of the 
wealthiest and greatest pollutant in the world (the US)99 to sign the Kyoto Agreement, all 
point to an affirmation of the doctrine of Thrasymachus and to an insecure future for the 
inhabitants of the earth. Yet it is highly unlikely that this brand of science will ever 
succeed in acknowledging and reversing its genocidal tendency, “since quantity, not man 
or society or values have formed its alpha and omega”100. Since self-defense and 
preservation of self is “a natural, perhaps even an instinctive reaction of all living 
organisms confronted with imminent injury101”, this genocidal tendency of science and 
the international relations that it sustains, questions the intelligence of the practitioners of 
this brand of science, who may, by their actions be guaranteeing their own self-
destruction and the destruction of their loved ones, with others. On this reasoning, 
“science” as the continual parody of human reason is the denial of civilization. In reality, 
it is the return to barbarity but under the banner of deadly progress. 
 
Further, because of its success in improving the material conditions of man, this narrow-
focused epistemology has devalued other complementary and necessary forms and ways 
of knowing. In other words, its limited methodology and subject matter, as well as its 
aggressive epistemological ethnocentrism has compromised the possibility of widening 
the ambit of human knowledge. An illuminating example of this restriction of human 
knowledge is the refusal of science to admit the reality of ‘paranormal’ phenomena and 
their ability to yield legitimate forms of knowledge.  
 
                                                 
97 Plato, 1974, The Republic, Grube, G. M. A. (trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co., 388 c (p. 12). 
Here, Thrasymachus, in an attempt to define justice, (i.e. right conduct toward others), claims that justice is 
“nothing else than the advantage of the stronger”. This assertion is commonly re-formulated as “might is 
right” 
98 “Mutual Assured Destruction”.  
99 Kenya Airways, 2007, Msafiri, p. 53; informs us that the United States, which has  4.6% of the world’s 
population contributes 23.5% of the global emission of carbon dioxide, which is the principal agent for 
global warming 
100 Okere, T., 2005, “Is There One Science, Western Science?”, op. cit. p. 27 
101 Ramose, 2002, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, op. cit., p. v 
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From the African point of view, such a narrowly focused science which is oblivious to 
the complexities of man and society and values, can hardly form the basis of a successful 
development paradigm. To begin with, its ontology conceives of the human community 
as constituting human beings presently alive. From the African point of view, such 
ontology can hardly support the concept of ‘sustainable development’, which as we have 
seen, means meeting the needs and interests of the present generation without 
compromising those of future generations. On the other hand, traditional African 
ontology, which conceives of human community as a continuum of the unborn, the living 
and those who have “remained somewhere102”, and sustains the principle of “thou shall 
not kill but enhance life within community” as the primal ethical principle, is well 
amenable to this concept.  
 
Other African philosophers, besides Okere, have contested the claims to universal 
validity of the primary concepts of Western science, and of its refusal to accept the 
validity of the conclusions of other knowledge traditions simply because they defy the 
concepts of science. A key Western scientific concept which has incurred the criticism of 
African philosophers is that of causality.  
 
Many philosophers and anthropologists are of the view that indigenous African cultures 
subscribe to the principle of universal determinism.  They believe, in other words, that 
the principle that every event has a cause is a fundamental principle in the causal theory 
of these cultures. This position is equally shared by Gyekye103, Minkus104, and 
Agyakwa105, Oluwole106 and Ayoade107. These philosophers and anthropologists 
deliberate on the indigenous concepts of the Akan, Yoruba and Bantu peoples.   Thus in 
                                                 
102 This translates as “waka baabi” a phrase used by the Akan of Ghana to announce the ‘death’ of a person. 
The significance of this rendition of death is that it does not imply a final departure from participation in 
spatio-temporal schema that is the world human beings live in.  
103 Gyekye, K., 1987, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought, op. cit.  p. 82 
104 Minkus, H., 1977, “Causal Theory in Akwapim Akan Philosophy”. In African Philosophy: An 
Introduction, Wright, R (ed). Washington D.C.: University Press of America, p. 115 
105 Agyakwa, K.O., 1974, Akan Epistemology and Western Thought, Unpublished PhD dissertation 
submitted to Teacher’s college, Columbia University, p. 79 
106 Oluwole, S., 1995, “On the Existence of Witches”, in Mosley, A.,  (ed) African Philosophy, New Jersey: 
Prentice Hall 
107 Ayoade, J.A.A., 1979, “The Concept of the Inner Essence in Yoruba Traditional Medicine” in 
Ademuwagun, Z. A. et al., (eds), African Therapeutic Systems, Waltham, Mass: Crossroads Press p. 49-55 
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view of their subscription to the principle of universal causality, the suggestion of a 
chance event in nature, for Akan thinkers, is discreditable.  Gyekye even goes as far as 
stating: 
 
“When a European explains an unpredictable or unexpected natural event by 
reference to chance, coincidence, luck, or fortune, from the point of view of Akan 
thinkers, that is the same as saying that the cause is unknown.  But the Akan 
thinker would here retort that ignorance of the cause of an event does not imply 
the non existence of a cause”108. 
 
Yet Akan determinism differs fundamentally from that of Western philosophy and 
science.  In Western thought, if x is determined by y, then the moment y occurs x follows 
necessarily.  Embedded in this is the serial notion of causation, which asserts that a cause 
(y) must precede the event (x), which y causes.  There may be intermediate chain of 
causes between x and y, but all these intermediaries must derive from y before it can 
properly be considered as the cause of x.  There is thus a lineal progression of causes 
from y to x, such that any causal event closer to y in the chain of causes precedes a cause 
closer to x. 
 
Within the deterministic universe of Africans, two types of causal explanations can be 
delineated.  The first type is explanations to what Gyekye terms ‘Why 1 questions’.  In 
these, contiguous causal relations are established and therefore physical laws are 
considered relevant and sufficient to explain relations between natural phenomena.  This 
is the same as the theory of causality upheld in Western philosophy and science.  But 
where the events to be explained are considered extraordinary in character, such that 
physical laws prove inadequate to explain them, then these events will invoke a ‘Why 2 
question’. Why 2 explanations do not necessarily project a serial progression of events 
from cause to effect. This is largely because the inter-linkages between events are not so 
clearly delineated. For Western philosophers and scientists, the why 2 question will 
hardly arise because nature is supposed to be fully explicable by scientific concepts and 
laws.  
 
                                                 
108 Gyekye, K. 1987, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought,  op. cit. p. 82 
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For indigenous African thinkers, however, Why 2 questions merely admit the limitations 
of the explanatory capacity of physical laws, and seek different kinds of explanations.   In 
his commentary on the Yoruba concept of Inner Essence, Ayoade suggests that we should 
not conceive of non-supernatural and supernatural questions as constituting two 
irreconcilable categories of causal theory but rather as different points along the same 
continuum.  He writes “this is particularly so because the Yoruba believes that a non-
supernatural ailment makes a patient highly susceptible to, or softens up a patient for, the 
infliction of a supernatural ailment”109. Ayoade’s ‘non-supernatural’ and ‘supernatural’ 
coincides with Gyekye’s ‘Why 1’ and ‘Why 2’ questions, respectively. 
 
The salutary point in Ayoade’s view is that in Yoruba causal theory, Why 1 causes and 
those of Why 2 are complementary and mutually inclusive.  The same conclusion can be 
reached for the causal theories of Akans and Bantus. We shall see in the next chapter that 
the African ontology admits of a visible and an invisible aspect of the world.  The visible 
world is composed of bodies to which the laws of physics apply.  But the quintessence of 
these bodies is a force which itself is invisible. In fact this claim of the invisibility of 
explanatory postulates underlies all the theories of modern natural science. As maintained 
in section 3.2, Newton considered forces the basis of action in the world. We have also 
seen that forces underlie the theories of Relativity and Quantum mechanics. These forces 
are phenomena that cannot be seen but experienced. Thus elaborating on electromagnetic 
force, which was posited largely to explain ‘action at a distance’, Einstein writes: 
 
“As a result of the more careful study of electromagnetic phenomena; we have 
come to regard action at a distance as a process impossible without intervention of 
some intermediary medium.  If, for instance, a magnet attracts a piece of iron, we 
cannot contend to regard this as meaning that the magnet acts directly on the iron 
through the intermediate empty space, but we are constrained to imagine that the 
magnet always calls into being something physically real in the space around it, 
that is something being what we call a ‘magnetic field’110  
 
Now, according to Einstein, to explain some types of natural phenomena, physicists are 
constrained to imagine the intervention of some physical reality pervading all space.  We 
                                                 
109 Ayoade, J.A.A., “The Concept of the Inner Essence in Yoruba Traditional Medicine” op. cit. p. 49 
110 Einstein, A., 1931, Relativity: The Special and General Theory, New York: Crown Publishers, p. 74 
 144
can legitimately infer from this that even in an uncompromising scientific framework as 
the discipline of theoretical physics, the borderline between the physical and the non-
physical is not clear-cut as mainstream logical analysis would like to affirm, that there is 
an area between these two realms in which we cannot with logical certainty identify 
events as belonging here or there. Adopting this integrated approach to causal analysis 
makes plausible explanations of the anomalies and paradoxes that we see in nature and 
which Western science has labeled ‘paranormal’.   
 
In his book Foundations of African Philosophy, Godwin Sogolo argues, inter alia, for the 
importance of cultural determinants in the analysis of ‘cause’. According to him, a given 
event can have a variety of causal explanations and our interest in that event determines 
which of these various causes we advance.  He describes a fire event brought about by an 
arsonist, and writes: 
 
“Our interest in the fire example is two-fold.  Firstly, it shows the almost infinite 
kinds of causal explanation that can be given for a single event.  And because the 
explanations are different sorts, the question of the superiority of one over another 
is misplaced.  The explanations provided by the fire fighters, the psychologist, the 
social worker, the anti-smoking campaigner, and the fundamentalist preacher 
might appear to be out of tune with what, in scientific terms, is accepted as a 
causal explanation, but this is so only from the point of interest of the scientist.  
Besides, there is no consensus among scientists about the notion of causality or 
what should count as an adequate causal explanation.  The second crucial point 
about the example we have chosen is that the different explanations are 
complementary and non-mutually exclusive”111  
 
On this view, the Western scientist’s disdain for African explanatory frameworks is 
because the scientist has no interest in these.  But this disinterest is hardly sufficient to 
render the African explanation false or illegitimate in comparison with dogmatism.  
 
This conclusion, of the non-immutability of any particular explanatory framework, has 
been strongly defended by Oluwole in her article entitled “On the Existence of Witches”. 
Here, Oluwole criticizes Western skepticism about witchcraft.  She denies that witchcraft 
or any ‘paranormal’ phenomenon can be dismissed simply because Western science has 
                                                 
111 Sogolo, G., 1993, Foundations of African Philosophy – A Definitive Analysis of Conceptual Issues in 
African Thought, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, pp. 107-108 
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not been able empirically to verify them, and points out that the assumption underlying 
the current requirements of empirical verification, the assumption that information can be 
transmitted and received by human beings only through the recognized channels of the 
senses, is subject to amendment in the future.  She contends that the denial by science of 
reality to the paranormal stems from mistaking tentative epistemological conclusions for 
immutable ontological ones.  She writes: 
 
“until scientists accept that they have not discovered an indubitable method of 
knowing what is real; until they realize that science…is a direct consequence of 
our epistemological rather than an ontological argument, so long will they give 
room for being accused of “intellectual fraud”- “fraud” for substituting the 
epistemic for the ontic.  As a matter of fact, this demand, this scientific 
hypothesis, transcends experience.  Our consent to the occurrence of mysteries 
confirms that the mysterious is that which is not yet understood but not that which 
is unknowable”112. 
 
 
Scientists, then, would do better to distinguish “between understood physical things and 
physical things not understood”113. To do this would be to acknowledge two things, at 
least. First it would be acknowledging that scientific criteria for, and conclusions on, 
reality and truth are, at best, only good working hypotheses for the present. One, then, 
cannot talk of facts representing objective and immutable reality. The methods of science 
can disclose facts, but these may change, and science must acknowledge this fact about 
‘facts’. 
 
It would also imply acknowledging that scientific activity is but one subject matter in the 
inquiry into nature and society. Therefore nature and society cannot be wholly 
describable by its laws.  Hence to declare something unreal or false just because it defies 
the explanatory framework of contemporary science is to offend against the laws of logic 
by begging the question and committing the fallacy of reaching a hasty conclusion.  
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Oluwole then asserts that the reality of witchcraft power can be scientifically proved by 
the following three methods, arguing that the positive result of any one of them would be 
sufficient to establish the reality of witchcraft: 
 
i) we may be given an explanation of the modus operandi of witchcraft power 
ii) we may experimentally establish a causal relationship between the postulated 
paranormal power and the event that proves the practical efficiency of this 
power 
iii) we may show a practical manipulation of the power114. 
 
Oluwole then asserts that the African’s claim that her belief in the reality of the 
paranormal forces falls within the logic of Western science115 is based on methods (ii) 
and (iii).  This conclusion is legitimate. It has been sufficiently argued that experience 
underlies the inference of the existence of the paranormal by Africans116. Thus, the belief 
in the paranormal by Africans is due to the testimony of practice: they have seen people 
use extra-sensory powers over and over again, control these powers and teach others how 
to invoke and control these powers. Accordingly, Africans can show that their belief in 
the reality of paranormal events cannot be ruled out on purely logical grounds.  They can 
hardly be ruled out on empirical grounds either, on account that they meet the demands of 
the verification principle, one of the basic principles of scientific empiricist doctrine, 
states that an entity or event is true if and only if it is scientifically provable to be 
demonstrable.  Thus the existence of these phenomena is inferred from knowledge of 
their effects by Africans.  From these effects they seek to derive their possible causes.  
Claims of the existence of these phenomena are strengthened by applying Oluwole’s third 
method (manipulating this power).  Here too, there exist abundant claims of the ability to 
control and manipulate these powers.  Medicine-men, diviners and others with the ability 
for extra-sensory perception claim knowledge of these powers, and there is enough 
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testimony to the apparent genuineness of some of these claims117. Accordingly, it is 
reasonable to believe in the reality of these phenomena, and that they can be the basis of 
legitimate knowledge.  
 
In fact, Oluwole is perfectly right in denying that a scientific theory is legitimate if and 
only if it can explain the modus operandi of the entities it postulates for explanatory 
purposes. What we know as gravity is a field of force first demonstrated, in Western 
science, by the fall of Newton’s apple. Now, it is a common view among philosophers of 
science that Newton’s Laws of Motion (which inter alia, postulate and explicate the force 
of gravitation) merely provide descriptive generalizations of unobservable entities.  
Harre, for instance, characterizes Newton’s Laws as a species of “Reticular Theories” and 
affirm their scientific legitimacy118. He explains that these theories are explanatory 
hypotheses whose confirmation is purely descriptive, not conceptual.  The modus 
operandi of the force responsible for the fall of Newton’s apple (i.e. the cause in the 
meta-descriptive sense) is still unaccounted for.   Therefore, the claim that there is a force 
in nature called gravity is a mere belief, legitimized each time an apple falls when thrown 
aloft. Why does this happen? No answer can be provided to this beyond descriptions.  In 
fact towards the end of his life, Newton reputedly expressed his dissatisfaction with the 
unexplained status of gravitation, and made suggestions as to “the hidden order of things 
that might account for it”119.  This hidden order has eluded human understanding up to 
date.  Therefore although Newton’s force of gravitation is in brisk scientific business, it 
remains subject to amendment in the future, as does all empirically based knowledge.   
 
3.8 The Social Sciences and Africa’s Development 
 
All the theories that have been applied to Africa’s development, since development 
emerged as a goal to be achieved by developing countries, have emerged from the social 
sciences120. They have come either from sociology, political science, law or economics, 
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120 As developed by Europeans and their descendants elsewhere in the world.  
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especially development economics, or a combination of these121.  As stated in section 3.2, 
before the 1960s explanations in the social sciences almost exclusively assumed the 
‘internalist epistemological’ stance by supposing that their truth or validity is a function 
of the trans-cultural and internal features of the “laws” that they employ; and that these 
laws reflect “the way human nature, and/or society, is”. Human behaviour is presumed by 
these explanations to be derived from human nature, which is characterized by law-
likeness. This stance is still quite popular in the social sciences. 
  
Two main social scientific theories, espousing this epistemology and view of human 
nature, are reflected in the practice of Africa’s development. One is the Lockean view 
stated above, that human beings are, by nature, discreet and rational individuals pursuing 
their self-interests in an environment of competing self-interests. This provides the 
theoretical base for, and the Eurocentric and universalizing impulses in, both the 
Modernization and Neo-liberal schools. The second theory, which theoretically founds 
the Dependency school, is Marx’s theory of human nature, within which is to be found 
substantial ambivalence.  
 
A distinct feature of this theory is Marx’s claims about our essentially social nature. For 
him, “the real nature of man is the totality of his social relations”122.  Thus save a few 
obvious biological facts about a human being, Marx would tend to deny any such thing as 
individual human nature. What kind of individual one is and what kind of things one does 
are determined by the society one lives in: “it is not the consciousness of men that 
determine their being; rather it is their social being that determines their 
consciousness”123. Thus the norms of one society, or what seems instinctual in one 
society, may be quite different in another.   
 
Against this is Marx’s theory of history, which provides the background to his theories. 
Marx claimed to have found a scientific method to the study of human societies, and 
                                                 
121 This follows from footnotes 1 and 2 above. See also So, A., Y., 1990, Social Change and Development., 
Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications, chapters 1-2 
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looked forward to the day when there would be a single science, including the science of 
man along with the natural sciences124. Consequently, he held that there are universal 
laws behind historical change, and that the future course of history can be predicted from 
these laws. These laws are economic in nature125. In view of Marx’s theory of human 
nature and the uniqueness of human societies that it implies, it is unclear how the 
proposal of ‘laws’ that apply to the behaviour of human beings qua human can be 
plausible. Clearly, this appeal to universal law refutes the proclaimed uniqueness of 
human societies stated inferred from the claim of our essentially social nature. However, 
it undoubtedly forms the basis of the Eurocentic imperialism and universalism inherent in 
Dependency Theory.  
 
One may now pose the question: is the North’s grip over modern science and technology 
and its imperialistic proclamation of their universal validity, not designed purposely to 
exploit the weaknesses of the developing world?  Has science ever aimed to improve the 
wellbeing of humankind, or has it always been an instrument of domination and control? 
Such questions demand immediate attention precisely because science cannot escape the 
imprints of culture, and also because of its contribution to the global disparity between 
rich and poor.  
 
If science is culture-based, then surely social, economic and political strategies become 
part and parcel of scientists’ conduct. This sensitivity to context must influence the 
scientist’s focus on solving local (Western) problems and meeting local aspirations. The 
preoccupation with self-validation which defined the lot of the first modern scientists 
seemed to have simply mutated, with time, into a focus on meeting the needs of the 
Western world. Such a focus yielded patterns in the systematic knowledge of Western 
science and technology that inhibits the development of sub-Saharan Africa and the 
developing world, in general.  In terms of the employment of science to colonize and 
exploit non-Western cultures, I quote at some length Harding, who observes that  
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“For example, modern science answered questions about how to improve 
European land and sea travel, mine newly needed ores, identify the economically 
useful minerals, plants, and animals of other parts of the world, manufacture and 
farm for the benefit of Europeans living in Europe, the America, Africa and India, 
improve their health and occasionally that of the workers who produced profit for 
them, protect settlers in the colonies from settlers of other nationalities, gain 
access to the labour of the indigenous residents, and do all this to benefit only 
local European citizens...But they have not been concerned to explain how the 
consequences of interventions in nature for the benefit of Europeans would 
change the natural resources available to non-Westerners, or what the other social, 
psychic, environmental, economic and political costs of such interventions might 
be. They have not been concerned to explain how to eradicate diseases that do not 
much affect peoples of European descent, and especially, the already 
disadvantaged within this group, or how to use effectively renewable energy 
sources. Even physics, supposedly the most value-neutral of sciences, is far more 
shaped by its pursuit of militarily useful knowledge than is generally 
recognized”126. 
 
The employment of science and technology to counteract development in sub-Saharan 
Africa is also discernible in the extent to which technology supports the global economic 
and financial system to deepen poverty in the region. We saw, in section 2.6.1 of the 
preceding chapter, how WTO envisages its trade policies as offering universal advantage 
for its members. We also saw how the United States employs these same policies to 
benefit its farmers and diminish the livelihood security of cotton farmers in sub-Saharan 
Africa. This happens precisely because the farmers127 employ industrial and agricultural 
technologies of the U. S to produce surplus goods which the rich world is unable to use 
itself. The farmers are paid to keep them employed and thereby keep up the demand for 
these industrial and agricultural technologies. The cotton (or whatever the product may 
be)  is then dumped on the world market which, in response to the principles of 
economics devised and employed in operating the world trading system, causes the prices 
of sub-Saharan commodities to collapse, and thus deepen the worsening livelihood 
standards and security of the poor.   
 
Further, in this age of globalization, information and technology systems have enabled 
the financial institutions of the rich countries to foray into the economies of sub-Saharan 
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countries, drawing them deeper into the global market. Having committed its scarce 
resources to make a sector competitive on this market, and once on the market, poor 
countries then encounter protective barriers blocking their goods. They also find the rich 
world having used its technology to its advantage on the market by developing substitutes 
for the products that the poor countries have brought for sale. Consequently, the export 
value of the goods from the poor countries and therefore their earnings fall drastically. 
They are then faced with the need to service the debts incurred to make their export 
sectors ‘competitive’, and eventually “the debt-trap” and extreme poverty.  
 
Another dimension of the “paradigmatic crisis” of science on the practice of Africa’s 
development is the fact that the connivance of science in the pervasive exploitation of the 
poor threatens the survival of both the majority of people on earth, and the earth itself. 
Although the previous quotation of Harding adumbrates this point, it s more lucidly  
articulated by Khor Kok Peng, who maintains that:   
 
“The crisis is that science has not been able to help fulfill the simple survival 
needs of a very large proportion of people in the world; it has not been able to 
conserve natural resources to ensure the decent survival of the majority of human 
beings in the generations ahead. Instead, it has helped to deprive the poor of the 
Third World of their basic requirements, and it has contributed to the depletion of 
natural resources that are required for the long-term and even the medium-term 
survival of man. It has also developed new chemicals, materials and processes 
which cause immense harm to human health and the environment”128.  
 
Although we generally agree with Peng, he would have commanded our complete 
concurrence had he replaced the word “able” in the first sentence of this citation with 
“willing”. In our view, the crisis does not result from any strict contradiction between the 
products of modern science (and its applications in technology) and indigenous African 
systems of producing and evaluating knowledge as such. In fact cultural borrowing and 
adaptation of ideas is a distinctive feature of human history129. The chief problem with 
appropriating the benefits of the modern scientific method and integrating them 
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effectively into indigenous African knowledge systems would seem to stem from two 
sources. The first is that “the modern scientific tradition has typically prevented it”130, 
presumably through its elitist posturing and cognitive imperialism described above. As 
such, Western science can be said to have “tended to inhibit or even prevent the 
development of a really universal, human-knowledge project”131. The second source, 
closely allied to the first, is the marginalization of Africa’s indigenous knowledge by its 
intellectuals, and its scientific dependence132.  
 
As mentioned earlier, colonial ideology and administration strenuously and consistently 
enforced the imperialism of modern science and its applications in technology. The 
contemporary global economic order continues in the same vein. A basic proposition of 
this ideology, firmly installed in the minds of many Westernized African intellectuals, is 
the extension of the views of Hume, Kant and Hegel into the thesis that Africa “is a 
continent that has contributed little or nothing to human ideas and civilization”133. This 
renders educated Africans captive to the force of their Eurocentric training, making them 
eager to abandon their harshly negated past for Western epistemological categories in 
their cognitive practices. According to Mudimbe, “the fact of the matter is that until now, 
Western interpreters [in the humanities and social sciences] as well as African analysts 
have been using categories and conceptual systems which depend on a Western 
epistemological order”.134  
 
These categories are considered “modern” and “civilized”, as opposed to “traditional” 
ones, which are everyday suppressed in legal suits, political rhetoric, and in economic 
and social planning and policy-making. This uncharitable view of the intellectual heritage 
                                                 
130 Lauer, H., 2004,  “Cause and Effect between Knowledge Traditions, op. cit., p 263 
131 Okere, T., 2005, “Is There One Science, Western Science?”, op. cit. p. 20.  
132 Hountoundji, P, 2004, “Knowledge as a Development Issue”, in Wiredu, K., (ed), A companion to 
African Philosophy, Malden, MA: Blackwell, p 532 
133 Bodunrin, P., “The problems of, and Prescriptions for, an Action Philosophy in Africa”, paper delivered 
at the Colloquium on the Place and Role of the Humanities in Africa Today, University of Ghana, April 
1975, p. 5.  
134 Mudimbe, V. Y., 1998, The Invention of Africa:Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p. x 
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of Africa, and its contribution to human civilization135 has contrived to relegate 
indigenous knowledge systems into the background in the production and application of 
knowledge in Africa136. This is not a strange phenomenon, given that in the quest for 
knowledge, “who gets to name natural and social realities gets to control how they will be 
organized and managed”137. Thus a crucial challenge for Africa’s intellectuals, if they are 
to be relevant in the quest for Africa’s development, would be their pursuit of 
authenticity.  
 
3.9 Indigenous Knowledge, Scientific Systems and Africa’s Development 
 
This authenticity demands that we “have to stop being what we have not been, what we 
will never be, and what we do not have to be”138. An important first step toward this, it 
has been suggested, is to harness “the usable past” to construct an “authentic African 
episteme139”. Forceful contentions have emerged, from the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, on how African intellectuals may achieve these. Of these, we will briefly 
consider the perspectives of Paulin Hountoundji, Mogobe Ramose and Tsenay 
Serequeberhan, which we count among the many prominent ones.  
 
                                                 
135 This view has been strenuously denied by many African philosophers, many of whom point to the 
African contribution to Western thought. Prominent among these are 
- Olela, H., 1977, “The African Foundations of Greek Philosophy”, in Wright, W (ed), African 
Philosophy: An Introduction, Toledo: Universities Press of America. On pages 77 -80, Olela 
strenuously and shows the influence of African world views on the prominent ancient Greek 
philosophers, such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Heraclitus, Pythagoras, Xenophanes, 
Parmenides, Anaxagoras, Democritus, Plato and Aristotle, who defined the themes and problems 
of the Western philosophical tradition. 
- Diop, S. A., 1974, The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality, Cook, M. (ed & trans) 
Westport: Lawrence Hill and Co., pp. 230-236. At p. 230, Diop states explicitly that “The Greeks 
merely continued and developed, sometimes partially, what the Egyptians had invented”; and the 
main thesis of the book is that historical, archeological and anthropological evidence supports the 
view that ancient Egyptian civilization originated from Sub-Saharan Africa. 
136 An unambiguous demonstration of this mentality is Gyekye’s pronouncement on the discouragement of 
indigenous knowledge systems of the scientific spirit 
137 Harding, S, 1997, “Is Modern Science and ethnoscience..”, op. cit., p 48 
138 Anibal Quijano, 1990, “Estetica de la Utopia” in David y Goliath, 57, p. 37; cited in Arturo Escobar,  
1995, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press, p. 221 
139 Mudimbe, V. Y., 1988, The Invention of Africa:Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge. 
Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p. 179 
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Hountoundji suggests that an important step towards correcting Africa’s scientific 
dependence, and bringing its indigenous knowledge to the service of its development, is 
to integrate indigenous knowledge systems “into the mainstream of ongoing 
research….”140.  It is important to note, that by “ongoing research”, Hountoundji means 
the internalist epistemology of modern normal science, for just as he thinks that there is a 
“standard” way of doing philosophy141, he also believes in the universal validity of 
modern science. Thus according to him, his approach to the study of indigenous 
knowledge is to look “for ways and means to test them in order to validate whatever in 
them can be validated, and make contemporary science take them into account in a 
reciprocal process of updating” itself. This is because “ethnoscience does not ask any 
question about the truth of local knowledge systems. It just describes them and leaves 
them as they are”142.  
 
A number of flaws in Hountoundji’s position and its aims may be pointed out. First, in 
contrast with the contemporary social and cultural studies of science and technology, he 
distinguishes between “ethnnoscience” and ‘science’. For him, ‘ethnoscience’ represents 
an aspect of the cognitive practices in indigenous African setting, whereas science refers 
to modern science. As such, he ignores Okere’s argument on the varied nature and 
sources of science, which we uphold143. He also, with this, perpetuates the Eurocentric 
                                                 
140 Hountoundji, P., 2004, “Knowledge as a Development Issue”, op. cit. p 534 
141 Ibid., p. 530. Here, Hountoundji distinguishes between “ethnophilosophy”, which he rejects and the 
standard way of doing philosophy, which he endorses.  
142 Ibid., p 535. The emphasis on ‘truth’ appears in the original text. 
143 The term ‘science’ is employed here with utmost caution. This is because I find plausible Harding’s 
view that the inclusion of empirical knowledge traditions of other cultures under the label “science” 
reinforces the self-claimed superiority of a European conceptual framework, in the sense that European 
term names the standard that any desirable knowledge tradition must achieve. (see Harding, S. 1997,  op. 
cit. p 49) Harding’s view is affirmed by Ramose when he argues that the term ‘African Renaissance’ is 
historically and philosophically inapposite to describe Africa’s desire for resurgence because ‘Renaissance’ 
invokes the images and agendas of the European Enlightenment. Ramose, therefore suggests the term 
Mokoko-Hungwe as symbol of “the period for Africa’s reversion to unmodified and unencumbered 
sovereignty”. (See Ramose, M. B., 2002,  “‘African Renaissance’: A northbound gaze”,  in Philosophy 
from Africa, op. cit. p 608-609). However, as seen in 3.6, Okere suggests that the meaning of ‘science’ is 
highly nuanced, and that science, under some of these meanings, is legitimately attributable to any culture. 
On this view, Harding’s objections are defensible only if one conceives of science as that field of  study 
that “considers only inanimate matter, bodies or anything with mathematical properties” (Okere, op. cit. p. 
23). In this work, however, allusions to ‘African science’ will refer to the critical and experimental 
practices, towards problem-solving in particular and knowledge production in general, in the indigenous 
setting of Africa 
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dichotomies evolved by the Western philosophers and anthropologists discussed above, 
and their denigration of the intellectual products of Africa.  
 
Secondly, Hountoundji seems to be suggesting that the practitioners of science in the 
indigenous setting of Africa were/are impervious to validating their hypothesis and 
beliefs. This is refutable in view of empirical studies on the subject. One of these is a 
philosophical appraisal of the practice of diviners in Ghana, which concluded that 
African diviners, in their practice, undergo processes that meet Kuhn’s criteria for normal 
science: they do employ a Disciplinary Matrix (DM) and apply symbolic generalizations 
to nature, they acquire, by training, a treasury of techniques, procedures and ethics in 
applying a paradigm, and they generate hypotheses and confirm them within that 
paradigm144. This conclusion has been affirmed by Sophie Oluwole’s analysis on the 
philosophical nature of the Ifa corpus. According to her, Ifa verses actually are rational 
justifications of specific philosophical positions 145. 
 
Thirdly, although some Western philosophers such as Alfred North Whitehead have 
argued for the open-endedness of science146, it is doubtful that science will ever want to 
adapt its paradigm in response to refutation of some of its theories and explanations by 
indigenous alternative knowledge systems such as those from the indigenous setting of 
Africa. In fact, “the chief problem with appropriating the benefits of modern scientific 
method and integrating them effectively into indigenous African knowledge systems has 
been that the modern scientific tradition has typically prevented it”147. This defiance to 
integration and assimilation with non-western systems of knowledge is exemplified by 
the stubborn refusal of science to admit the reality of ‘paranormal events’ in spite of their 
validation by the scientific tool of probability. Consequently, modern science denies that 
                                                 
144 Ajei, M. O., 2000, The Paranormal: op. cit.,  p 100-108 
145 Oluwole, S., 1988, “African Philosophy as Illustrated in Ifa Corpus”, in African Philosophy, Vol. 11, 
No. 2, 1988, p. 159 
146 This view is sufficiently implicit in chapters 1-2 and 7-12 of Whitehead’s Science and the Modern 
World (1967, New York: The Free Press). Also, Whitehead, in his Process and Reality: An Essay in 
Cosmology, (New York: Macmillan, p vi) strives to go beyond “modern thought [which has] been confined 
to the most general notions of physics and biology” and to “construct a system of ideas which bring the 
aesthetic, moral, and religious interests into relation with those concepts of the world which have their 
origin in natural science”.  
147 Lauer, H., 2004, “Cause and Effect between Knowledge Traditions”, op. cit., p 263 
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these events can provide us with genuine and reliable knowledge148. In view of this 
attitude towards diverse epistemological frameworks, it is surprising to encounter 
Hountoundji’s optimism that science will update its paradigm by co-opting and 
integrating legitimate perspectives from African systems of thought. However, a number 
of African intellectuals recognize the urgency in rejecting this optimism.  
 
In his African Philosophy through Ubuntu, Ramose treats a vast number of themes. 
Prominent among these is his argument for African philosophy’s status as a particular, 
fully developed way of philosophizing, which has to be understood and practised in its 
own way and in its own framework. Ubuntu constitutes the nature of African philosophy. 
One salient point about African philosophy through ubuntu is that knowledge and being 
cannot be separated. On this view, epistemology is as much an ontological reflection as 
ontology is an epistemological concern. “Accordingly, African ontology and 
epistemology must be understood as two aspects of one and the same reality”149. Further, 
Religion, politics and law [and presumably other sciences] must be anchored upon the 
ontology of ubuntu philosophy150. In view of these, it is legitimate to claim that ubuntu is 
simultaneously the foundation and the edifice of African philosophy.  
 
Ramose also pronounces on the relation between African philosophy and the liberation of 
Africa. In his view, the philosophical character of European colonization was the intent 
of Europe to impose its conceptions of reality, knowledge and truth on the colonized151. 
The essence of this was to call into question the humanity of the African to the extent that 
it was an enterprise aimed at disproving the humanness of the African152. A significant 
consequence of this, for the African, has been the experience of living with a humiliated 
consciousness, even after decolonization. It needs be noted that an intransigent 
exemplification and consequence of this experience is the denigration and denial by 
Africans of their intellectual heritage. On the basis of this, Ramose concludes that the 
                                                 
148 See Ajei, M. O., 2000, The Paranormal, op. cit. p. 11, chapters 3 and 4. 
149 Ramose, M. B., 2002, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, op. cit. p 40 
150 Ibid., p. 51-52. In fact in chapters 4-8 of the book, Ramose argues for Ubuntu as the basis of ethics as 
well as social, legal, medical and political philosophy 
151 Ibid., p. 36 
152 ibid., p. 35 
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authentic liberation of Africa is long overdue. A foremost aim of this liberation is the 
release of Africans’ conceptions of reality, knowledge and truth from dominance under 
the European epistemological paradigm153. 
  
Serequeberhan, on his part, thinks that the African’s condition in need of change is that of 
a “misunderstanding, an estrangement from the meaning of ourselves”. Needless to say, 
this also results from the mental enslavement discussed above, to the extent that its roots 
are in the obliteration of the “standards and practices of our fathers”.  
 
Further, Awoonor argues that the continent’s marginalization within the context of “the 
globalization myth”154 can be traced to two factors. The first is the abdication of the class 
of African intellectuals of their responsibility to bring to the table of the ‘globalized 
world’ its side of the discourse. This abdication inheres in their acceptance of “the 
particularism of the Western claim to predominant superiority in all things as the 
foundation for the universal”155. Accordingly, this class of Africans “has become not only 
the consumer of other people’s material culture in extenso, but more perniciously, other 
people’s ideas”156. Secondly, the continent’s marginalization can be traced to “the 
African intellectual’s “pernicious refusal to take a look at our indigenous knowledge”157. 
 
The common thread running through these observations is that philosophy must play a 
lead role in the struggle for Africa’s emancipation from these by exploring and resolving 
to decipher the sources of our abdication, confusion and misunderstanding158.    
 
 
 
                                                 
153 ibid., p. 36 
154 See section 2.10 for a discussion of this 
155 Awoonor, K., 2006, “Humanities and Globalization: An African Perspective”, in Legon Journal of the 
Humanities: Special Edition 2006, Legon: University of Ghana, p. 11 
156 ibid. The emphasis appears in the quotation. 
157 ibid. 
158 Serequeberhan, T., 1998, “Philosophy and Post-Colonial Africa”, in Emmanuel C. Eze (ed), African 
Coetzee, P. H., and Roux, A. P. J. (eds), Philosophy from Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 125 
pp. 9-12. 
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3.10    Concluding Remarks 
 
The above critique of internalist epistemologies is, fundamentally, a critique of “the lies, 
illusions and mystifications constructed in the Western episteme about Africa”159. It is an 
exposure of the basis of the paradigmatic crisis encountered by social scientists studying 
Africa’s development. The effects of these lies and illusions are the epistemicide and 
valuecide being perpetuated by Africans in their strides towards development, 
exemplified by the persistence, through perpetual cosmetic adaptations and theoretical 
reconstructions, of the Eurocentric and economistic schools of thought, in the 
development process in Africa.  
 
The above critique, then, defines the need for ‘a paradigmatic shift’ in African 
development practice. It promotes the development of indigenous African knowledge 
systems that, in contrast to the Western ‘ethnosciences’ that are currently being imported 
through Western-controlled “development” policy, are rooted in the philosophical 
traditions and social needs of Africans. Success at this will help place Africa as the 
subject in the struggle for its liberation from the imperialist and exploitative practices of 
Western science and technology. It is to these foundations of the authentic liberation of 
Africa that we now turn in the next chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
159 Mudimbe, V. Y., 1988, The Invention of Africa, op. cit., pp. 142-143 
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CHAPTER FOUR: FOUNDATION FOR AFRICA’S DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
In Section 3.9 of Chapter Three, we introduced Ramose’s views on African philosophy 
and its prospects for liberating Africa from the epistemicide and valuecide engendered by 
Western ethnocentrism. In the course of this we encountered his claim that ubuntu is the 
basis of the philosophy of the Bantu speaking peoples. Particularly emphasized were his 
claims that African ontology and epistemology must be understood as two aspects of one 
and the same reality, and that the various sciences and their theoretical foundations are 
anchored upon these two branches of philosophy. In this Chapter we return to the 
ontology and epistemology of ubuntu as the basis of African philosophy and sciences, 
and consider the congruence of philosophical thinking of African cultures, using Bantu 
and Akan cultures as our points of departure.    
 
The central task of this chapter, then, is to inquire into the nature of reality and 
knowledge in the philosophies of indigenous African societies. This is dictated by the fact 
that a culture’s conceptions of what is real and knowable are pivotal in the formation of 
its values; especially of the good. And as sufficiently emphasized in the foregoing 
chapters, we strongly subscribe to the view that the foundations of Africa’s development 
must be the values grown and nurtured from the soil of Africa. The discussions in this 
chapter reiterates our affirmation of the positions of the South Report and Maquet1, that 
there are sufficient cultural features common to African societies to give them a shared 
identity and reason to work together for common objectives. This “family atmosphere”2 
among and between African peoples, is a prominent reason why an appropriately 
conceived common development framework for the continent is liable to succeed. The 
common ontological and epistemological features discussed will lead us, in concluding 
the chapter, to reflections on how they may support the basic structures of development 
theory and practice toward Africa’s authentic liberation.  
 
                                                 
1 In Section vii of the introductory chapter 
2 Ramose, M. B. 2002, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, Harare: Mond Books, p. 40 
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4.2.  Essential Features of African Ontology 
 
4.2.1 The Structure of Be-ing 
 
According to Ramose, the word ‘ubuntu’ couples two words: ubu and ntu. Ubu concerns 
be-ing in general, in so far as “It is enfolded be-ing before it manifests itself in the 
concrete form or mode of ex-sistence of a particular entity”3. Oneness is characteristic of 
ubu. However, this enfolded be-ing is always oriented towards unfoldment. In other 
words, it seeks “incessant continual concrete manifestation through particular forms and 
modes of being”4. Ntu expresses this process of continual unfoldment. Thus, ubu as 
generalized be-ing has the possibility of infinite manifestations5.  
 
Umuntu, the human being, is one such manifestation, and the realm of humans is 
embodied by “the onto-triadic structure of be-ing”6. What this means is that this realm is 
constituted of three interdependent levels of existence. The first is the world of the living. 
This is the level of epistemic discourse, as well as the creation and organization of social 
structures. The second is the level of “the living-dead”7. In this conception of reality, the 
death of a human being implies the discontinuance only of the person’s physical being 
but not the discontinuance of the person’s life. The third level of the realm of the living is 
that of the yet-to-be-born, and these are the “beings of the future”8.  
 
                                                 
3 Ibid., p. 41 
4 Ibid.  
5 The affirmation of this thesis by the Igbos of Nigeria is encoded in the igbo term for ‘the world’. This is 
Uwa which, according to Osuagwu, literally means “the Unfolding”. See Osuagwu, C. G. “Cybercosmos: 
The African Dynamic Network Universe”, The Tshwane Renascent Africa Lectures, delivered at the 
University of South Africa, Pretoria, 20-31 March 2006, p. 2 
6 Ibid. p. 50 
7 Mbiti, J., 1970, African Religions and Philosophy, London: Heinemann, p. 25. Here, Mbiti employs this 
phrase to mean “the spirits of those who have recently died”. This was the first time this phrase was 
stematically employed in African philosophical discourse. However, it is doubtful whether Mbiti can 
restrict the concept to only those who have recently departed the life of the living. We subscribe to the 
phrase’s wider interpretation by Ramose (at Ramose, M. B, 2002, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, 
Harare: Mond Books, p. 50) to mean “those who have passed away from the world of the living” 
8 Ramose , M. B, 2002, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, ibid. 
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These reflections on Bantu ontology coincide largely with the Akan theory of be-ing, 
which displays the following three essential features. The first is the postulate that 
existence comprises visible and invisible realms, such that some aspects of reality are 
imperceptible9. Secondly, Akan thought postulates a universe containing a hierarchy of 
beings, with Onyame10 at the top.  In descending order from Onyame comes the abosom 
(deities) the Nsamanfo (human beings who have departed the visible realm of existence 
for the invisible one) human beings and physical objects.  Subject to minor variations, 
this hierarchical ontological structure has been asserted alike by professional 
philosophers, traditional sages and anthropologists writing on Akan culture11, and for 
other African cultures12. The third essential postulate of Akan cosmology is that the 
universe is endowed with varying degrees of force of power, all of which derive 
ultimately from Onyame.  Gyekye reports that  
 
“This force or power is sunsum…in this metaphysic all created things, that is, 
natural objects, have or contain sunsum.  Every deity (obosom) is a sunsum but 
not vice versa.  Sunsum, then, on my interpretation, appears to be a generic 
concept, it appears to be a universal spirit, manifesting itself differently in the 
various beings and objects in the natural world”13. 
 
He then furnishes us with other senses in which sunsum is used. According to him: 
 
                                                 
9 A number of authors claim the same for other African cultures. One of the strongest defenses of this  
claim occurs at Bujo, B, 1998, The Ethical Dimensions of Community, Nganda, C. N. (trans), Nairobi: 
Paulines Publications, pp. 15, 16, 33 
10 The most powerful of the beings that inhabit the Akan universe 
11 Some commentators have attributed a dualistic universe to the Akans, assigning all the categories of 
being beyond human beings to be the immaterial/spiritual realm of existence, whereas observable entities 
like trees have been consigned to the physical realm.  I would like to suggest here that although the Akan 
thinker affirms that the universe is composed of visible and invisible beings, it is doubtful whether he 
implies by this that these aspects of existence are two distinctly separate categories as the notion of dualism 
would suggest  (the as yet unsolved mind-body problem in Western philosophy is sufficient evidence that 
interactionism is no solution to the problems that beset dualism).  Rather the Akan thinker conceives of 
these two realms as two points on a continuum, and not distinct realms.  This is because an obosom, for 
instance, which in a strictly dualistic interpretation of Akan cosmology will belong to the immaterial realm, 
is believed to be capable of physical manifestation and as such, enter into a visible world.  On the other 
hand a tree, which in a strictly dualistic universe would be conceived as a physical entity, is believed to be 
constituted of non-physical properties by many Akan thinkers.  This makes a clear-cut dichotomy of the 
immaterial/material or spiritual/physical in Akan ontology implausible.  
12 Mbiti, J., 1970, African Religions and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 46 
13 Gyekye, K., 1995, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme, 
Philadelphia: Temple University Press, pp. 72-73 
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“First it is used to refer to any self-conscious subject whose activities are initiated 
self-consciously.  In this sense Onyame, the deities, and the ancestors are said to 
be spirits (sunsum), that is spiritual beings with intelligence and will.  Second, it 
is used to refer to the mystical powers believed to exist in the world.  These 
powers are held to constitute the inner essences or intrinsic properties of natural 
objects, and are believed to be contained in those objects”14. 
 
Thus, on Gyekye’s interpretation, sunsum denotes an intelligent and willful being as well 
as a power that constitutes the essence of all existents. This interpretation is affirmed by 
Minkus, who writes: “As well as designating the activating essence of particular beings 
and things, it [sunsum] also refers to the general power to act in non-ordinary, non-
physical ways”15.  
 
Thus sunsum is a force that pervades the whole universe. It is embodied in particular 
existents and empowers them to act self-consciously16.  A conscious being, then, belongs 
to that class of existents whose essence is a power (to act in the world) that is an aspect 
of, and contingent upon, a universal natural power.  What makes any existent what it is, is 
its possession of some definite amount of this power. On the terms of this ontology, 
therefore, a physical object has the potential of self-activation. As such, it can, without 
external agency, be a causal agent in the world. 
 
This notion that every existent is composed of self-activating power constitutes a 
difference between African ontology and other metaphysical systems.  Gyekye notes this 
in the following passage: 
 
“In saying that natural objects contain sunsum or power Akan thinkers mean to 
attribute to them an intrinsic property, namely the property of activity or an 
activating principle.  If this interpretation of the Akan position is correct, then it 
rejects by implication the view held by Cartesians and others in Western 
                                                 
14 Ibid., p. 73 
15 Minkus, H., 1977, “Causal Theory in Akwapim Akan Philosophy”. In African Philosophy: An 
Introduction, Wright, R. (ed.)., Washington D.C.: University Press of America, p 114-115 
16 Hagan, G. P., 2000, “Modern Technology, Traditional Mysticism and Ethics in Akan Culture”, in Lauer, 
H. (ed), Ghana: Changing Values Changing Technologies: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies II, Washington 
D. C., Council; for Research in Values and Philosophy, pp. 43-44. Hagan affirms this view here by 
claiming that “all things have sunsum” means that “both visible and invisible entities are treated as being 
endowed with a principle of activity that enables all existents interact in and of themselves” 
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philosophy and also in Islamic philosophy that matter is essentially passive or 
inert and that a creative divine being must therefore activate it17. 
 
But what, closely, is meant by the claim that sunsum is a ‘power’ or ‘force’ that pervades 
the universe?  What is the nature of this force? As stated above, Akan thinkers enunciate 
reality as comprising of visible and invisible aspects.  Most traditional Akan sages and 
modern philosophers alike admit that sunsum belongs to the invisible aspect of reality.  It 
is posited by many of them as a force that is concealed from immediate sense experience, 
something shrouded or veiled, something which ordinary sense experience can access but 
only after the act of “removing the veil” which shrouds sunsum from immediate 
perception18. The capacity to remove this veil may be acquired during training toward the 
priesthood of the indigenous religion, or by the conscious (or unconscious) assumption of 
a special mental state19. 
 
Do all these make sunsum “spirits”, as tenaciously contended by Gyekye20?  In our view, 
the Akan thinker’s conception of the defining attributes of sunsum far from justifies 
identifying it with the Cartesian notion of “spirit”, as Gyekye does. His identification of 
sunsum with Descartes’ res cogitans may be rightfully inferred from his claims. First, he 
holds that the sunsum and okra are ontologically identical though logically distinct. This, 
according to him, means that “they are not independent existents held together in an 
accidental way by an external bond. They are a unity in duality, a duality in unity”21. He 
then goes on to consider the okra/sunsum symbiosis as an immaterial entity22, equivalent 
to Descartes’ ‘soul’23. The problem is that the Cartesian res cogitans belongs to an 
uncompromising category of ‘spirit’, and defining the ontology of sunsum as coinciding 
with it is problematic for a number of reasons. 
 
To begin with, the concept spirit in the Western philosophical context under discussion 
refers to a substance which, by nature, cannot ever be accessible to sense experience.  It 
                                                 
17 Gyekye, K., 1995, An Essay op. cit. p. 75 
18 Ajei, M. O., 2000., op. cit. p. 42 
19 Ibid.,  p. 44 
20 Gyekye, K., 1995, An Essay, op. cit.,  p. 88, 94 
21 Ibid., p. 98 
22 Ibid., p. 94 
23 Ibid., p. 87 
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is by nature distinctly detached from the system of coordinates that define the spatio-
temporal schema. This distinction is categorical24. Such uncompromising severance of 
the Cartesian ‘spirit’ from the world of experience renders it inadequate to express fully 
the meaning of the sunsum, which is conceived of as a force capable of manifesting, and 
influencing events in the physical world. This latter attribute is confirmed for other 
cultures. For instance Mbiti writes of entities which are “invisible but may make 
themselves visible to human beings”25. 
 
Descartes and Gyekye’s spirit mismatches sunsum because the beings that populate Akan 
cosmology prohibit such an irrevocable separation. Therefore, any analysis of these be-
ings that ignores this prohibition is bound to encounter logical problems such as ‘the 
mind/body problem’ and ‘the problem of other minds’, two intractable problems 
bequeathed by Descartes to Western ontology and epistemology. The genesis of these 
problems is Descartes’ categorical departure, in expounding his metaphysics, from the 
three fundamental laws of formal logic26.  However, we cannot hope to attain sufficient 
clarity on many African philosophical concepts with these laws, precisely because they 
are primarily concerned with the form and not the content of thought. As such, they are 
ill-equipped to capture the content and all the ramifications of a dynamic concept like 
sunsum.   
 
On Akan terms, sunsum is a force that permeates the natural world, but of which one 
cannot expect to have immediate sensory experience.  It is as well the activating power of 
every being.   One implication of this is that for it to be possible for beings to have 
agency in the universe, their activating energy (sunsum) has to interact with the energy of 
something else. Regarding this, it is worth noting that the Akan word for prayer is 
‘mpaebo’, a compound word derived from ‘pae’ and ‘bo’.  The imperative pae literally  
means split or cleave, as in “pae dua no mu” (split the wood). ‘Bo’, on the other hand, 
yields to a range of connotations such as call, hit, beat, sound. Thus ‘mpaebo’ may be 
construed as ‘to sound a call’. The salutary point here is that by the act of praying, you 
                                                 
24 Descartes, R., 1998, Discourse on Method and The Meditations, London: Penguin, Second Meditation 
25 Mbiti, J., 1970, African Religions and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 102 
26 The Law of identity, the Law of the Excluded Middle and the Law of non-contradiction 
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“call to” the sunsum external to you.  You set your life-force into vibration by the words 
and act of prayer, so that it may reach other forces.   
 
Experience in this world, then, has to do with this interaction of sunsum.  Sometimes 
these interactions lead to experiences of which we are cognitively, affectively, or 
sensorially conscious.  At times we lack conscious experience of them. Yet they occur 
and produce real events.  What distinguishes different categories of beings is the level of 
the potency of their sunsum. These levels determine the capacity of various beings for 
agency in the world, and of their consciousness of reality.  Therefore, proceeding from 
this ontology, if we fail to consciously experience certain events, then this is either 
because our level of consciousness or activating power is weaker than is required for that 
level of understanding, or we are inattentive to the event.    
 
We have seen, through our discussion of Ramose’s work, that the three postulates of 
Akan ontology are congruent with elements of Bantu thought.  This point is confirmed by  
Placide Temples who theorizes Bantu ontology as essentially a theory of forces27. This 
particular perspective has had an enormous ideological impact on contemporary African 
philosophical discourse on self-identity, and thus obliquely, on development. This for two 
reasons: First, Temples’ work, Bantu Philosophy, may be claimed to have engendered 
active discourse on the nature of African philosophy and on conceptual directions for the 
African cultural future. Secondly, the work is easily interpreted as implicated in the 
ethnocentric emphasis of the Western discourse that it claimed to challenge. In view of its 
significance, we give some attention here to this work. 
 
Against the elaborate rationalization of European derogatory conceptions of Africa 
stemming from Hegel’s philosophy of history28, and its influence on the sustained 
denigration of African thought maturing into constructions of African mentality as 
                                                 
27 Temples, P. 1959, Bantu Philosophy, Paris: Presence Africaine, p. 51.  
28 The upshot of Hegel’s thesis was that sub-Saharan Africa is not part of universal history because world 
history is a rational process and sub-Saharan Africa doesn’t have the capacity to contribute to this process. 
For a thorough examination of this thesis and its influence, see  
- Ramose, M. B., 2002 African Philosophy through Ubuntu, op. cit.  
- Irele, A. 1983. “Introduction”. pp 7-32 in Hountondji, P. J, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality. 
London: Hutchison and Co      
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‘primitive’ and ‘pre-logical’ by anthropologists in the early twentieth century29, Temples 
defined an ontology which, according to him, underlay Bantu consciousness and action, 
and which finds expression in the religious and social institutions and the value 
preferences of the Basotho. It is an ontology which conceives force as the very essence of 
be-ing. Thus 
 
“…the Bantu speak, act, live as if, for them, beings were forces. Force is not for 
them an adventitious accidental reality. Force is even more than a necessary 
attribute of beings: force is the nature of being, force is being, being is force” 30.   
 
Further, according to Temples, the interrelationship of forces within a wholeness of 
existence, as well as the hierarchy of forces, are also fundamental principles of Bantu 
ontology. At the top of this hierarchy is God. Then comes the forefathers, and next living 
human beings, who are stratified according to their ‘vital power’. Beneath the living are 
animals and vegetation and inanimate objects31.   
 
But while cautioning Europeans to abandon their derogatory conceptions of African 
thought, Temples animatedly upholds these conceptions. First, he states that he does  
 
“not claim, of course, that the Bantu are capable of formulating a philosophical 
treatise, complete with an adequate vocabulary. It is our job to proceed to such 
systematic development. It is we who will be able to tell them, in precise terms, 
what their inmost concept of being is”32.  
 
Then, again,  
 
“hitherto we had been building on sand…..we have at length discovered the true 
point of departure. We shall rejoice at having found within the Bantu something 
to render them more noble, without feeling ourselves obliged to kill first the man 
already existing33”  
 
It needs to be pointed out that the subjects in this quotation refer to European 
missionaries and colonial administrators. One legitimate inference that may be drawn 
                                                 
29 Levy-Bruhl, L, 1910, Les fonctions mentales dans les societes inferierures, Paris: Presses Univer-sitaires 
de France, pp 505-6. 
30 Temples, P. 1959, Bantu Philosophy, op. cit., p. 51  
31 Ibid. p. 46 
32 Ibid. p. 36 
33 ibid p. 44. 
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from this is that the ‘discovery’ of the philosophical ability of Africans makes them, 
foremost, candidates for Western ‘civilization’ and ‘christianization34. But since Africans 
may not be aware of this, it was incumbent on the missionaries and colonialists to 
decisively impress on Africans that their way of viewing the world and their place in it 
should have no ultimate objective than that of the European civilizing mission. It is 
notable that “Temples was advocating this at a time when the Atlantic social scientists 
were formulating the modernization theories35”  
 
These racist and imperialistic connotations of Temples’ work have subjected it to severe 
criticism by a number of African philosophers. According to Hountoundji, for instance, 
Temples’ attribution to Bantus of a “collective and unconscious world-view”36 as 
philosophy is a contemptuous abstraction from history designed as a concrete device “in 
the service of a very concrete policy which is nothing less than the preservation of 
imperialist domination”37. Further, Temples’ “Bantu Philosophy’ is a hoax decidedly 
calculated to make the African a mere object for discussion. Thus  
 
“Bantu Philosophy is a mere pretext for learned disquisitions among Europeans. 
The black person continues to be the very opposite of an interlocutor; he/she 
remains a topic, a voiceless face under private investigation, an object to be 
defined and not the subject of a possible discourse”38. 
 
These are authentic and cogent criticisms. However, they de-emphasize some 
constructive features of Temples’ work. We think a more fruitful approach to Bantu 
Philosophy may be to distinguish its elucidation of Bantu ontological concepts from the 
political objectives of its author. The elucidation is largely accurate, even though much of 
the author’s objectives are misguided and repugnant. However, much of the criticism has 
seized predominantly on Temples’ misguided objectives to discredit the whole work. We 
                                                 
34 The seventh and last chapter of the work is entitled “Bantu Philosophy and our Mission to Civilize”  
35 Chachage, C. S. L., 1994, “Discourse on Development among African Philosophers”, in Himmelstrand, 
U., Kinyanjui, K., and Mburugu, E (eds), African Perspectives on Development, London: James Currey 
Ltd., p. 52 
36 Hountondji, P. J., 2002, “An Alienated Literature”, in Coetzee, P. H., and Roux, A. P. J. (eds), 
Philosophy from Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 125 
37 Ibid. p. 127 
38 Ibid. p. 126 
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wish, however, to separate these objectives from his statement of Bantu ontology, which 
we think is credible.  
 
The Akan concept of sunsum has strong conceptual and cultural affinity with moya, 
moea, umoya39 in the Bantu languages. This is what enables the ontology of the Bantu 
and Akan peoples to stress the existence of a general, enfolded be-ing, of which specific 
and particular beings in the universe (visible and invisible) are aspects of. The Bantus 
conceive of this general be-ing as ubu, whereas the Akans call it sunsum. This notion of 
be-ing in general suggests that the ultimate structure of reality is exemplified by oneness, 
a suggestion which we now wish to consider and shed some light.  
 
4.2.2: Holonness: the Non-fragmentation of Be-ing 
 
Most traditional communities in Africa regard the visible and invisible dimensions of 
existence as aspects of a complex wholeness inhabited by a multiplicity of beings, some 
of which share characteristics of both dimensions. In fact in African thought, to exist 
means “standing in a particular relationship with all there is both visible and invisible”40. 
Ramose refers to this as the ‘whole-ness’ conception of be-ing, or holon-ness41. This 
contrasts with the often-quoted “holistic” world view of Africans, a misconception 
which, in Ramose’s view, derives from Western ontological and logical categories that 
furthers the “fragmentation of be-ing”42.  
 
But what does this mean? According to Ramose, the fragmentation of be-ing occurs 
because the structure of be-ing in Western thought has been left to be determined by the 
structure of language. We know be-ing through language, and this knowledge is 
exemplified by the structure of a doer (subject) engaged in the activity of doing (verb) 
that is directed at a passive recipient/beneficiary of the doing (object). This represents the 
subject-verb- object (SVO) structure of language. This linguistic state of affairs has been 
                                                 
39 Ramose, M.B., 2002, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, op. cit., p. 85 
40Ruch, E. A., and Anyanwu, K. C., (eds), 1981, African Philosophy, : An Introduction to the Main 
Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa, Rome: Catholic Book Agency, p. 124 
41 Ramose, M. B., 2002, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, op. cit., p. 46 
42 Ibid., pp 46-47 
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superimposed on thought, warranting the argument that the SVO structure also 
determines thought. As such, thought is said to merely encode the inherent separateness 
of subject and object.  
 
Ramose continues by arguing that this mode of thinking is extended by proclaiming that 
the subject is the moulder of reality. On this view, reality becomes moulded being in so 
far as be-ing is reduced to human experiences and ideas. The existence of the subject as 
an aspect of be-ing, as well as the subject’s activity as a possibility condition for 
connecting to be-ing, is relegated to the background. Henceforth, the subject – the human 
being – becomes the center of the universe. It is this projection of a linguistic theory on to 
reality as an explanation of reality that represents the said fragmentation of be-ing. In 
Ramose’s words, the “obliviousness of do-ing and the imperceptible derecognition of be-
ing as the possibility condition for moulding and ordering is what we mean by the 
fragmentation of being as wholeness”43.  
 
This identification of thought with be-ing, which reached its climax in Newton’s work, 
was already matured in the infancy of Western philosophy. In his poem Peri’ phuseos, 
Parmenides44 is guided by a Goddess to distinguish the Way of Opinion (the senses) from 
the Way of Truth (the faculty of the intellect). The Goddess shows how knowledge 
gained through sense experience must be rejected in light of a revelation from mind: 
 
“It is necessary that you shall learn all things, as well the unshaken heart of well-
rounded truth [provided my mind] as the opinions of mortals in which there is no 
true belief. Nevertheless, you shall learn these [opinions] also, how the 
appearances, which pervade all things, had to be acceptable”45. 
 
The superiority of the intellect over the senses depends, for Parmenides, on the fact that 
only thought can know ‘what is’ (or be-ing). The senses offer us a constantly changing 
world, a mixture of be-ing and non-be-ing. However, our minds cannot think of non-be-
ing, as this would amount to not thinking at all. Therefore, non-being does not exist. Be-
                                                 
43 Ibid., p. 44 
44 Who flourished in the latter part of the 6th Century B. C 
45 Taran, L., 1965, Parmenides, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 9 
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ing is the only possible object of thought and because of this, be-ing and thought are the 
same. This is the famous “…for the same thing can be thought and can exist”46. 
 
It has been pointed out that what Parmenides in fact uncovered was the form of thought 
when it thinks: i.e., identity with itself47. The necessary identity of thought while 
thinking, is conceived by Parmenides as the unity and identity of be-ing and the only 
possible object of rational thought. Because, on his terms, identity is the only thing we 
can think without contradiction, this form of thought becomes the only true be-ing 
possible for thought. In Parmenides, then, the identity of thought with itself becomes the 
essence of be-ing and the only necessary truth.  
 
In celebrating this unjustified passage from a truth of logic to an ontological truth some 
millennia later, Descartes could only proclaim that ‘Cogito ergo sum’. What this means is 
that all Descartes could think with necessity and derive rationally with no doubt was the 
identity of thought with itself. Since, proceeding from the Law of Identity, it cannot be 
true that I am simultaneously thinking and not thinking, then if I am thinking, then I am 
while I think. Therefore in Descartes, as in Parmenides, there is only one truth that one 
cannot reject because it is immediately self-evident, and that is the existence of thought 
while thinking and, therefore48, one’s own existence as a thinking being. But this 
existence does not have any other specification than that of thinking. I exist ‘in so far as I 
think’. But what about the existence of other persons? Do my hands, which do not think, 
also exist? What am I at the moment when I am not thinking? Therefore, how often am I? 
 
These questions define “the mind-body problem” and “the problem of other minds” in 
Western philosophy, and as indicated in section 4.2.1, these are problems to which no 
convincing answers have yet been found. The intractable nature of these problems may 
not be unconnected with the overemphasis on the thinking subject in Western philosophy. 
                                                 
46 Ibid. p 41 
47 Papa-Grimaldi, A., 1998, Time and Reality, Aldershot: Ashgate, pp. 9-10, 210. 
48 It is this inference that constitutes the unjustified passage from the identity of thought with itself, to the 
identity of thought with be-ing. 
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This emphasis on the subject, which manifests in the fragmentation of be-ing, is a direct 
consequence of a false dichotomy between be-ing and becoming49.  
 
4.2.3 The Rheomode and the Nature of Be-ing 
 
This emphasis, however, is rejected by the rheomode, which is the philosophical 
language of ubuntu. As noted earlier in section 1.3.6.2, the rheomode “is a critique of a 
thought and language structure which assumes and imposes a strict and a necessary 
sequence in terms of subject-verb-object. It is an appeal for the understanding of entities 
as dimensions, forms and modes of the incessant flow of simultaneously multi-directional 
motion”50. Thus it is a language that acknowledges be-ing rather than ‘be’, and preserves 
the whole-ness rather than the ‘whole’ of be-ing. By avoiding ‘whole’ and ‘be’, it negates 
the fixation of be-ing and introduces motion and dynamism into the nature of reality. 
 
Another characteristic of the rheomode is that it departs from the verb, yet it recognizes 
the importance of the subject by understanding the verb as a verbal/noun (gerund). Thus 
the action of the verb, or doing, becomes inseparable from the doer. The doer in the act of 
doing then becomes “at any given moment the embodiment of the potentiality for an 
infinite variety of an unceasing activity of merging and converging” 51. In this way, “the 
incessant flow of motion as be-ing is preserved because the verb pertains to doing rather 
than do!52”  
 
Such a whole-ness or holonistic view of the universe that admits of the dynamic structure 
of reality is common to many African cultures.  Senghor asserts that “the African 
conceives the world, beyond the diversity of its forms, as fundamentally a mobile, yet 
unique reality that seeks synthesis”53.  It is important to understand that in the process 
towards this potential synthesis, interaction of the various beings in the system, which 
                                                 
49 The Parmenidian being and non-being. 
50 Ramose, M. B., 2002, African Philosophy Through Ubuntu, op. cit., p. 45 
51 Ibid. p 46 
52 Ibid.  
53 Senghor, L., 1970, “Negritude”, in Montgomery, G et al. (eds), Independent Africa, New York: Anchor 
Books, p. 184 
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occurs necessarily, allows for such fluidity that the defining characteristics of these be-
ings dovetail into each other. Because reality is as an aggregate of components that 
interact in both determinate and indeterminate patterns, all of which are potentially 
capable of yielding truth, the rheomode becomes a language that simultaneously 
acknowledges the importance of logic and recognizes the limitations imposed by it.  This 
language furnishes us with the ability to transcend these limitations in a deliberate and 
structured manner, with a view to widening the human capacity to articulate insights on 
nature’s complexity.  One such capacity is the ability to operate simultaneously at the 
physical and non-physical realms of reality, as well as the capacity to interact with other 
entities in nature whose be-ing we cannot accurately define.   
 
A holonistic conception of reality is likewise affirmed by the Akans. Referring to Akan 
cosmogony, Abraham observes that “the whole forms one internally contiguous order”54. 
In our attempt to expound on this observation, we shall adopt the Akan concept of the 
person as our point of departure. This is because this concept has proven to be most 
fertile in spawning strands that can hardly be ignored in an appraisal of the holonistic 
tenets of Akan thought.  
 
There is considerable consensus among authors on Akan ontology55 that the Akan 
consider the human person as ontologically constituted of the okra, sunsum, and honam56. 
Since the publication of Danquah’s Akan Doctrine of God57, the relationship of okra to 
sunsum has occasioned a philosophical debate which still rages on and has produced 
different positions on the matter.  We would like to adopt Gyekye’s exposition of these 
concepts as the point of departure for our discussion because, in our opinion, it ranks high 
amongst the most recent and thorough accounts of the subject.  
                                                 
54 Abraham, W. E., 1962, The Mind of Africa, Chicago: Chicago University Press, p. 51 
55 Some of these are:  
- Danquah, J. B., 1944, The Akan Doctrine of God, London: Lutherworth Press 
- Oguah, B. E., 1977, “African and Western Philosophy: A Comparative Study”, in Wright, R. A. 
(ed) African Philosophy, Washington, D. C: University Press of America, pp. 196-197 
-  Gyekye, K., 1995, Essay, op. cit., p. 89.  
56 The okra is usually translated into English as ‘soul’, sunsum is held to be the activating principle in the 
person and the source of character, and honam is the body. 
57 Danquah, J. B. 1944, Akan Doctrine of God, op.cit 
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As seen in Section 4.2.1, Gyekye considers the okra and sunsum as logically distinct, but 
ontologically united58. We endorse this position, and understand it to mean that the 
relationship between okra and sunsum is not one of strict identity59.  This is not the kind 
of relationship that okra has with sunsum because, as Gyekye points out, we can make 
true assertions about okra that will not apply to sunsum. 
 
Another strand in Gyekye’s exposition is his admission that sunsum is capable of 
physical manifestation.  In spite of this, he maintains nonetheless that it is essentially 
immaterial/spiritual in the Cartesian sense of ‘spiritual’60. His primary reason for this 
position is that the manifestation doesn’t occur in the spatio-temporal world, “otherwise 
anyone would be able to see and communicate with the okra (soul)”61.  We agree with 
Gyekye that the fact of the physical manifestation of okra/sunsum doesn’t necessarily 
make it categorially physical.  On the other hand we reject his position that this leads to 
the conclusion that it is categorially immaterial. 
 
Our position on the nature of sunsum fully coincides with that of its Yoruba conceptual 
correlate, the emi. Gbadegesin informs us that in Yoruba thought emi, is the life-giving 
principle bestowed on all human be-ings by the supreme being. But emi not only supplies 
life and existence, “it also guarantees such conscious existence as long as it remains in 
force”62 However, if we are to conceive emi as spiritual, then this must be understood 
only as referring to “an invisible entity and nothing more than that”63.  
 
Obviously, this is far from Gyekye’s understanding of the spirituality of sunsum. An 
invisible entity does not necessarily have to be immaterial. But Gyekye arrives at the 
immateriality of sunsum because his arguments are designed primarily to refute the claim 
                                                 
58 Gyekye, K., 1995, Essay, op. cit., p. 98 
59 This type of identity relationship is said to exist between x and y if every non-intentional predicate 
asserted of x, if true, is also true of y and vice versa.   
60 Gyekye, K., 1995, Essay, op. cit., p. 87 
61 Ibid., p. 86 
62 Gbadegesin, S., 2002, “Eniyan: The Yoruba concept of a Person”, in Coetzee, P. H and Roux, A. P. J. 
(eds) Philosophy from Africa, op. cit. p 178-179 
63 Ibid. p 179 
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that it is a physical entity.  However, this task is rendered insurmountable by his thinking 
that once we admit its physical manifestation, we renounce the possibility of legitimately 
upholding the view of a spatially-bound sunsum.   
 
The argument that Gyekye is meeting a logical one:  if the okra/sunsum materializes in 
space, then it is presumably present at a specific location at a specific time, as these 
characterize the essence of a physical substance.  But his answer to this problem, also a 
logical one, engenders greater difficulties: if we admit his position that sunsum is a 
spiritual entity because the modes of seeing it are not physical, then we are bound to 
claim that, for example, electromagnetism is spiritual because its manifestation is not 
perceived by anyone.  However, this would be incorrect, as our discussions in section 3.3 
sufficiently demonstrate. Thus we can admit the immateriality or non-spatiality of 
okra/sunsum only at the cost of ignoring its other important feature – its manifestation in 
space-time.  If we chose nevertheless to conceive it as a Cartesian spirit, then we choose 
arbitrarily. To avoid such a choice, Akan thinkers evidently adopt the option of 
conceiving of the nature of sunsum in accordance with the logic of the rheomode. 
 
Wiredu highlights some of these problems with Gyekye’s conception of the person and 
provides his ontology of okra/sunsum as “quasi-physical”. What he means by this is that 
it is not “straightforwardly physical as it is believed not to be fully subject to spatial 
constraints. Nor is it perceivable to the naked eye. Nevertheless, in some ways, it seems 
to be credited with paraphysical properties64”. The upshot of Wiredu’s position seems to 
be that the okra is, essentially, a physical entity with some accidental non-physical 
properties. Thus referring to the okra, he contends that “there is the conception under 
discussion only a reduced materiality and the reduction affects not its imagery but 
dynamics”65.  He reinforces this view elsewhere, by relying on the Akan language66.  
 
                                                 
64 Wiredu, K., 1983, “The Akan Concept of Mind”, in Ibadan Journal of Humanistsic Studies, No. 3, p. 119 
65 Wiredu, K., 1992, “Death and the Afterlife in African Culture” in Gyekye, K and Wiredu, K (eds) Person 
and Community – Ghanaian Philosophical Studies I, Washington, D. C: Council for Research in Values 
and Philosophy, p. 140 
66 Wiredu, K., 1987, “The Concept of Mind with Particular Reference to the Language and Thought of the 
Akans”. In Floistad, G., (ed), Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey: Vol. 5. Dordrecht: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers. 
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Wiredu thus diametrically opposes Gyekye on this subject. But in so doing, he introduces 
yet more intractable problems into focus. For instance we may ask: if the okra is 
essentially physical, and a physical entity is one which occupies a volume of space that is 
equal to itself at any particular time, then why is it not completely susceptible to space-
time coordinates? 
 
It has been observed, and we think correctly, that the differences between Gyekye and 
Wiredu could be reduced to one question: “What is the nature of that being which, when 
it is physically observed, is sunsum and when it is not observed, is sunsum?  Are we to 
say that it is physical or non-physical?”67. The one question thus becomes two in 
Engmann, with two purposes.  The first interrogates the nature of sunsum, and the second 
prescribes two possible answers to the first.  But taking into account the context in which 
the question arises, we think the only legitimate question is the first one.  This question is 
appropriate because it is the more vigorous of the two.  The second question erodes the 
interrogative force of the first by reducing the range of possible answers to two 
diametrically opposed ones.  By so doing, it pretends as if the solution to this problem 
must necessarily conform to the Law of Identity, that we have on our hands a riddle 
which must be resolved in an “either/or” format. However, such a resolution cannot 
consistently endure in a holonistic framework upheld by indigenous African thinkers. 
 
Regarding this, it is apposite to emphasize the point that consistency in terms of 
conformity to the Law of Identity is not the only test of the rationality or legitimacy of 
discourse.  The Akan view of the universe may not subscribe fully to this law of formal 
logic, but coherent modes of thought that subscribe to other notions of consistency cannot 
be denied legitimacy merely because they are at variance with the Law of Identity.  In 
fact a number of doctrines with firmly established philosophical credentials have been 
expounded outside the ambit of the identity principle.  One which warrants inclusion in 
this category is existentialism.   
 
                                                 
67 Engmann, J., 1992, “Immortality and the Nature of Man in Ga Thought”, in Gyekye, K. and Wiredu, K. 
(eds), Person and Community, op. cit., p. 171 
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Engmann’s either/or resolution may have been required if the reality of sunsum was 
experienced by the Akans as inextricably locked under the key of Cartesian dualism.  
However, logic and its fundamental rules may not be capable at all of providing the 
standards for dealing adequately with the question about nature of be-ing as such.  This is 
because  
 
“perhaps the whole body of logic as it is known to us, perhaps all the logic that we 
treat as a gift from heaven, is grounded in a very definite answer to the question 
about the essent; perhaps in consequence all thinking which solely follows the 
laws of thought prescribed by traditional logic is incapable from the very start of 
even understanding the question about the essent by its own resources; let alone 
actually unfolding the question and guiding it towards an answer”68. 
 
Judging by the attributes they ascribe to sunsum, it is clear that Akan thinkers consider 
the validity of their claims about it as transcending the laws of identity, non-
contradiction, and the excluded middle.  It is clear from the dynamism of their conception 
that they do not wish to deny themselves the possibility of asserting ‘both/and’ if this is 
what nature presents to them as real. They refuse to placidly accept the ‘definite answer 
to the question about the essent’, which is an analysis of reality in terms of the logic of 
western science. This logic is based upon a specific conception of space and time. 
Rethinking reality in other terms becomes necessary since the validity of this logic, as 
stated in section 3.5, has been vehemently questioned by contemporary scientific 
perspectives. As discussed there, there exist natural phenomena – like electromagnetic 
force - which, like sunsum, are not immediately accessible to sense experience but which 
manifest themselves to human sense experience under specific conditions.  
 
4.2.4 Be-ings in a ‘Network Universe’ 
 
The vitality of sunsum determines the relative position of beings on the hierarchical order 
of Akan ontology.  Due to the belief in the existence of universal sunsum, and also that it 
derives from God, it is legitimate to argue that this ontological framework conceives of 
be-ing or Nature or God as one.  The divine energy made manifest in particular and 
specific beings in the perceivable and imperceptible worlds constitutes the different 
                                                 
68 Heiddeger, M., 1987, An Introduction to Metaphysics, New Haven: Yale University Press, p 25 
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modes of expression of God.  Thus in this ontology, human beings, like all categories of 
being, are just part of this generalized be-ing, which in the Bantu language is 
philosophically rendered as ubu.  Therefore, we cannot plausibly separate be-ing (as 
matter) from be-ing (as consciousness).  Ultimately, be-ing is understood as being a 
wholeness, or that which makes everything connected into a whole.  
 
The notion of be-ing as oneness readily leads to the view that each particular existent is 
merely a speck in a pattern of interactions within the wholeness. Further, its correlate, the 
notion of universal force, yields the view that each existing entity has the power to 
interact with every other entity. It is in view of this that “the world of forces (beings) is 
held like a spider’s web of which no single thread can be caused to vibrate without 
shaking the whole network”69. Osuagwu considers this world of universal and necessary 
inter-relations as analogous to the intercommunicative network of contemporary 
Information Technology, and consequently characterizes the African world as a “cyber-
cosmos”70.  
 
Two fundamental implications flow from this cybernetic character of existence for the 
quest for foundations for Africa’s authentic development. The first is that each human 
being is a source of causal activity. As seen, in terms of Akan ontology, every being 
belongs to that class of existents whose essence is a power (to act in the world) that is 
contingent upon a universal natural power. The salient point with this is that Africans are, 
ontologically speaking, active sources of actions that influence life. They have an 
intrinsic property that enables them, even unconsciously, to influence their own and other 
lives and to affect the total life force of their communities by their manner of being. Thus 
an African has an ontological justification for rejecting the imposition of foreign-made 
development theories.  
 
The second implication flowing from the notion of be-ing as a oneness is that each 
existent is key to the formation of “universal solidarity”, which characterizes indigenous 
                                                 
69 Tempels, P., 1959, Bantu Philosophy, op. cit., p. 60. 
70 Osuagwu, C. G., 2006, Cybercosmos: The African Network Universe, A lecture delivered under thew 
Tshwane Renascent Africa Lectures series, University of South Africa, Pretoria, March 22-30, p. 2 
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African society71. This solidarity, deriving from the perceived “wholeness” of existence, 
has definite implications for African value preferences and social organization. Now we 
wish to turn our attention to the African epistemological framework and inquire into how 
it may influence the quest for Africa’s development.   
 
4.3 Knowledge and Development 
 
Undoubtedly, some of the fundamental questions a theory of knowledge has to answer 
are 
1. Can we know anything at all? 
2. If we can know something, then what is it that we can know?  In other words, can 
we know everything or are there limits to what we can know? 
3. How do we come to know what we can know: what are the sources and the 
pathways to knowledge? 
 
Answers to these questions generated by theories in Western philosophy. These theories 
have generally been considered as standard ones to these questions.  It may be worth our 
while therefore to conduct a brief excursus into the meaning of ‘knowledge’ in the 
Western philosophical tradition.  
 
4.3.1 The Conditions of Knowledge in the Western Epistemological Tradition 
 
Save the absolute skepticism of Pyrrho and his adherents, the common view among 
Western philosophers has been that some things can be known. I am using ‘thing’ 
comprehensively to include events, propositions and other objects of knowledge.  But 
what does it mean to say that we can ‘know’ some things?  What is the nature of 
knowledge? 
 
It has been a central claim in Western philosophy since Plato’s Theaetetus that to know p 
means that:  
                                                 
71 Bujo, B., 1997, Ethical Dimension, op. cit. p. 17 
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1. p is true 
2. You must believe that p is true 
3. You must be justified in believing that p is true 
 
Jointly, these constitute the necessary and sufficient condition for knowledge. However, 
the interpretation of the third condition has posed a perennial challenge to Western 
epistemologists.  The challenge inheres in this: if my knowing that p means my having 
justification for my belief that p is true, then what kind of justification will do? In 
attempts to answer this, a few trends of thought have emerged in Western philosophy. We 
would like to look at those espoused by Descartes and Locke, since these constitute the 
most prominent approaches in the said philosophical setting. 
 
4.3.1.1 Knowledge Requires Certainty 
 
According to Descartes, knowledge requires certainty.  In other words to know that p, the 
evidence I have in support of p must be indubitable.  The evidence is indubitable if the 
statement that represents the evidence (s) relates to p in such a way that it is impossible 
that p should be false if s is true.  Descartes formulates this theory thus: 
 
“But if I did convince myself of anything, I must have existed.  But there is some 
deceiver, supremely powerful, supremely intelligent, who purposely always deceives me.  
If he deceives me, then again I undoubtedly exist; let him deceive me as much as he may, 
he will never bring it about that, at the time of thinking that I am in fact nothing.  Thus I 
have now weighed all considerations enough and more than enough; and must at length 
conclude that this proposition “I am, I exist”, whenever I utter or conceive it in my mind, 
is necessarily true”72. 
 
Descartes makes it clear at the outset of his Meditations that he is setting out in search of 
an indubitable foundation for knowledge.  As the passage above reveals, this search, after 
his exercise of the hyperbolic doubt, leads him to the intuitive certainty of the existence 
                                                 
72 Descartes, R., 1998, Discourse on Method and The Meditations, op. cit., Second Meditation 
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of his thoughts. This, he holds, is indefeasible evidence for his existence, for it is 
impossible both for him to be aware of his thought and not to exist.  On this view, then, 
the evidence that justifies your belief must be indefeasible.   
 
Suffice it to say that the impossibility of procuring indubitable evidence in support of our 
beliefs was the breeding ground for absolute skepticism in Western philosophy.  
According to these skeptics, knowledge requires certainty, and since no one can be 
certain of anything it follows that no one can know anything.  In fact on the terms of 
Cartesian epistemology, we can hardly claim any knowledge of the external world, as 
evidence for the truth of anything in this world is probable, at best. Therefore, as 
discussed in section 4.2.2, what Descartes’ epistemology yields is the certainty of our 
thoughts and nothing more73.  
 
4.3.1.2 Knowledge Requires Good Evidence 
 
The British empiricist John Locke systematized an epistemology which requires not 
indefeasible evidence but good evidence as sufficient justification.  According to him, 
although the evidence of experience is always defeasible, it is nevertheless adequate to 
justify our true beliefs about the external world.  He argues that all our knowledge is 
ultimately founded on experience74.  This provides us with the grounds for probable, but 
not certain, knowledge; and probability, in practical life, is sufficient justification for 
knowledge.  He rejects enterprises of the sort that Descartes undertook by claiming that 
“He that in the ordinary affairs of life, would admit of nothing but direct plain 
demonstration, would be sure of nothing in this world, but of perishing quickly”75.  
 
                                                 
73 Later on, in the third Meditation, Descartes attempts to save his theory from such a conclusion by 
claiming that God guarantees the certainty of both a priori knowledge and the evidence of our senses.  But 
for this claim to be acceptable, we must know (have indefeasible evidence) that our experiences correspond 
to reality because God has guaranteed that.  However Descartes doesn’t show us how we have such 
evidence of God’s guarantee.  Therefore, it is legitimate to maintain that on Descartes’ terms, we cannot 
know anything about the world save the existence of our own minds. 
74 Locke, J., 1975, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford: Oxford University Press, Book 2 
Chapter 1. 
75 Ibid., Book 3 Chapter 11, Section 10 
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But if experience justifies true belief, and yet it is always defeasible, then how do we 
decide which experience is reliable?  In answering this question empiricists have often 
claimed that some of the knowledge acquired by experience provides the basis for the rest 
of our knowledge.  In other words, all our knowledge is founded on one basic class of 
things we know, those confirmed true by sense experience.  Let us recall that Descartes 
also founded knowledge on the certitude of thought and the guaranteed non-deceptive 
nature of a benevolent and all-powerful God.  Epistemologies such as Descartes’ and 
Locke’s are called Foundationalist Epistemologies in so far as they postulate a class of 
beliefs of which we allegedly have secure knowledge, and assert that all other beliefs, if 
they are to constitute knowledge, must be properly derived from these foundational 
beliefs. 
 
Foundationalist epistemologies ruled Western philosophy and science without serious 
challenge until Edmund Gettier published his “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”76. In 
this work, Gettier provided examples that showed that the justification principle in 
foundationalist epistemology could produce a situation where a false belief is (or, can be) 
justified. Two consequences of Gettier’s paper are worth noting here. First, it prompted 
other approaches to the analysis of knowledge in Western philosophy and; secondly, they 
have fortified the legitimacy of the claims of other epistemological systems.  
 
4.4 Some Features of African (Non-Foundationalist) Epistemology: 
 
How have indigenous African epistemologies responded to the fundamental questions 
posed in Section 4.3? No African culture has yet been encountered that avows absolute 
skepticism of the Phyrric type. Accordingly, thinkers in the indigenous African setting do 
admit that some knowledge is attainable. If so, then how is it acquired?  What can we 
know, and what are the sources and pathways to knowledge?  I will attend to these 
questions now, using Akan epistemology as my point of departure.  
 
 
                                                 
76 Gettier, E., 1963, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis, 23, 6  
 182
 
4.4.1      Levels of Nimdee77 in Akan Epistemology: 
 
In consonance with their metaphysics, Akan thinkers offer a hierarchical order of the 
objects of knowledge and its sources.  Three levels of knowing, emanating from two 
broad sources, can be delineated in the Akan philosophy of knowledge. 
 
4.4.1.1      Nea Wohu 
 
The first level of knowing is nea wohu. Literally, this means that which is observable or 
perceivable. Knowledge at this level derives from ordinary sense experience and the pure 
activity of the mind.  Thus ‘nea wohu’ represents both rational and empirical knowledge 
in traditional Akan epistemology. Two verbs are conduits to these sorts of knowledge. 
These are ‘hu’ which translates into the English ‘see, observe’; and ‘te’ which translates 
into ‘hear’.  The verb ‘te’ also signifies perception by other sense organs as well.  Thus, 
‘me te nka’ (I feel) and ‘me te pampa’ (I smell) denote sense experience other than by 
hearing. Thus ‘te’ and ‘hu’ represent the pathways to empirical knowledge.   
 
Further, they represent knowledge acquired through the pure activity of the mind.  Thus, 
‘mahu nea wokyere no78’ means ‘I understand what you mean’ and ‘mate ase79’ means ‘I 
understand/comprehend the depths of it (i.e. of the subject matter)’.  Therefore, reason 
and sense experience are confirmed as accepted pathways to the first level of knowledge 
in Akan epistemology. 
 
4.4.1.2      Nea Etra Adwen 
 
The Akan word ‘adwen’ readily translates into the English ‘thought’. Therefore, the 
phrase ‘nea etra adwen’ means ‘that which transcends thought’.  Thus Akan thinkers 
                                                 
77 This is the Akan word for knowledge 
78 Literally,  ‘I see what you are showing/indicating’ 
79 Literally, ‘I have heard the bottom line of it’ 
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maintain that we can access propositional knowledge at a level beyond rational 
deliberation.   
 
Two reasons, at least, make this position plausible.  First, it accords with their holonistic 
ontology. If reality comprises the visible and the invisible, and the visible is 
comprehensible through rational deliberation, then it is reasonable to suppose that there 
must be another way by which invisible reality could be comprehended.  Secondly, 
experience justifies this strong belief in accessing knowledge at a level beyond rational 
deliberation80. In fact most modern Akan philosophers81 affirm that besides reason and 
sense experience, extra-sensory (or ‘paranormal’) cognition is a third mode of knowing in 
Akan epistemology. 
 
A widely accepted definition of a “paranormal” event is that which seems to contradict 
the fundamental ideas and principles upon which modern science has been based82. By 
the 1940s, psychical researches had identified two broad categories of paranormal events.  
These are paranormal cognition, (or extra-sensory perception) and psychokinesis. 
Paranormal cognition has been defined as “alleged….knowledge without the use of any 
known sense organ”83. Four main species of this have been identified84. These are:  
 
i) Telepathy: This term refers to the communication between one mind and 
another without the use of recognized channels of sense. In ordinary parlance, 
we identify telepathic ability as the ability to ‘read someone’s mind’. 
                                                 
80 Ajei, M., 2000, The Paranormal, An Inquiry into Some Features of Akan Metaphysics and Epistemology, 
Thesis presented in part-fulfillment for the requirements of the M. Phil Degree in Philosophy, to the 
Department of Philosophy, University of Ghana, pp. 94-95, 100-101 
81 Notably  
- Gyekye, K., 1995, Essay on African Philosophical Thought, op. cit., p. 202  
- Agyakwa, K.O., 1974, Akan Epistemology and Western Thought, Dissertation submitted to 
Teacher’s College, Columbia University, in fulfillment for the Award of the Ph. D, p. 57 
- Oguah, B. E., 1977, “African and Western Philosophy” op. cit. p. 204-205 
82 Mosley, A., (1978), “The  Metaphysics of Magic: Practical and Philosophical Implications”, In Second 
Order, Vol. VII, Ile-Ife, Ife University Press, p. 9 
83 Mundle, C. W. K., 1967, “ESP Phenomena, the Philosophical Implications of”, in P. Edwards. (Ed), The 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 3, Macmillan, pp 49-50 
84 Johnson, R.C., 1955, Psychical Research, London: English Universities Press, pp. 9-57 
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ii) Clairvoyance: refers to the mind’s ability to acquire knowledge of physical 
objects or events, as distinct from mental ones, without the use of the senses.  
Thus, in clairvoyance the extra-sensorial information originates from physical 
objects.  An example of clairvoyant ability would be x’s ability to state 
accurately the contents of a closed briefcase encountered for the first time. 
iii) Precognition refers to the acquisition of knowledge about future events 
without the use of recognized sensory channels or cues for inference. 
iv) Retrocognition:. This species of PNC is complementary to precognitive 
experience.  It is the non-inferential cognition of events in the past, verified 
later, which are outside the range of a person’s memory.   
 
Some expressions in the Akan language illustrate the reality of paranormal cognition. If, 
for example, x is able to foretell the arrival of y in a way that we will recognize as 
precognitive, and you ask x how he came to have this true belief of y’s impending arrival, 
he would say, ‘na ne din da m’adwene mu’85. Another statement which might be offered 
in answer to the same question could be ‘onipa din ben ne ho’86.  How do these 
statements reflect the assertion of the type of knowledge we have referred to as nea etra 
adwen? 
 
In answer to this, we must recognize, first, the significance of the notion of ‘din’ or name 
in both statements. A person’s name, for the Akan, has a direct bearing on his or her 
okra87 through the medium of kradin88. The kradin signifies the day the okra entered the 
visible world in the form of a human being.  Now, as seen in Sections 4.2.1 and 4.2.3, the 
okra constitutes an ontological unity with sunsum.  Therefore, ‘ne din da madwene mu’ 
means that the person (the embodiment of okra/sunsum) is in my mind.  In other words I 
was consciously aware of the person, whose persistent presence in my mind was 
indicative of the prospective arrival.  The precognized event (the arrival) was inferred 
from the persistence of the person’s being in my mind.   
                                                 
85 Literally, the person’s name was in my mind. That is, I kept thinking about him! 
86 Literally, a person’s name is attached to himself/herself. 
87 The life-sustaining principle of a person 
88 The okra’s name 
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Two things are implied here.  First, that the statements ‘onipa din ben ne ho’ and ‘x din 
da madwene mu’, when used in this context, could be considered to be inductive 
statements from experience: each time x’s person persistently occupied my mind, they 
turned up where I am.  This means, second, that there is some sort of communication 
between the mind of x and mine beyond the reach of the senses and rational thought. As 
such, I cannot be cognitively aware of this.  My intuitive awareness of the presence of x 
represents my consciousness of this communication between our minds, but I am not 
cognitively aware of this communication.  Although I lack this cognition, experience 
justifies my belief that such communication takes place and that whenever it does, there 
is some proscribed consequence.  Thus there is awareness, but it is awareness at another 
level, an awareness which ‘tra adwen’ (surpass thought). 
 
Similarly, an answer to how one came to have a certain clairvoyant information would 
elicit the answer ‘esoo me mu’89!  It occurred to me suddenly and without any rational 
deliberation or sensory cue.  Such an intuitive occurrence demonstrates an important 
characteristic of awareness of the sort of ‘nea etra adwen’. 
 
Another characteristic of knowing at this level is the attribution of ‘ben’ to the knowing 
subject. The term ‘ben’, in ordinary usage, means ‘well-cooked’, but epistemically it 
connotes profundity in perception or knowledge. A context in which this would be 
epistemically employed is this: suppose you go to a diviner for consultation and, before 
you speak, he tells you of your mission to his shrine.  The Akan thinker will surely 
attribute the term ‘ben’ to that diviner, and what would be meant here is not that that the 
diviner has knowledge through the ordinary channels of hu and te. It will rather be 
referring to a profundity of perception which is beyond the ordinary. The diviner would 
then be referred to as obenfo90. 
 
                                                 
89 It gripped me 
90 The ‘well-cooked’ one. 
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The profundity of perception attributed to an obenfo reflects the view, first, that the 
person’s knowledge ability or stock in a particular filed surpasses the ordinary.  
Oftentimes, however, ‘the field’ signifies the whole of reality, comprising as we have 
seen, of visible and invisible realms.  In this case, the inordinate perceptiveness or ‘well-
cookedness’ of the diviner would clearly be referring to competence in knowing events in 
the invisible realm.  Hence the obenfo’s  knowledge is of the type which tra adwen 
(transcends thought). 
 
P ‘aben’, then, would mean p is well-versed in the affairs of sunsum. P can penetrate the 
realm of sunsum, comprehend and perhaps manipulate events in this realm.  P will then 
be held to have strong sunsum which heightens p’s perceptive faculties and allows for the 
transcendence of the limitations of the visible world. The heightened powers of sunsum 
allow p to gain a deeper insight into the fundamental principles that govern relationships 
between things and events in both realms of reality. We maintain that this high power of 
sunsum refers to exalted psychic power. The activation of such power leads its owner to 
distinct perception of the fundamental relations in existence. The vitality of an obenfo’s 
sunsum overcomes uncertainty, confusion, rashness and other hindrances to knowledge, 
so that the mind can reach occurrences in reality beyond the reach of cognition. The mind 
of such a person will be the juncture of a configuration of pathways leading to different 
forms of knowledge.   
  
4.4.2 Paranormal Cognition: A Way of Knowing in African Epistemology 
 
It is clear that the status of obenfo refers to the ability to have that form of knowledge 
which is usually referred to as ‘paranormal cognition’. As seen in Section 4.4.1.2, a 
“paranormal” event is that which seems to contradict the fundamental ideas and 
principles upon which modern science is based. Belief in the occurrence of these events 
is common to many non-Western cultures, yet their ontological status and, with it, the 
question of whether they can be legitimate sources of knowledge has occasioned 
academic debate since the end of the nineteenth century91.  All subscribers to 
                                                 
91 This is exemplified by the establishment of the Society for Psychical Research in London in 1882 
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physicalism, the ontological and epistemological framework which sustains mainstream 
Western science, have persisted in their denial of existence to these phenomena and the 
claims to knowledge made by their advocates. 
 
There is little doubt, in fact, that many Africans recognize paranormal cognition as a 
mode of knowing.  In fact, a salient feature of African epistemologies is their insistence 
that ‘paranormal’ cognition provides us with genuine and reliable knowledge92. Thus 
according to Agyakwa, “no account of Akan epistemology would be satisfactory which 
did not examine the role of divination and mediums”93. But is this insistence justifiable?  
If so, on what grounds? 
 
We can say, on the basis of the holonistic ontology of African thought, that divination is a 
process by which some special people interact with the ordinarily non-sensible forces of 
nature. But the legitimacy of paranormal cognition is not evinced only through the 
resources of African philosophy. It can also be validated through conventional theories of 
knowledge in Western philosophy as well. This may be done by simply posing the 
question: if x claims knowledge of p through paranormal means, what method of 
validation for that knowledge can x disclose such that if p is indeed true, we will come to 
believe that x has good reason for believing that p?  The next section is devoted to how 
this justification condition can be met by paranormal cognition in Western philosophy.  
 
4.5      Paranormal Cognition and the Causal Theory of Knowledge 
 
First we believe that paranormal cognition can be legitimized in Western philosophy via 
the Causal Theory of Knowledge (CT). This is one of the theories inspired by the 
                                                 
92 See footnote 81 in this chapter. The same thesis has been advanced by Ajei, M. O and Ramose, M. B. in 
their unpublished article “The Paranormal: African Philosophy Questions Science”. Other works which are 
orientated towards affirming this thesis are  
- Sogolo, G., 1993, Foundations of African Philosophy, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press, p. 91-116 
- Ayoade J. A. A., 1979, “The Concept of Inner Essence in Yoruba Traditional Medicine”, In 
Ademuwagun, Z. A. et al., (eds), African Therapeutic Systems, Waltham, Mass: Crossroads Press, 
pp. 49-55 
93 Agyakwa, K. O., 1974, Akan Epistemology, op. cit., p. , p 57 
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problems posed by Gettier’s paper. The central idea underlying various formulations of 
CT is that in order to know that p 
 
1. p must be true 
2. You must believe that p is true 
3. Your belief in p must be caused in an appropriate way94. 
 
Here, therefore, the justification condition is met if your belief is caused in an appropriate 
way.  But what way is appropriate, and how do we decide on this?  In addressing these 
questions Alvin Goldman suggests that the appropriate way of getting a true belief is to 
be able to distinguish the actual state of affairs for which the belief is true from relevant 
possible states of affairs of which the belief is false.  This discrimination of the actually 
true from the possibly false state of affairs is best done by a method that is reliable in the 
circumstances95. 
 
From this, a few points emerge that justify our claim that CT can validate paranormal 
cognition.  First, Goldman’s theory suggests that the appropriate way by which beliefs 
are caused varies.  A reliable method varies with the circumstances.  What constitutes 
good evidence for a true belief is relative to the state of affairs prevalent in the belief 
situation.  If the belief situation confirms that the evidence for the proposed knowledge 
was acquired by ‘a reliable method’ the evidence is justified. This introduces sufficient 
dynamism required for a framework of epistemic justifications that can validate the 
African’s belief in paranormal cognition as legitimate knowledge. Let us take a case of 
precognition for illustration:  
 
Suppose we inform you this moment of our belief that y will occur at noon tomorrow.  
We have no cues whatsoever to afford us a reasoned guess of the prospective occurrence 
of y, and you have satisfied yourself in this respect.  We nevertheless insist, on the basis 
                                                 
94 Appiah, A. K., 1989, Necessary Questions – An Introduction to Philosophy, Englewood Cliffs, N. J: 
Prentice Hall, p 52  
95 Goldman, A., 1978, “Discrimination and Perceptual Knowledge”, In Pappas, G. S. and Swain, M (eds), 
Essays on Knowledge and Justification, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p. 124   
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of ‘a strong intuition’, that y is certainly forthcoming.  You ask us why this strong belief 
and we respond we believe it is our sunsum dictating to us. Then y occurs in fact.  What 
is the modus operandi of sunsum, you ask?  We are unable to explain this satisfactorily to 
you. But suppose we tell you that in fact each time we ‘have someone persistently on our 
mind’ the person in question comes, as was the case with y.  
 
Would you deny us a reliable method in forming the belief that y will occur?  If we are 
able to foretell such occurrences correctly a number of times, and you find no other 
relevant alternative to our explanation, then what will be the basis of your denial to us of 
a reliable method? If our belief that y will happen is true, and we formed it by a reliable 
method, then CT confirms our knowing that y will occur tomorrow at noon.  In other 
words, our belief that y need not be anchored to some foundational empirical or rational 
principle. This is because for x to know that p, by the formula prescribed by CT, x needs 
only to show true belief in p because s/he cannot think of any set of circumstances which 
can lead him or her, falsely, into believing that not-p. We shall notice, in Section 4. 6 
below, that this acceptance of variation as a source of knowledge defines a feature of 
African epistemologies and introduces dynamism into them. 
 
The second salutary point that can be inferred from Goldman’s analysis is that CT 
considers mind as a causal system in the world because they see human consciousness 
and the problems it addresses as part of the wide world of nature.  For these theories, the 
notion of a mind having a direct effect on an object in the world is intelligible because 
human consciousness is an integral part of the natural world96. As such, they are 
compatible with the Akan thinker’s holonistic ontology, which renders an account of 
consciousness as an integral aspect of the natural world. 
 
According to Rhine, experimental evidence suggests that paranormal cognition derives 
from “a form of energy different from all known [by Western science] forms of 
                                                 
96 This differs radically from foundational epistemological theories, which look at the relationship between 
mind and knowledge from the point of view of a subject ‘looking out’ on the world.    
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energy”97. We maintain that this ‘unknown form of energy’ can be identified with the 
Akan sunsum or the Bantu ubu.  The African diviner and many ordinary persons 
experience the practical efficacy of sunsum at many instances.  Although this experience 
(which leads to the belief that valid knowledge can be derived from the realm of sunsum) 
defies known limits of ordinary experience, they obviously do not defy the limits of 
possible experience.  The persistence of these experiences leads the African thinker to 
this conclusion that paranormal cognition results from the efficacy of the activity of 
sunsum.  Therefore the conclusion is legitimately inferred from this evidence, and as 
such, constitutes a good argument.  By stressing the nature of sunsum as an imperceptible 
natural force capable, under certain conditions, of manifesting itself in the physical 
world, we suggest that the people capable of interacting with the ordinarily non-sensible 
forces pf nature are charting a path into areas which are yet to be controlled by the tools 
of Western science. As such, they are making contributions to the quest for knowledge 
and development.  
 
4.6     Ontology, Epistemology and Development: Towards Afri-centrism 
 
We wish now to turn briefly to how the outlined tenets of African epistemology may 
influence an African-centered development framework. We begin by re-emphasizing the 
point that mainstream ontological discourse in Western philosophy has fragmented be-ing 
into a mind-body and spiritual-material duality. The repercussions of this, at the 
epistemological level, are characterized by the SVO-structured thought process which 
perpetuates a number of mutually exclusive distinctions. Some of these are the distinction 
between rationalism and empiricism, objectivism and subjectivism and the famous 
‘is/ought’ distinction which reached its apogee in the work of the logical positivists. In 
this epistemological tradition, human beings in pursuit of knowledge about nature are not 
only separated from nature. They are also impartial creatures ‘objectively’ peering into 
the complexities of nature to discover and describe its regularities and codify them into 
laws. 
                                                 
97 Rhine, J. B. cf. Mosley, A. 1978, “The Metaphysics of Magic: Practical and Philosophical Implications”, 
in Second Order, Vol. 8, Ile-Ife: Ife University Press, p. 12 
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On the other hand, the holonistic structure of be-ing in African thought ensures that “man 
and nature are not two separate independent and opposing realities but one inseparable 
continuum of a hierarchical order”98. But this is not all. From the African point of view, 
an epistemological system is a wholeness that displays essential mutual dependence of its 
component parts. As Anyanwu points out,  
 
“The African maintains that there can be no knowledge of reality if an individual 
detaches himself from it…… Knowledge, therefore, comes from the cooperation 
of all human faculties and experiences. He sees, feels, imagines, reasons or thinks 
and intuits all at the same time”99. 
 
It is in this sense that the rheomode, the language of indigenous African philosophical 
thought, ensures that the epistemic distinctions in Western philosophy, noted above, do 
not constitute a problem in African epistemology.  
 
Secondly, the non-fragmented be-ing in the African universe ensures the dynamism of 
African epistemological categories. In this order of things, a search for immutable 
knowledge, like the Cartesian “cogito ergo sum” is rendered unreasonable. Absolute and 
final knowledge and truth are therefore inadmissible in this epistemology. Thus, a 
holonistic ontology and its rheomode reveals that no method of investigation can yield a 
perfect truth about nature. Instead, we are encouraged to recognize and to explore the 
interdependence of significant elements in a whole-ness, and to appreciate the relevance 
of this recognition and exploration to our knowledge about nature and society. This is a 
prominent feature of African epistemologies. 
  
What does all this mean for an African ontology and epistemology-inspired development 
framework? First, we observe that the rejection of the insistence on foundational ‘proofs’ 
or certainty means that development need not be conceived as wholly constituted of 
tangible and measurable features, as economism maintains.  
 
                                                 
98 Anyanwu, C. K., 1981., “The African World-view and Theory (of) Knowledge”, in Ruch, E. A. and 
Anyanwu K. C. (eds) African Philosophy, op. cit., p. 87 
99 Ibid. p. 94 
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Another point worth observing raises the question of the relationship between values and 
the essential interdependence of ontology and epistemology in African thought. We have 
seen how ontology and epistemology are understood as two aspects of one and the same 
reality in indigenous African philosophy.  
 
The human be-ing, as subject of knowledge, is inextricably bound to the social context. 
And this thrusts the subject, ineradicably, into the realm of morality. The human being is 
tossed into ethics because, as Ramose argues, that language directs and focuses the entire 
epistemological domain towards the ontology of ubu, and that this is done by the 
indissoluble pairing of ubu and umuntu through the maxim umuntu ngumuntu nga Bantu 
(motho ke motho ka batho)100. A humane, respectful and polite attitude towards others, 
then, constitutes the core of this epistemological focus on the ontology of ubu.  
 
The point under consideration is that the biological fact of be-ing a human being is 
insufficient for one’s surging forward and contributing significantly to the 
interrelationships that ultimately constitute the whole-ness of being. One is enjoined to be 
a human being (a person). The critical task then is to demonstrate, through relating to 
other be-ings, one’s embodiment of ubu-ntu “because the fundamental ethical, legal and 
social judgment of human worth and human conduct is based on ubu-ntu. The judgment, 
pronounced with approval or disapproval respectively, is invariably expressed in these 
terms: ke motho or gase motho”101. However, this judgement is not descriptive, since it is 
otiose to affirm the biological nature of a human being, or abolish the biological fact of 
one’s human be-ingness. Rather, this affirmation or negation of ubu-ntu is a normative 
judgement, a metaphor for ethical, social and legal judgment of human worth and human 
conduct. The same ethical judgement of human worth is rendered in Akan as onye 
nnipa102, and in Yoruba as Ki i se eniyan103.  
                                                 
 
100 Ramose, op. cit. p 41, construes this to mean “to be a human being is to affirm one’s humanity by 
recognizing the humanity of others and, on that basis, establish humane relations with them” 
101 This means “he/she is a human be-ing or he/she is not a human be-ing. See Ramose, op. cit. p. 43 
102 Gyekye, K. 1992, “Person and Community in African Thought”, in Wiredu, K. and Gyekye, K., Person 
and Community: Ghanaian Philosophical Studies, I, Washington, D. C: Council for Research in Values 
and Philosophy, p. 109. Here, Gyekye interprets this as the person is “not a person”. 
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For our development framework, the upshot of this moral conception of a person in the 
epistemological situation is that however certain the theoretical value of rules, they are 
subject to change or must be abandoned if their practical value does not further human 
life. We turn now to the significance of values for development.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
103 Gbadagesin, S. 2002, Eniyan: The Yoruba Concept of a Person, op. cit. p 175, translates this as He/She 
is not a person! 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
TOWARDS AN ETHICS-BASED DEVELOPMENT PARADIGM FOR AFRICA 
 
5.1     Ethics and Africa’s Development 
 
In section 4.6, we explained the interdependence of African ontology, epistemology and 
ethics. This chapter proceeds from the position that a homegrown paradigm for Africa’s 
development has to be based in ethics. This is because although the aspirations and will 
of the objects of development must be reflected in the principles, policies and programs 
of a development framework, its implementation is invariably coordinated and 
administered by a society’s political structures. And politics is meaningless without 
ethics.  
 
The main reason underlying the prominence of a political structure in the successful 
implementation of development goals is that the helm of the polity is the repository of the 
aggregate of the sovereign will of the people. As such it is proper to invest it with the 
responsibility to lead and guide the implementation of the people’s aspirations embodied 
in those goals. Now, politics depends on ethics because, as Ramose points out, it is not 
egoistic interests1 but rather a sense of the ethical that propels individual human beings to 
commune and construct a political system. Thus he defines politics as “the continuation 
of ethics by specific means agreed upon voluntarily beforehand in the quest for justice in 
human relations”2. Accordingly, ethics “enjoins politics to recognize, respect and protect 
the right to life of each and every individual” because 
 
“the specificity of the political relationship among human beings is that it 
revolves around the question of life and death. Politics in this sense is about 
individual and collective survival. Because its subject-matter is the life or death of 
another human being politics is by necessity an ethical enterprise since it must 
proceed from the premise that each and every human being has an inalienable and 
equal right to life”3. 
                                                 
1 As claimed by Contract Theorists such as Hobbes and Locke 
2 Ramose, M. B., 2004, “Poverty: A Creature of Politics and a Question of Justice”, in International 
Journal of Humanistic Studies, Volume 3, p. 39 
3 Ibid. 
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The right to life entails the right to access to all the natural resources necessary for the 
preservation of one’s life. Thus the state, as a political institution and the custodian of 
natural resources of a country, is an ethical entity with a moral duty to mount a direct and 
incessant attack on poverty in order to preserve human life and dignity. As indicated in 
sections iii and iv of the Introduction, these should also be the overriding aim of 
development.  
 
We understand ethics simply as moral philosophy. It thus involves critical reflection on 
morality, which to us has a double connotation. First it refers to “a set of social rules, 
values, and norms that guide the conduct of people in a society”4. The rationale for moral 
rules then is to ensure the harmonious co-existence of members of society through the 
systematic adjustment of their discordant interests5. Secondly, morality refers to the 
attitudes and responses to such rules and norms. It is thus concerned with people’s beliefs 
about right and wrong conduct and good and bad character. 
 
Accordingly, an ethics-based development framework involves two approaches. First, it 
ought to advocate the adoption of substantial moral principles and norms to underpin 
development theory. Secondly, it promotes ethically inspired procedures to guide the 
behaviour, attitude and conduct of those entrusted with implementation as well as those at 
the receiving end of development. What is required of the administrators of this 
framework, then, is that their behaviour and orientation should respond to the formulated 
morally-inspired principles. Their moral commitment must thus be beyond reproach, 
which means that they must avoid akrasia6. This chapter argues that traditional African 
culture contains such principles and procedural guides as can ensure Africa’s 
development in a manner that represents its liberation from economism and its 
concomitant epistemicide and valuecide.  
                                                 
4 Gyekye, K., 1997, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African Experience, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 205 
5 Wiredu, K., 1992, “The Moral Foundations of an African Culture”, in Wiredu, K. and Gyekye, K. (eds), 
Person and Community, Ghanaian Philosophical Studies I, Washington, D. C.: Council for Research into 
Values and Philosophy, p. 193 
6 The problem of knowing what is morally right and lacking the will to do it. 
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5.2 The Basis of African Ethics 
 
As seen in Chapter Four, the concept of vital force is central to African ontology and 
epistemology.  In the area of ethics, the notion of community occupies this pride of place. 
These two concepts are intimately related and interdependent, in so far as vital force can 
only be nourished by, and therefore thrives best in, community. A community is, in turn, 
nothing but an aggregate of vital forces. Increasing its vital force is thus the overriding 
aim of every community, and a vehicle towards this is ethical conduct. It is in this vein 
that “life is the highest principle of ethical conduct”7. Accordingly, “thou shall not kill” is 
the first precept of African ethics. It is in this sense that it is fundamentally different from 
the ethic of capitalism which, as discussed in section 1.4.1, theoretically allows for 
murder in the bid to accumulate wealth. 
 
 How then, does the stated role of community manifest itself in African ethics? A salient 
point of departure for addressing this question is the realization that “it is not possible to 
achieve the ethical ideal individually or as a strictly personal achievement”8. This is 
because in indigenous African cultures, moral principles and norms of ethics are firmly 
rooted in two mutually dependent doctrines that shape the ideals of social organization 
and human relations in traditional African societies. These are communitarianness and 
humaneness.  
 
5.2.1 We are what we are: The African Community-oriented Socio-political Ethic 
 
Communitarianism is a theory of social organization that has been formulated variously 
by its many adherents. Underlying all these formulations is the idea that social 
organization should give weight to the claims of community in its relationship with the 
individual person. Bujo distinguishes between “communitarianism in Western thought” 
                                                 
7 Bujo, B. 2001, Foundations of an African Ethic Beyond the Universal Claims of Western Morality, 
Nganda, C. N. (trans), Nairobi: Paulines Publications, p. 22 
8 Bujo, B. 1997, Ethical Dimension of Community: The African Model and the Dialogue between the North 
and the South Nganda, C. N. (trans), Nairobi: Paulines Publications, p. 28  
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and the “ethics of African social organization”, on the grounds that “African ethics goes 
beyond the concrete, visible community to embrace the dead as well”9.  
 
Although we share Bujo’s orientation towards questioning the suitability of ascribing 
communitarianism to African thought, we differ from his thinking that differences in the 
conception of community alone is sufficient to distinguish the African theory of social 
organization from communitarianism. In our view, further justification for this distinction 
is suggested by our discussion in Section 4.2.2. There, we confirmed Bujo’s thesis that 
existence comprises of both visible and invisible dimensions, and elaborated on 
Ramose’s view that the idea of a “holistic” world view of Africans is a misconception 
which derives from the fragmentation of be-ing. We followed Ramose therefore in 
contrasting “holistic” from “holonness”, as the proper characterization of the African 
world view, in the bid to negate the fixation of be-ing and introduce motion and 
dynamism into the nature of reality. In extending this thinking into the realm of ethics, 
we see the need to distinguish between communinatianism and, for lack of a better 
characterization, communitarian-ness, which we believe captures the African ethics of 
social organization 
 
As mentioned in Section 4.6 personhood, in African thought has a moral dimension. This 
dimension finds concrete expression and justification in the communitarian structure of 
indigenous African societies, which ensures that the social identity of an African is well-
defined before birth. Thus according to the Akan, “when the human being descends from 
heaven, he/she descends into human community”10. Wiredu’s interpretation of this is that 
one is born into a community of well-defined social affiliations11. It also means that to be 
human means that one cannot live outside a human community because “since the human 
being does not voluntarily choose to enter into a human community, community life is 
not optional for the individual”12. The individual is, thus, by nature, an inalienable strand 
in a social fabric. This means that a person is embedded in a context of social 
                                                 
9 Ibid., p. 24 
10 Se onipa sane firi soro a obesi kurom 
11 Wiredu, K. 1992, “Moral Foundations”, op. cit. p. 197 
12 Gyekye, K. 1997, Tradition and Modernity, op. cit., p. 39 
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relationships and mutual interdependence with others in a way that makes that person 
naturally orientated towards other persons.  
 
The community, with its complex but well-defined social relationships constitutes the 
context within which the individual strives to achieve his/her goals in life13. Thus the 
Akan say that “ a person is not a palm tree that he (or she) should be self-sufficient”14. 
Since no one can posses everything that one needs for full self-realization, one 
necessarily needs the cooperation and sympathy of others, whose lives are in turn 
nourished by one’s success.  Another proverb that may be employed to express the same 
thought is “a single tree left to endure the force of a windstorm is liable to break”15.  In 
other words, a cluster of trees can better withstand the danger of the windstorm because 
each one will bear a part of a dispersed risk. The cooperation and sympathy of others, 
then, are prominent aspects of the necessarily social human existence. From this point of 
view, it is the community which enables the self-realization of the individual, whose 
ability to act freely as a moral agent is not impeded in any way by being naturally social. 
Accordingly, the central tenet of African communitarian ethics is that one cannot realize 
one’s full potential in life in isolation.  
 
Solidarity and cooperation are necessary requirements for human living and flourishing. 
This thought is most keenly expressed by the Sotho saying that “I am because we are, and 
because we are, I am too”16. As such, one must pay regard to the role that one’s life may 
                                                 
13 One arena in which the ontological reality of the individual’s place in community is most exemplified is 
the naming ceremony. Name-giving is ontologically significant to the extent that it affirms a newly born 
child’s space of belonging (i.e., in the context of the community). Because the name is never without 
individual meaning, it becomes one’s stamp of identity within the cultural context. Besides expressing 
one’s belonging-ness to community, a name also encodes a clue to its bearer’s possible (i.e. expected) 
course in life. In other words, the appellations and connotations attached to a name suggest the sort of 
person that the community expects one to be. 
14 Onipa nnye abe na neho ahyia ne ho. 
15 Dua koro gye nframa a ebu. 
16 Bujo, B., 2001, Foundations of an African Ethic,  p. 24. Bujo reports that this saying: “Motho ke motho 
ka batho ka bang” is a fundamental principle on the relationship between person and community in Sotho 
thought. Ramose, M. B. 2002, op. cit. p. 41.,  also construes “motho ke motho ka batho” to mean “to be a 
human being is to affirm one’s humanity by recognizing the humanity of others and, on that basis, establish 
humane relations with them”. According to him, this enjoins the human person to display a humane, 
respectful and polite attitude towards others. The critical task for a person then is to demonstrate, through 
relating to other be-ings, one’s embodiment of ubu-ntu “because the fundamental ethical, legal and social 
judgment of human worth and human conduct is based on ubu-ntu. The judgment, pronounced with 
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have on the welfare and interests of others. One’s conduct, preferably, should contribute 
to the common good because it is from this pool of good that one’s own welfare can be 
extracted. This essential interdependence of human life is succinctly expressed in Akan, 
as rightfully observed by Wiredu, by the maxim life is mutual aid17. Hence community 
must be accorded primary status in determining ethical norms and conduct in African 
culture.  
 
5.2.1.1: Because we are does not mean that I am not 
 
It has been claimed that the peculiar community-oriented character of the ethics of social 
organization embedded in communitarianness, with its emphasis on shared ends and 
common goods, has led some philosophers to the view that the individual in African 
thought is fully engulfed by social relationships. Gyekye, for instance, imputes this view 
to Mbiti for claiming that “Whatever happens to the individual happens to the whole 
group, and whatever happens to the whole group happens to the individual. The 
individual can only say: ‘I am, because we are; and since we are, therefore I am’ ”18. 
Gyekye thinks that such construal of personhood in African thought is “overstated and 
somewhat misleading” because it tends to “whittle away the moral autonomy  of the 
person – making the being and life of the individual totally dependent on the activities, 
values, projects, practices and ends of the community”19. Clearly, if Gyekye’s 
interpretation of Mbiti is correct, then Mbiti’s position is definitely overstated.  
 
It must be emphasized that the principles of solidarirty and interdependence expressed by 
the ethos of communitarianness do not in the least mean that the ethical identity of the 
individual is wholly dissolved by community. A number of arguments may be deployed 
to support this.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
approval or disapproval respectively, is invariably expressed in these terms: ke motho or gase motho” 
(he/she is a person or he/she is not a person.) 
17 “Obra ye nnoboa” 
18 Mbiti, J. S., 1970, African Religions and Philosophy, New York: Doubleday, p. 141 
19 Gyekye, K., 1997, Tradition and Modernity, op. cit., p. 37 
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First and foremost, the individual is indispensable to the ethical community, “since each 
person must express his ethical conviction in such a way that he includes the entire 
community20”. Besides, a number of proverbs from all over sub-Saharan Africa 
emphasize the dignity of the individual in community. Prominent among these are those 
that encourage the individual’s self-confidence and self-reliance. Thus a Bashi proverb 
says  “ a clever or far-seeing man increases his drink [i.e. beer] with water”21. Bujo 
construes this to mean that an industrious person who persists will always find a way to 
increase his possessions22. If a community is to survive and thrive, it will need to count 
on such members because the one who works to create wealth would be in a position to 
give help. Again, a Baganda proverb has it that “you cannot quench your thirst with water 
for which you have gone begging”23. The Akans express the same proposition thus: “the 
hand that begs is always beneath that which gives”24. The idea here is that one who 
continually begs or lives on the mercy of others, although not physically or mentally 
handicapped, is “not a person”! What this means is that a person who intentionally fails 
to achieve self-sufficiency or autonomy without any natural handicaps or external 
constraints outside his or her control does not conform to the basic ideals and norms that 
persons ought to display in their conduct. Such failure to use one’s abilities to exploit 
one’s potential is disgraceful for the Akan: “disgrace does not befit an Akan”25. 
 
This is probably why the Swahili advice that a guest must be allowed no work for two 
days and be handed a hoe on the third26. The Akans would say “one does not fan [hot 
food] that another may consume and enjoy”27. A Swahili proverb also has it that “if you 
want to have peanuts, get yourself a roasting pan”28. What these proverbs express is the 
idea that individuals are responsible for the course of their lives, and that individual effort 
                                                 
20 Bujo, B., 2001, Foundations of an African Ethic, op. cit.,  p 24 
21 ibid. p. 120. The statement is “Aga nyanduma mishi gagayunjuliza” 
22 Ibid.. 
23 Ibid. The statement is “Mazzi masabe: tegamala nnyonta”  
24 “Nsa a ema no wo sore sen nea esre adee”  
25 “Animguase nfata okanni ba” 
26 Nyerere quotes this at Nyerere, J. K. 1968, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism: Dar es Salaam: Oxford 
University Press, p. 4 
27 “Obi nhuhu ma obi nkeka” 
28 Bujo, B. 2001, Foundations of an African Ethic, op. cit. p 120, renders this as “ukipenda karanga 
(“kalanga”), upakatie gae”. 
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is necessary for the fulfillment of needs and achievement of goals. Infact, “it is by 
individual effort that we struggle for our heads [lives]”29, and “life is war”30. 
 
These proverbs substantiate the view that while African ethics stresses more on the 
communion of persons than on their autonomy, it does not in anyway reject 
individualistic values and is decidedly against passively tagging onto community, for 
according to the Swahili, “if someone says: ‘let me leap where my brother or friend 
leapt’, he risks falling deep into the mud”31. Thus in the African communitarian culture, 
the individual cannot develop full personhood outside the community. However, the 
welfare of the community requires the initiative and talents of its individual members. 
The relationship between person and community is thus one of interdependence and 
mutual nurturing. This is the quintessence of African communitarianness. 
 
5.2.2 African Humaneness and the Morally Good: 
 
Wiredu has suggested, correctly we think, that humaneness is another foundational 
principle in Akan socio-political theory. Once again, we wish to distinguish the 
humaneness of the European and Enlightenment, especially from the “scientific 
humaneness”32 that became fashionable in the nineteenth century Europe, from what 
constitutes the humanistic ethos of traditional Africa. In Akan thought the ambit and 
nuances of humaneness is best captured by the claim that “onipa na ohia”33. We affirm 
Wiredu’s view that ohia in this context, has a dual connotation. It means (a) human 
interest is the basis of all value; and (b) human fellowship is the most important of human 
needs34. This same thought is rendered in Sesotho as “feta kgomo o tshware motho”35. 
                                                 
29 In Akan, “Tiri yeprere no koro koro” 
30 In Akan “Obra ye ko” 
31 Bujo, B. Foundations of an African Ethic op. cit., p. 121. “Kambuukire baaba (munnange) 
w’abuukidde”: kwe kuywa mu ntubiro.  
32 See Lacy, A., 1995, “Humanism” in Honderich, T (ed), 1995, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, 
Oxford: OUP, p. 376. , This tended to emphasize the rational powers and importance of man 
33 It is the human being that has value. 
34 Wiredu, K. 1992, “Moral Foundations”, op. cit. pp 194, 201 
35 According to Ramose, (2002, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, op. cit., p. 114), this means that if and 
when one is faced with a decisive choice between wealth and the preservation of the life of another human 
being then one should choose the preservation of  that life.  
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A few insights emerge from these two meanings. First, it can be inferred from (a) that 
what is good is what promotes human interests. The salutary point being made by this is 
that moral precepts and acts ought to be grounded in considerations about human well-
being. Accordingly, a fundamental precept of Akan ethics is onipa hia mmoa36. This 
precept follows inevitably from the stress on human sociality emanating from Wiredu’s 
second construal of onipa na ohia. This humanistic ideal certainly underlies the first 
principle of our prospective African development paradigm which, as stated in Section 
5.1, is the preservation of human life and dignity. 
 
Unlike the situation in the Western philosophical setting, the ethical framework 
sustaining this development paradigm gives no paramount role to the rational ability of 
the individual in determining the morally good37. This is because reason-governed morals 
turn conscience into “the last internal judicial instance which renders account only to 
God”38. As such, when the individual conscience, as a last instance of moral-decision 
making, recognizes a particular act as right, then no human person can judge this as 
                                                 
36 A human being deserves help, or ought to be helped 
37 Since Plato, ethical thought in Western philosophy has predominantly relied on natural law. For Plato, 
the “Forms” are eternal and unchanging realities which embody perfect reality, truth and goodness. It is 
upon these that the laws and ways of life in a just state as well as the individual should be based. These 
Forms can only be apprehended by reason, which represents the essential feature of the nature of the 
philosopher. (See Plato, 1974, The Republic, Grube, G. M. A. (trans), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing,  
473C-E, 484B-487A). Aristotle explicitly distinguished between conventional law and natural law. 
According to him, the former is law that is established by general agreement whereas the latter is ethical 
precepts that are derived directly from the natural order of the world and from human nature. He then 
insisted on these precepts as the foundation of social and political structures and institutions. (Aristotle, 
1997, Politics, Barker, E. (trans), Oxford: OUP, 1253a-1253b). The fundamental principles governing 
social organization, then, are discoverable in the nature of things, and since man is by nature a rational 
animal, it follows that it is reason which discovers and governs these principles. This tradition of 
conceiving of the good as reason-governed has endured, through the works of St. Thomas Aquinas and 
John Locke, to contemporary times. For Aquinas, natural law refers to “the eternal law as it is revealed 
specifically in human nature and known by human reason…..”(Miller, E., 1984, Questions that Matter:  An 
Invitation to Philosophy, N. Y: McGraw-Hill p. 443). As seen in Section 2.6, Locke reaffirms this status of 
natural law as the basis of the good, and of its government by reason. For him, all private and public good 
is based on natural law which immediately displays fundamental rights and liberties. Through Locke’s 
conception of law and rights, the status of natural law has been fortified in Western ethical discourse by 
inspiring not only the American Declaration of Independence (According to Miller, E., 1984, (op. cit. p. 
455), Thomas Jefferson, who in 1776 drafted the Declaration, declared outright that his intent was that it 
should embody the social and political principles of Locke), but also the U.N Declaration of Human Rights 
and the Constitutions of many contemporary liberal democratic societies. Yet there are schools in Western 
legal theory very critical of the natural law tradition, such as the Positivist and Realist schools of law. 
38 Bujo, B. 1997, Ethical Dimension, op. cit., p. 62 
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fallible. In this way, morality becomes privatized. But the “privatization of morality”39 
conflicts with African commutarianness with particular reference to the concept of 
conscience. Our understanding of this concept proceeds from “the central importance of 
human relationships for moral action”40. In this way, conscience matures by the sustained 
ability to talk with and listen to one another. 
 
One concrete consequence of this privatization of morality is reflected in the position of 
the philosophers of capitalism who, as discussed in section 1.4.1, “gives the impression 
that poverty is inevitable, caused by the human shortcomings of the poor….41”. To the 
extent that one has self-justification before God for “pushing the other aside as I would a 
material object as part of the totality which obstructs my passage”42, one cannot be doing 
evil. In short, reason-oriented ethics denigrates the importance of human relationships for 
moral action. Accordingly, one may ask if such an ethical system “could defend itself 
against the accusation of inhumanity and the imperialism of reason if the person who is 
not able to argue does not count and the unreasonable one has to be eliminated”43. 
 
African ethics rejects reason-oriented ethics to the extent that its point of departure is that 
individualism cannot yield the ethical ideal. A virtuous life exemplified by good 
behaviour, is the sort of behaviour that ensures the growth of life among all community 
members, and of community welfare. The responsibility for leading such a life belongs to 
all community members; hence indigenous African communities may be justifiably 
described as “ethical communities”44. 
 
                                                 
39 We borrow this phrase from Theophilus Okere’s work entitled “The Poverty of Christian Individualist 
Morality and an African Alternative” The work appears as Chapter Seven in a document prepared for the 
workshops of the 1971 Synod of Bishops, a synthesis of the general debate on Justice in the World. A 
privatized morality, according to Okere here, refers to a morality “designed to have no effect on public life” 
and “targeted on the individual conscience”.  Accordingly, “its laws, and, its commandments, are for the 
individual to obey, its sanctions, rewards and punishments go to the individual. It is conceived to make the 
individual holy, not to make society just”. See http://www.crvp.org/book/Series02/II-3/chapter_vii.htm 
40 Bujo, B., 1997, Ethical Dimension, op. cit., p. 70 
41 Gutierrez, G., 1983, The Power of the Poor in History, Barr, R. R. (trans), New York: Maryknoll, p. 115 
42 See quotation of Arnsperger in footnote 120 of  section 2.4.1 above 
43 Bujo B., 1997, Ethical Dimension, op. cit., p 39 
44 Bujo, B., 1997, Ethical Dimension, op. cit p. 27 
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The communitarian and humaneness of these ethical communities are reflected in social 
institutions and arrangements. The thesis that we proposed to defend is that the 
knowledge and values that sustain these institutions and arrangements are imperative for 
Africa’s future development. Accordingly, let us turn now to an examination of three 
facets of indigenous social organization in order to determine how they utilize this 
knowledge and values. We will interweave this with a discussion of how these may be 
harnessed for contemporary Africa and its future.  
 
5.3 Politics from a Communitarian-ethical Perspective 
 
It must be re-emphasized that besides saving human life and dignity, our development 
paradigm will need to secure the authentic liberation of Africa from the Eurocentric and 
economistic paradigms that have defined its post-colonial development practice. The 
achievement of these aims depends on ensuring that the strategies adopted by the 
paradigm spring from conscious reflection on African needs and aspirations by Africans 
who suffer no amnesia of the Eurocentric damage to Africa or moral akrasia. 
 
Politics is one arena in which such conscious reflection needs to be secured, because of 
the importance of political authority to development choices and implementation. This 
subsection argues that indigenous African conceptions of politics and political processes 
can provide the conscious reflection for alternatives needed for the said liberation.  
 
5.3.1 Democracy from a Communitarian-ethical Perspective:  
 
We suggested in Section 3.3.2 that the political philosophy of liberalism, outstandingly 
articulated in the philosophy of John Locke, insists on the inherent freedom of individuals 
from undue societal control, as well as their freedom for the pursuit of their own interests. 
The communitarian understanding of freedom is extremely significant for the 
conceptualization and formation of democracy in Africa. As seen, the individual and 
community are mutually dependent in the communitarian structure. The individual’s 
identity and potential cannot be fully realized without the community’s contribution, and   
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the community is naturally oriented towards enhancing the progress and life-aspirations 
of the individual. Accordingly, democracy based on indigenous African knowledge and 
values need not be based on the freedom of individuals from community. This is because 
freedom, in the communitarian social system, is not negatively defined, “i.e., in the sense 
of “liberation-from- something”. Rather, it is “liberation-towards-something” – towards 
understanding that ‘it is the human being that counts’. In other words in the African 
social setting, only if the “I” liberates the “we” can the “we” lead the “I” towards 
complete freedom”45. How then, does this sort of freedom reflect in the political thought 
and structures of traditional Africa? 
 
5.3.2: Sovereignty of the People 
 
The ohene46 is the political head of the African state. In spite of the fact that there is no 
direct popular election of the ohene47, the will of the people is, generally, the basis of all 
properly constituted political authority in traditional Africa, for in the event of the 
ohene’s failure to make his rule reflect this will, his authority “falls to the ground”48. As 
such, although the chief is treated as befits the veneration attached to his office, his 
political authority is determined by the principle of the sovereignty of the people, which 
must be rightfully considered the first principle of the political system in traditional 
Africa.  
                                                 
45 Bujo, B, 1997, Ethical Dimension, op. cit., p. 75 
46 In his article "The King as Memory and Symbol of African Customary Law", (in Hinz, M. O. et. al (eds), 
2006, The Shade of New Leaves: Governance in traditional authority - A Southern African Perspective, 
Berlin: LIT Verlag, pp 351-374) Ramose points to the strategies designed by the colonialists in Africa to 
maintain their superiority over the indigenous conquered peoples. One of these was that upon seizing their 
territory, the colonial conquerors “referred to the kings or political heads of their societies “as chiefs in 
order to avoid equating them with European kings” (p. 360). But reducing their status in comparison with 
European monarchs was not the only purpose of converting their titles into “chiefs”. This was done also to 
make them “act as guardians of the law of the conqueror” (pp 359-360) and thereby establish their status as 
puppets and accomplices in the colonial administration in the minds of their subjects. In deepening this 
tradition of denigration, a number of post-colonial African authors (such as Gyekye, K., 1996, African 
Cultural Values, Accra: Sankofa Publishing; Gyekye, (1997, Tradition and Modernity, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press; Busia, K. A., 1968, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political State of Ashanti, 
London: Frank Cass) on the traditional political system, perhaps unwittingly, have continued the trend of 
referring to the titular head of the African indigenous political system as “chief”. We depart from this trend 
by employing ohene, the title of the political head of the Akan state in the following discussions. 
47 Most indigenous African states chose their chief from among members of a royal family, acknowledged 
by the people as such by history and custom 
48 Cureau, A. L., 1915, A Study of Primitive Races in the French Congo, London: Fisher and Urwin, p. 279 
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Hence in the Sesotho language, the principle of popular sovereignty is rendered as “kgosi 
ke kgosi ka batho”49. In other words, the source and justification of royal power is the 
people. The Ndebele affirm this by claiming categorically that “the king is the people. To 
respect the king is to respect oneself. He who despises our king despises us. He who 
praises our king praises us”50.  
 
The principle of popular sovereignty espoused in these quotations has long been 
acknowledged by non-African scholars, two of whom we wish to quote here for 
illustration. First, Campbell, in his analysis of the exercise of political power among the 
Bantus, writes: 
 
“All government is by the will of the people, whether it be the choice or 
coronation of a king; the selection of a man to fill a new chieftainship; the 
framing, proclamation and promulgation of a new law; the removal of the villages 
from one site to another; the declaration of war or the acceptance of terms of 
peace: everything must be put to the poll and come out stamped with the 
imprimatur of the people’s will. No permanent form of negro government can 
exist save that based four square on the people’s will”51. 
 
Again, Rattray, speaking of the Asante52, makes the following observations:  
 
“I have already on several occasions used this word ‘democratic’, and it is time to 
explain what this term implies in this part of Africa. We [the British, and by 
extension the Western World] pride ourselves, I believe, on being a democratic 
people and flatter ourselves that our constitutions are of a like nature. An Ashanti 
who was familiar alike with his own and our constitution would deny absolutely 
our right to apply this term either to ourselves or to our constitution. To him a 
democracy implies that the affairs of the tribe [the State] must rest, not in the 
keeping of the few but in the hands of the many, that is, must not alone be the 
concern of what we should term “the chosen rulers of the people”, but should 
continue to be the concern of a far wider circle. To him, the state is literally Res 
Publica; it is everyone’s business. The work of an Ashanti citizen did not finish 
when by his vote he had installed a chief in office….. The rights and duties of the 
Ashanti democrats were only really beginning after (if I may use a homely 
analogy) the business of the ballot-box was over. In England, the government and 
                                                 
49 “Ramose, M. B. African Philosophy through Ubuntu, op. cit., p. 43 
50 Gyekye, K., 1996, African Cultural Values, Accra: Sankofa Publishing, p. 110 
51 Campbell, Dugald., 1922,  In the Heart of Bantuland, A Record of Twenty-Nine Years in Central Africa 
among the Bantu Peoples, London: Seely Services and Co., p. 42 
52 A sub-group of the Akans of Ghana and the Ivory Coast 
 207
House of Commons stand between ourselves and the making of laws, but among 
the Ashanti there was not any such thing as government apart from the people”53.  
 
Although there is no direct popular election of the political head of the African State, the 
will of the people is prominently reflected in the selection of the ohene. This is 
sufficiently demonstrated by the traditional Akan political system, the defining features 
of which has been the subject of many critical studies. Many of these works affirm for 
Akan social organization a well-regulated constitutional system of government of which 
the principle of the representation of the people is fundamental.  
 
Arguably, the most outstanding expression of this principle is found in the determination 
of the ambit and exercise of political authority, which is vested in the ohene, who is 
assisted by a council54 of elders that comprise of heads of clans ( a cluster of biological 
lineages) and “those intelligent men who by reason of their experience in matters political 
and judicial”55 were considered desirable resources to public deliberations. As members 
of the ohene’s council, these wise and technically competent community elders 
performed the highest legislative, executive and judicial functions in the traditional 
African state.   
 
The office of the ohene is an elective one, and the process of this election has been 
elaborately described by Rattray, Busia and Gyekye, on all of whom we shall draw freely 
in our analysis56. Upon the vacancy of a stool (throne), a candidate is nominated by the 
queen mother57, for the acceptance of the councilors of state (or the community). The 
                                                 
53 Rattray, R. S., 1929 Ashanti Law and Constitution, Oxford: Clarendon Press,  pp. 406-407 
54 Rattray, R. S., 1929, Ashanti Law and Constitution, Oxford Clarendon Press, p. 407. Here Rattray notes 
that the Akan expression “adwabo”, is used both for market and council (or assembly). Gyekye, (1997, 
Tradition and Modernity, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 123) rightfully notes that the use of that 
expression points to the practice of bargaining, negotiation and compromise that characterizes the decisions 
of political councils and assemblies in Akan communities. We will return to this in section 6.3.3 when we 
discuss consensual democracy. 
55 Casely-Hayford, J. E., 1911, Ethiopia Unbound, London:  C. M Philips, p. 72 
56 See  
- Rattray, R. S., 1929, Ashanti Law and Constitution, op. cit., p. 82 
- Busia, K. A., 1968, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political State of Ashanti, London: 
Frank Cass, p. pp 7-11 
- Gyekye, K. 1997, Tradition and Modernity, op. cit., pp. 121-123 
57 The highest office held by a female in the Akan state. The queen mother is the female head of the royal 
lineage, and arguably the most important counselor to the ohene. Her executive functions include policy-
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councilors may reject the nominee, and this obliges the queen mother to nominate 
another. She has the prerogative to nominate three candidates, failing which the right to 
nominate falls on the councilors.  
 
Upon acceptance of a nominated candidate by the councilors, the body of citizens, 
represented by Asafo companies58, must sanction the councilors’ acceptance before the 
ohene may be enstooled (enthroned). This is justifiably construed as the “election” proper 
of the ohene. The principle underlying this process is that “a royal [or noble] does not 
install a chief”59. 
 
After these processes have been completed, a day is set aside for the installation of the 
ohene. The most significant feature of this process is the swearing of the oath of office by 
the chief elect before the councilors and body of citizens. Rattray records twelve 
injunctions embodied in this oath, which are pronounced by the Okyeame60 and 
acknowledged by the new elect61. These are: 
 
1. Do not go after women (i.e. do not be a womanizer) 
2. Do not become a drunkard 
3. Listen to our advice  
4. Do not gamble 
5. We do not want you to disclose the origin of your subjects 
6. We do not want you to abuse us 
7. We do not want you to be miserly 
                                                                                                                                                 
making for the welfare of the womenfolk and administration of the State in times of war when the ohene 
and his officials and successors are on the battlefield.  
58 The military divisions of the State  
59 This is the literal interpretation of “Odehye nsi hene”. See Busia, K. A., 1968, The Position of the Chief, 
op. cit. p 11. The salutary point being conveyed here is that it is the prerogative of the ordinary citizenry to 
do so. 
60 In the traditional Akan polity, the okyeame was a diplomat and counselor to the ohene. His other 
functions included pouring of libation at official gatherings as well as a mediating in the communication 
between the ohene and his audience. According to Yankah (Yankah, K., 1998, Free Speech in Traditional 
Society: The Cultural Foundations of Communication in Contemporary Ghana, Accra: Ghana Universities 
Press, p. 10), this exercise of editorial responsibilities over the spoken word by the chief is meant to endure 
their poetic quality by imbuing “the royal word with all the diplomatic and proverbial finesse necessary to 
befit the lofty realm he occupies”. 
61 Rattray, R. S., 1929,  Ashanti Law and Constitution, op. cit. p. 82 
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8. We do not want one who disregards advice 
9. We do not want you to treat us as fools 
10. We do not want autocratic ways 
11. We do not want bullying 
12. We do not want beating [the infliction of physical pain] 
 
These injunctions are easily reduced to a number of prescriptions that highlight the ideals 
and values that the people expect their ohene to live up to. The first and second 
injunctions clearly inveigh against profligacy and a penchant for intoxicants, most likely 
because the first has the propensity to create discord and dull impartial focus; whereas the 
second impairs reflective ability. The fourth injunction is against policies and conduct 
that may dissipate the wealth of the state or make it insecure. The third, eighth, ninth and 
tenth injunctions are statements of the principle of the sovereignty of the people. They 
commonly pronounce against the chief acting without the concurrence of his councilors 
who are representatives of the people, and suggest that such acts are liable to be set aside 
as unconstitutional. These injunctions also suggest the need for equitable treatment and 
respect for individual talent and enterprise, and hence of autonomy. The fifth injunction 
states the need for the ohene to be a role model for harmonious living, and the sixth 
requires the ohene to show respect for his subjects and Gyekye points out that what is at 
stake here is the recognition of their equality as human beings62.  
 
The acknowledgement and acceptance of all these injunctions constitutes his declaration 
to rule by law, and completes the process of his enthronement. These injunctions clearly 
define the ambit of the ohene’s authority and the nature of the relationship that is 
expected between him and his subjects. Danquah maintains that flouting some of these 
injunctions constitutes sufficient cause for removal from office63; and Gyekye points out 
the significance of prefacing each injunction with “we do not want….”. In his view, the 
people are, in effect, prescribing to the chief how he should rule them, and this “is an 
indication of the confidence the people have in insisting on the exercise of a political 
                                                 
62 Gyekye, K. 1996. African Cultural Values, op. cit. p 114 
63 Danquah, J. B., 1928, Akan Laws and Customs, London: Frank Cass, p. 115 
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power that will reflect their wishes; it is an indication also of the people’s intention to 
make the chief aware that he will need to depend on his people for a satisfactory and 
peaceful rule”64.  
 
The offer and acceptance of these injunctions constitutes a contract between the ohene 
and his people, and an implicit understanding between the parties that any action by the 
ohene that flouts any of the terms is unconstitutional and makes him liable to 
dethronement. The ohene, then, does not have an indefeasible right to office once 
enthroned. He is liable to be unseated for reasonable cause, and each of the injunctions of 
the oath can constitute such a cause. The principles enunciated in the process of selection 
and installation of the ohene then demonstrate the principle of the rule of law and 
accountability of government to the people. Although he presides over council, the chief 
seldom initiates a law65. The people, through their councilors, do this. Hence in 
announcing a law or policy promulgated in council, the ohene’s spokesman says “the 
chief and his councilors and elders say I must inform you that ……..”.  
 
This contract of enthronement may be considered the decisive expression of the 
sovereignty of the people among the Akan, a principle which, as the quotations above 
demonstrate, is upheld by many African cultures. . A government which failed to allow 
the people an effective voice in their own affairs would be considered structurally 
defective and unconstitutional. Thus in the nineteenth century, seven Ashanti kings were 
unseated for breaching various provisions of their oaths of office66. For his tenure as the 
political head of the state to succeed, therefore, the ohene needs to cooperate effectively 
with his people, and this cooperation will depend on the extent to which he is able to 
inspire the sympathy and loyalty of the people. This, in turn, will depend on the extent to 
which he is able to meet their values and aspirations.  
 
What this illustrates is that the political head of an indigenous African state was never 
imposed on the people. In fact the political system supports the assertion of a British 
                                                 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., p. 42 
66 Busia, K., A., 1968, The position of the Chief, op. cit., p. 22 
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colonial administrator that “with all the display of regal power, the [Akan] chief is little 
more than a puppet moved at the will of the people”67. This may be an overstatement of 
the case, but it highlights the legitimacy of the claim that the political system recognizes 
the people’s sovereignty as a foremost principle.  
 
5.3.3: Consensus Seeking: Democracy through the ‘Palaver’ 
 
Wiredu points out that political power in the Akan traditional setting is set up for 
participation, and not for appropriation; and the underlying philosophy is one of 
cooperation, and not confrontation68. On the basis of this he characterizes this political 
system as substantial (consensual) democracy and distinguishes this from formal 
democracy, which is the type of democracy conceptualized and fostered by the West and 
pursued by most African countries today. But what does this distinction consist in? In 
answering this we resort to Wiredu’s elaboration on it, as we can hardly do better than 
what he provides. He writes: 
 
“I would like to emphasize that the pursuit of consensus was a deliberate effort to 
go beyond decision by majority opinion. It is easier to secure majority agreement 
than to achieve consensus. And the fact was not lost upon the Ashantis. But they 
spurned that line of least resistance. To them, majority opinion is not, in itself, a 
good enough basis for decision-making. Or, to put it in terms of the concept of 
representation, it deprives the minority of the right of representation in the 
decision in question. Two concepts of representation are involved in these 
considerations. There is the representation of a given constituency in council, and 
there is the representation of the will of a representative in the making of a given 
decision. Let us call the first formal, and the second, substantive representation. 
Then, it is obvious that you can have formal representation without its substantive 
correlate. Yet, the formal is for the sake of the substantive. On the Ashanti view, 
substantial representation is a matter of fundamental human right. Each human 
being has the right to be represented not only by council, but also in council in 
any matter relevant to his or her interest or those of their group. This is why 
consensus is so important”69. 
 
                                                 
67 Cruickshank, B., 1854, Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast of Africa, Vol. 1, London: Hurst & Blackett, p. 
236 
68 Wiredu, K., 1997, “Democracy and Consensus in African Traditional Politics: A Plea for Non-Party 
Politics”, in Eze, E. C., (ed) Post-Colonial African Philosophy, Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell publishers, p. 
308 
69 Ibid., p. 307 
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An important feature of majoritarian democracies is the prominence given to political 
parties, which are coalitions of citizens with a defined ideology for governing. However,  
 
“many SSA [Sub-Saharan African] countries leave the financing of political 
parties to private individuals and organized groups of friends. As a result, political 
parties get hijacked by private and group interests and when they win political 
power; their agenda is often not in national interest”70.  
 
On the other hand, government “becomes a kind of coalition – a coalition not, as in the 
common acceptation, of parties but of citizens”71 in a consensual democratic system. The 
need for consensus in political decision-making by this coalition derives from “the belief 
that ultimately the interests of all members of society are the same, although their 
immediate perceptions of those interests may be different”72. Hence the pursuit of 
solidarity embedded in the communitarian ethos, is itself “inspired by a belief in the 
identity of the interests of all the members of the community…. and of the recognition of 
the political and moral values of equality, reciprocity and respect for the views of 
others”73. It is not difficult to see why in such a political system human interest would 
constitute the basis of all value, and human fellowship be the most important of human 
needs. 
 
Consensual democracy has been ascribed to other traditional African cultures.  Thus Bujo 
talks of a time-consuming procedure aimed at finding a consensus, in which “an effort is 
made to discuss the matter not by maneuvering nor by trickery or force and taking into 
consideration the well-being not just of the participants but much more that of all the 
affected people”74.  Likewise, Ramose affirms that “traditional African political culture 
embodied and invited opposition in the very principle of consensus” towards an 
“unrelenting quest for oneness”75. 
                                                 
70 Mensa, C, Welcome Address at the Conference on “Fifty Years of Sub-Sahara African Independence and 
the Role of Political; Parties: Promise, Decline and Resurgence”, held at the Golden Tulip Hotel, Accra, 4-
5 May 2007,  p. 4 
71 Wiredu, K., 1997, “Democracy and Consensus..”, op. cit. p. 310 
72 Ibid. p. 306 
73 Gyekye, K., 1997, Tradition and Modernity, op. cit., p 130 
74 Bujo, B., 1997, Ethical Dimension, op. cit., p. 36 
75 Ramose, M. B. 2002, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, op. cit., p. 113 
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The Tswanas express the principle of solidarity underlying their consensual democratic 
practice in the saying that “go ya ka magoro gase go tswana, melato re a rerisana”76. 
Akans express the “freedom of debate” in the consensus-seeking process with the saying 
that “ti koro nko agyina”77. This is because it is always better and more fruitful for more 
‘heads’ (minds) minds to deliberate on matters of public concern than just one ‘head’. 
 
In spite of all these, some scholars have supposed that African political culture lacked the 
concept and practice of opposition, because of the absence of political parties. Thus 
Simiyu claims that  
 
“The class structure [in African societies] prevented the development of 
democratic tendencies. There may have been checks and balances against the 
absolute authority of the king, but the exercise of those controlling forces was 
done by the immediate members of the ruling aristocracy without the participation 
of the commoners”78.  
 
The supposition that dissenting views were absent in the African polity may also be 
inferred from Hountondji’s talk of the “myth of unanimity” and the “myth of 
consensus”79. What Hountondji means by these is that the idea of consensus is an 
imaginary construct that has no basis whatsoever in truth because such an idea would 
imply a monolithic conception of a subject to which all thinkers in a given society give 
unanimous assent. However there cannot be such completely identical views, hence the 
“myths”. 
 
Robin Horton also traverses similar ground when he writes that in traditional cultures 
“there is no developed awareness of alternatives to the established body of theoretical 
                                                 
76 According to Ramose, at ibid., p. 115, what this means is that “even if we may go our own way, 
whenever urgent and vital issues arise we still have the obligation to come together and try to find a 
common solution to those issues”.  
77 “One head does not go into council. 
78 Simiyu, V. G., 1987, “The Democratic Myth in the African Traditional Societies”, in Oyugi, W. O. and 
Gitonga, A (eds), Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa, Nairobi: Heinemann, p. 69 
79 Hountondji, P. J., 1983, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, Bloomington: Indiana University Press,  
pp. 51-55. 
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tenets” and that they therefore harbour “closed” systems of thought”80. The “lack of 
awareness of alternatives makes for an absolute acceptance of the established theoretical 
tenets, and removes any possibility of questioning them. In these circumstances, the 
established tenets invest the believer with a compelling force. It is this force which we 
refer to when we talk of such tenets as sacred”81. In fact according to Horton, the lack of 
alternatives and the sacredness of the unanimous tenets of knowledge and values in 
traditional Africa is so strong that any challenge to these threatens stability so much that 
it “evokes intense anxiety” in the culture82. 
 
Many arguments may be deployed, both at the conceptual and empirical levels, to deny 
these views on the undemocratic nature of African political thought. However, we believe 
deploying a few will suffice to make the point. First, as argued, the process of the 
selection and installation of a political head provides enough theoretical and practical 
expression of the democratic ideal. Secondly, if consensus is admitted as a decision-
making and norm-finding procedure in these societies, then it would be conceptually 
untenable to simultaneously ascribe unanimous views and lack of theoretical alternatives 
to them. This is because the notion of consensus presupposes the existence of opposing 
views, for “it is the opposing views that are, or need to be, reconciled. If there were no 
opposition, it would be senseless to talk of reaching a consensus”83. Indeed, “surely, one 
cannot speak of consensus where there is no opposition at all”84. Also, as pointed out in 
section 5.3.2, the Akan word for council (or assembly), connotes the practice of 
bargaining, negotiation and compromise, and surely these cannot occur where there is no 
alternative or dissenting views. 
 
Consensus seeking, as a decision making procedure, was adopted and valued at all levels 
of the political and administrative structure, and all citizens conceded the right to 
                                                 
80 Horton, R., 1971, “African Traditional Thought and Western Science”, in Wilson, B. (ed), Rationality, 
New York: Harper Touchbooks, p. 153 
81 Ibid., p. 154 
82 Ibid. pp 154-155 
83 Gyekye, K., 1997, Tradition and Modernity, op. cit., p 130 
84 Ramose, M. B. 2002, African Philosophy through Ubuntu, op. cit., p. 113 
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contribute to consensus formation85. It is also the pillar that supported decentralization, 
upon which “lay the whole success and wonder of this loosely bounded confederacy [of 
the Ashanti state]…A paramount chief who endeavored to centralize too much in olden 
times generally paid with his life for his folly in having allowed his ambitions to override 
his knowledge of his own constitution”86.  
 
5.4 Political Culture in an Ethics-based Model of Development  
 
Consensual democracy is, among others, the institutional expression of the third and fifth 
injunctions which a newly elected Akan hene must acknowledge. For Africans, then, 
democracy means continuous and active participation of every citizen in the affairs of 
governing. The decentralized orientation of consensual democracy meant that a 
deliberative forum was filled by those “who share daily life with the people, so that their 
argumentation is concerned with the people’s existential interests”87. Freedom to 
participate in debate meant that arguments are conducted by choosing people who share 
in the daily life of the community and are thus in a position to take into prominent 
consideration in their argumentation the people’s existential needs and interest. Further, 
an effort is made by participants in council and other discursive fora to discuss issues at 
hand not by trickery or maneuvering or force; and by taking into consideration the 
welfare of not only the participants but the whole community88. This is because 
discussion aimed at discovering appropriate solutions for action, not the defeat of an 
adversary in argument. The business of government evokes the constant attention and 
interest of the citizenry, and because of the requirement that the governor become 
accessible to the governed.     
 
A key lesson that contemporary Africa should learn from these institutional arrangements 
is the need for a unified political authority. A union government for Africa is necessary 
for Africa’s future. This will be a “a government of the people, for the people, by the 
                                                 
85 Bujo, B., 1997, Ethical Dimension, op. cit., p. 36 
86 Rattray, R. S., 1929, Ashanti Law and Constitution, op. cit.  p. 405 
87 Bujo, B., 1997, Ethical Dimension, op. cit., p. 36 
88 Ibid., p 36 
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people”89 which rejects the party system of government because the latter “brings in its 
trail division, hatred, sectional and tribal strife”90. The necessity for a single continental 
government stems partly from the need to bridge this division and sectionalism initiated 
by the Berlin Conference91 and perpetuated through neo-colonialist tactics like “aid”, and 
foreign investment92. The recovery of Africa’s political sovereignty, as Diop has argued, 
is a precondition for economic sovereignty and psychic autonomy93. This is because 
economic and social development requires decisive political action. Therefore,   
 
“enlightened [Africa’s] self-interest itself argues for the adoption, before late, of a 
federal system. …The upshot is that only a continent-wide or a subcontinent-wide 
federated state can offer a safe political and economic area, stable enough for a 
rational formula covering the development of our countries with their infinitely 
varied potentials to be put into effect”94.  
 
As seen in section 1.4.3.2, Nkrumah also stresses the need for Africa’s political unity as a 
precondition for its total liberation from imperialism95. This is evinced among others by 
his exhortation to Africans to “seek ye first the political kingdom and all things shall be 
added unto thee”96.   
 
                                                 
89 Kutu Akyeampong, erstwhile head of State under the Supreme Military Council of Ghana, in an 
interview broadcast on the BBC, 14th January 1977 
90 Kutu Akyeampong, erstwhile head of State under the Supreme Military Council of Ghana, in speech 
delivered at the inauguration of the reconstituted National Committee of the Charter of Redemption, Accra, 
12th October, 1976. 
91 In 1884 at the request of Portugal, the first Chancellor of Germany, Otto von Bismark, hosted fourteen 
countries in Berlin from November 1884 to February 1885 to determine territorial control over Africa 
among the participants. The countries represented included Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Denmark, France, 
Germany, Great Britain, Italy, the Netherlands, Portugal, Russia, Spain, Sweden-Norway (unified from 
1814-1905), Turkey, and the United States of America. At the time of the conference, 80% of Africa 
remained under traditional and local control. But the outcome of the conference the General Act of the 
Berlin Conference, formalized the  Scramble for Africa and by 1914, the conference participants had fully 
divided Africa among themselves into fifty countries. 
92 Nkrumah, K., 1970, Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, London: Panaf, p. 239 
93 . Diop, C. A., 1987, Black Africa, op. cit.,  pp. 115-116 
94 Ibid., Foreword. 
95 Nkrumah, K, 2004, Neo-colonialism, The Last Stage of Imperialism, London: Panaf, p. ix-xx, and pp. 
255-259 
96 Nkrumah reputedly uttered these words in a speech entitled “Poverty versus Plenty” on the campaign 
trail in Northern Ghana on March 6th 1949. A record of that speech is not known to be extant, but in his 
book I Speak of Freedom, London: Heinemann, 1961, p. 16, Nkrumah acknowledges this aphorism by 
claiming that “Economic freedom, I told them [i.e. the audience], would follow political freedom. 
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In spite of these, decisive willingness and action for harnessing indigenous African 
political principles and practices, and forging a common political center for Africa 
structured by these principles, is hard to locate in contemporary African politics. This is 
easily evinced by conclusions reached by the 2005 African Governance Report97, 
according to which “governance overall is getting better in Africa”98. Some of the 
indicators for this conclusion are that  “the political space has been liberalised, human 
rights and the rule of law are more widely respected, legislatures and judiciaries are 
asserting their independence, the legitimacy and credibility of the electoral process have 
increased, voter turnouts are on the increase, economic management is getting better”99. 
In other words the tenets of majoritarian democracies are flourishing. For us this is 
scarcely an indicator of Africa’s progress towards liberation. 
 
The unwillingness and inaction for continental political unity is sometimes masked by 
proclamations to the contrary, as may be inferred from a number of documents. One of 
these is the Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community100. Article 6.1 of this 
Treaty declares the complete integration of African economies, over a six-phased 
process, within thirty-four (34) years of the signing of the Treaty. Two other seemingly 
union-furthering documents are the Constitutive Act of the African Union101 (AU) and 
the Mission and Vision of the organization as stated in the Strategic Plan of its 
Commission102. Article 3 of the Act states the objectives of the Union whereas article 4 
enumerates the principles according to which the Union will function. One would 
therefore expect a consistent and definite statement and the path towards unity from these 
articles. However, these two articles are riddled with ambiguities and inconsistencies. 
Thus Article 3 states the following, inter alia, as the objectives of the Union: 
                                                 
97 Prepared for the 4th African Development Forum (ADF IV) convened by the Economic Commission for 
Africa and the African Union in Addis Ababa on 11-15 October 2004 
98 Economic Commission for Africa, 2005, Striving for Good Governance in Africa: Synopsis of the 2005 
African Governance Report Prepared for the African Development Forum IV, Addis Ababa: ECA, p. iii 
99 Ibid. pp 4-12 
100 Economic Commission for Africa, 2002, Treaty Establishing the African Economic Community 
101 Adopted by the Heads of State and Government of the OAU in Lome, Togo, on the 11th of July 2000 
102 African Union Commission, 2004, Strategic Plan of the African Union Commission, Volume 1: Vision 
and Mission of the African Union, Addis Ababa: AU  
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a. Achieve greater unity and solidarity between the African countries and the 
peoples of Africa;  
b. Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of its Member 
States; 
c. Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the continent; 
d. Promote and defend African common positions on issues of interest to the 
continent and its peoples. 
It is clear that objectives a, c and d may be held to further the goal of eventual unity 
whereas b seeks to preserve the divisive status quo.  
Further, Article 4 states that The Union shall function in accordance with the following 
principles, inter alia: 
a. Sovereign equality and interdependence among Member States of the Union; 
b. Respect of borders existing on achievement of independence 
d. Establishment of a common defence policy for the African Continent 
g. Non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of another 
i. Peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in peace and security 
k. Promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union 
The incongruence between principles a, b, g, i, k, all of which establish “sovereign 
equality”  and therefore detracts from the movement towards unity, on the one hand; and 
principle d on the other, which promotes unity, can surely not pass without notice.  
 
Besides the tension within the Constitutive Act, inconsistencies also abound between the 
Act and the Strategic Plan. Thus according to the Strategic Plan, the first key idea 
underlying the vision of the Union is that “political integration should be the raison-
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d’être of the African Union, the objective being to achieve a United States of Africa 
(federation or confederation) in the long run”103. This vision is elaborated upon in the 
following assertion:  
 
“A united and integrated Africa; an Africa imbued with the ideals of justice and 
peace; an inter-dependent and robust Africa determined to map for itself an 
ambitious strategy; an Africa underpinned by political, economic, social and 
cultural integration which would restore to Pan-Africanism its full meaning; an 
Africa able to make the best of its human and material resources, and keen to 
ensure the progress and prosperity of its citizens by taking advantage of the 
opportunities offered by a globalized world; an Africa capable of promoting its 
values in a world rich in its disparities”104. 
 
In the political sphere, therefore, a twofold exigency needs fulfillment towards a 
development paradigm that can contribute to Africa’s authentic liberation. First is the 
need to streamline these documents which declare Africa’s aspiration to continental unity 
into a consistent whole. And if the decision by the 10th Ordinary Summit of the AU’s 
Executive Council to accelerate discussion on an “African union government” and an 
“African high command”105 are indications of the direction of the Union towards this, 
then it is a laudable direction indeed.   
 
Secondly, this union must be built on the communitarian ethical model. By doing so, a 
peculiar virtue of consensual democracy will be invoked to serve the continental 
government. This virtue is the sense of personal commitment to the affairs of state, “a 
conviction that any harm done to the state as a whole directly harms the individual106”, 
which individual citizens would develop on the basis of their communitarian orientation. 
And this, surely, is needed bedrock for Africa’s development.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
103 African Union Commission, 2004, Strategic Plan, op. cit. p 22 
104 Ibid. p. 26 
105 The New African Magazine, March 2007, p. 12 
106 Gyekye, K., 1996, African Cultural Values, op. cit. p 116 
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5.5  Humane Economics and Africa’s Development 
 
Gyekye states emphatically that the doctrine of communitarianism in indigenous Africa 
was “essentially socio-ethical, not economic”107. He advances this view in order to reject 
the proposition that communalism is essentially an economic system that can evolve into 
a socialist economy108. This leaves Gyekye at pains to point out that “the notions of 
private property and private enterprise…. were not unknown in the African traditional 
way of managing the economy”109. We have seen in section 5.2.1.1 that ample room was 
provided for individualist values and talents in the communalist structure. Hence it 
should go without saying that it has always been the case in African cultures that “private 
property, such as cattle, existed side by side with communal property, such as land”110.  
 
However, the management of vital segments of the economy were directly inspired and 
sustained by the socio-ethical core of communitanianness. This section argues for the 
view that the pursuit of communitarian economics is relevant and worthwhile for aspects 
of economic development in Africa within the ethics-based development paradigm.   
 
How was the economy of traditional Africa sustained by the communitarian doctrine? 
Land, for instance, an economic-productive factor that most forcefully validates the right 
to life111, was communally owned. In furthering Gyekye’s denial of an organic link 
between Marxism and communalism, we may add that the principles of acquisition and 
distribution of this particular economic good in African law and custom renders the 
Marxist dialectic inoperative. This is because the family, not the individual, was the unit 
for the ownership of land. And there was no social differentiation in apportioning this 
essential means to livelihood: all able adult members of a family were entitled to claim 
                                                 
107 Gyekye, K, 1996, African Cultural Values, op. cit., p. 96 
108 Gyekye, K., 1997, Tradition and Modernity, op. cit., p. 37, attributes this position to post-independence 
African leaders such as Kwame Nkrumah Leopold` Senghor and Julius Nyerere.  
109 ibid 
110 Molema, S. M. 1920, The Bantu: Past and Present, Edinburgh: W. Green and Son Ltd., p. 115 
111 Ramose, M. B., 2002, “I conquer, therefore I am the sovereign: Reflections upon sovereignty, 
constitutionalism, and democracy in Zimbabwe and South Africa”, in Coetzee, P. H. and Roux, A. P. J. 
(ed), Philosophy from Africa, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 473 
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ownership of a part of the family’s land for their livelihood. In the absence of  
differentiation in the acquisitive and distributive mechanisms, the Marxist dialectic 
becomes irrelevant in land ownership in the African setting. 
 
This non-differentiation in the allocation of commonly-owned property is an important 
economic value translated into a display of distributive justice that should enrich Africa’s 
future development paradigm. It will thus ensure that laws governing ownership of 
natural resources are revised to display as their main aim the human and economic rights 
of citizens. A concrete manifestation of this revision would be to adopt as preamble to 
our development paradigm Article one of the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of 
Hunger and Malnutrition, which states that “every man, woman and child has the 
inalienable right to be free from hunger and malnutrition in order to develop fully and 
maintain their physical and mental faculties”112. 
 
Another aspect of the traditional economy that can enrich the modern setting is the 
collaborative harnessing of labour characterised as nnoboa by the Akans and as letsema 
by the Bantu113. For the African future, this collaborative pool of resources can have at 
least two types of merits. First, it can directly impinge on human dignity and welfare 
within the continent. If collaboration should become a central feature of the processes 
that drive the economic system, then this will blunt the ‘murderous’ edges of competition 
and its defense of selfishness as a virtue. As discussed in section 1.4.1 competition, which 
is a core feature of capitalism implies rivalry that makes human beings mere tools in the 
hands of a competitor in the quest for profit. And for this self interest justifies the 
deprivation of life and the subjugation of human dignity. This is what makes such a 
system ethically objectionable114. For this reason, collaborative economic processes, 
which better epitomize “seeking together”, which is the original meaning of 
                                                 
112 UNGAR, 1974, 3346, p. xxix; cf. Ramose M, B., 2002, ibid., p 473 
113 This is the practice whereby all members of a cooperative allow their labor to be utilized by one member 
for a day. All the members take their turn in this utility of the collective labour until every member has 
benefited, before another round may begin. 
114 Ramose, M. B., 2004, “Poverty: A Creature of Politics and a Question of Justice”. In International 
Journal of Humanistic Studies. Vol. 3, pp 36 – 53. 
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competition115, should be preferable for Africa’s future development paradigm, for it has 
better prospects of ensuring a humane system that dignifies the human being as an 
economic factor and end of economic activity. 
 
The second merit that would accrue to the adaptation of letsema is that it will help 
improve Africa’s standing in her economic relationship with the rest of the world. As a 
trading block sub-Saharan Africa has suffered and continues to suffer the most 
unfavourable terms in global trade. One main reason for this is that cash crops remain a 
major source of government revenue for a significant number of these countries. 
Although the continent’s commodity price index in 2004 went up from 2003, most of the 
increase was due to the rise in the prices of oil, metals and minerals. Africa’s key 
agricultural exports: cotton, cocoa, coffee (robusta) and groundnut oil recorded price 
declines in 2004116. In fact, the agricultural sector is characterised by “loss of 
competitiveness in world markets”117. 
 
This uncompetitive agricultural sector is a main reason for Africa’s insignificant share in 
world trade. But in spite of its low share, the continent is highly dependent on this trade. 
Thus:  
“contrary to general perceptions Africa’s markets are integrated considerably in 
the global economy. But, this integration is asymmetric. Africa depends on the 
rest of the world, whereas the rest of the world does not depend on Africa. Its 
shares in both world trade and FDI are only 2 per cent of the global total, a 
reflection of the continent’s low share in world GDP”118. 
 
The unfavourable terms of trade for Africa due to the continual drop in agricultural prices 
has been attributed to bumper harvests and over-production of these commodities both 
within and outside the continent119. Collaborative economics, pursued in a united 
continental political framework can help to remedy this defect by presenting a common 
front for commodity price negotiations as well as general negotiations on terms of trade.  
                                                 
115 The Group of Lisbon, 1995, Limits to Competition. Cambridge: Massachusetts: MIT Press. p xii 
 
116 Economic Commission for Africa, 2005, Economic Report on Africa 2005, Addis Ababa: ECA, p. 31 
117 Ibid., p. 138 
118 Ibid. p. 205 
119 Ibid. pp 31-32 
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Further, the enhanced self-reliance that results from political unification and the forging 
of a common economic front will benefit Africa’s standing in another respect. The Africa 
Union’s 2007 budget portrays a shortfall of 36.27 million dollars on projected 
expenditure over income from the contributions of member states120. As in earlier years, 
the AU will most likely look up to ‘foreign partners’ to make up this shortfall. Now, for 
an organization, supposedly established to defend and deepen the independence of 
Africa, this is a contradiction in terms. But this is the most logical outcome of subscribing 
to NEPAD, and its conception of “partnership”, as discussed in Chapter Three. The 
notion of mutual dependence and communal sharing from indigenous Africa must be 
adopted in place of NEPAD’s decadent “partnership” which only pushes Africa further 
into the custody of  dependence, and therewith, into epistemicide and valuecide.  
 
5.6 Humane Technology, Ethical Ecology and Africa’s Development:  
 
The holonistic conception of existence facilitates the view that the potentials of humanity 
cannot be fully realized without its peaceful coexistence with other beings. This is partly 
because every being is endowed by God with vital force capable of strengthening [or 
diminishing] the vital energy of man121. This is clear in our discussions in section 5.2.1, 
which also supports the observation that “the human person and the cosmos complement 
each other to such an extent that they cannot exist without this interdependence”122, for as 
Temples has established, “the world of forces is like a spider’s web, of which one single 
thread cannot be caused to vibrate without shaking the whole web”123. In view of this 
necessary interdependence, humanity must view its interests not as antithetical but 
complementary to those of nature. Therefore the self-interested task for human beings is 
not the domination of nature but rather the pursuit of conduct that moves the entire 
cosmos into harmony.   
 
                                                 
120 The New African, March 2007, p. 12 
121 Temples, P., 1959, Bantu Philosophy, Paris: Presence Africaine, p. 46 
122 Bujo, B., 1997, Ethical Dimension, p. 209 
123 Temples, P., 1959, Bantu Philosophy, op. cit. p. 60 
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However, the functions and goals of modern technology seem to be diametrically 
opposed to this harmony. In league with capitalism and thus oriented directly toward the 
consumer, modern technology compels an insatiable urge always to produce and 
consume fast and desire for more. And in directing and responding to this orientation, 
“the human person [in pursuit of economistic ends] strives to deal with nature as with a 
slave; profit is what matters most, to the extent that one is even ready to compromise with 
death”124. This compromise with death, negotiated in a prospective annihilation of the 
human race, seems in fact to be accepted as the most rational apogee of technological 
advancement. Since the mid twentieth century, this has become evident in two main 
ways, at least.  
 
The first is the endurance of the doctrine of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD), 
promulgated in the most powerful corridors of the modern world where rationality 
allegedly decides the fate of the world. This doctrine declares the prospect of making the 
earth inhabitable as its main aim. MAD avows a strategy by which a full-scale use of 
nuclear weapons by one of two opposing sides would effectively result in the destruction 
of both the attacker and the defender. Adopted by the United States and the Soviet Union, 
it is based on the theory of deterrence according to which the deployment of nucleur 
weapons is essential to threaten the enemy in order to prevent the enemy’s use of the very 
same weapons, and as such avoid assured mutual annihilation. It is now assumed that the 
annihilation would not be confined to the two warring factions, but would bring about 
universal devastation125.  
 
The second possible compromise with death manifests itself in the threat of the 
greenhouse effect and global warming126.  Global warming refers to the average 
                                                 
124 Bujo, B., 1997, Ethical Dimension, p. op. cit. 216 
125 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mutual_assured_destruction 
126 When sunlight reaches the surface of the Earth, some of it is absorbed and warms the Earth. Because the 
Earth's surface is much cooler than the sun, it radiates energy at much longer wavelengths than does the 
sun. The atmosphere absorbs these longer wavelengths, and this absorption warms the atmosphere. 
Greenhouse gases, which include water vapor, carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and ozone, also emit 
longwave radiation both upward to space and downward to the surface. The downward part of this 
longwave radiation emitted by the atmosphere is the "greenhouse effect." Greenhouse gas emissions, 
predominantly carbon dioxide, from anthropocentric activity dictated by economic gain (industry, 
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temperature of the earth’s near-surface air and oceans in recent decades. Climate models 
predict that global surface temperatures are likely to increase by 1.1 to 6.4 degrees 
Celsius between 1990 and 2010. Such an increase can cause the seas to rise to levels that 
will inundate many presently inhabited islands. There may also be increases in the 
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, the retreat of glaciers, the extinction 
of species, and increases in the range of disease vectors.  Within this context, the refusal 
of the United States of America which is the foremost contributor to global warming127, 
to ratify the Kyoto treaty128, brings into focus the malevolence of the ethics of capitalism 
and the need for a communitarian and humanistic based ecological ethics.  
 
On September 4, 2006 capitalism’s compromise of death was enacted when inhabitants 
of Abidjan woke up to the stench of radioactive waste dumped in seven sites around the 
city. Within a few days three people had died and 1,500 treated for various conditions 
emanating from inhaling the waste. Trafigura Beheer BV, the foreign company that 
chartered the vessel that discharged the waste said an Ivorian firm had been paid to 
dispose of the waste in the Ivory Coast. In response to it, Ivorians carried placards in 
demonstrations some of which read: "They are killing us for money," and "They sold off 
our health"129. In view of these, modern technology should indeed be “ashamed of 
                                                                                                                                                 
transportation and commercialized agriculture) are the main causes of recently observed global warming. 
See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_warming 
127 As footnote 94 of Chapter 4 indicates, the United States, with  4.6% of the world’s population 
contributes 23.5% of the global emission of carbon dioxide, which is the principal agent for global 
warming. 
128 According to the United Nations Environment Programme, the Kyoto Protocol is an agreement under 
which industrialized countries commit themselves to reduce their collective emissions of greenhouse gases 
by 5.2% compared to the year 1990. The goal is to lower overall emissions of six greenhouse gases - 
carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, sulfur hexafluoride, HFCs, and PFCs - calculated as an average 
over the five-year period of 2008-12. National limitations range from 8% reductions for the European 
Union and some others to 7% for the US, 6% for Japan, 0% for Russia, and permitted increases of 8% for 
Australia and 10% for Iceland. The treaty was negotiated in Kyoto, Japan in December 1997, and  came 
into force on February 16, 2005 following ratification by Russia on November 18, 2004. As of December 
2006, a total of 169 countries and other governmental entities have ratified the agreement (representing 
over 61.6% of emissions from Annex I countries, that is  developed countries which have accepted GHG 
emission reduction obligations and must submit an annual greenhouse gas inventory). Notable exceptions 
to these are the United States and Australia. (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto_Protocol)   
129 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/5323222.stm  
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congratulating itself for the invention of the most complex life-destroying weapons”130. 
But this shouldn’t be the only nature and purpose of technology.  
 
A communitarian-ethics inspired technology will give substance to the notion of 
“sustainable development”131, which we considered in section 2.7. This means that it 
must be “able to help fulfill the simple survival needs of a very large proportion of people 
in the world; [and be] able to conserve natural resources to ensure the decent survival of 
the majority of human beings in the generations ahead”132. Clearly, such technology will 
help preserve human life and dignity. It will achieve this within a framework that 
harmonizes humanity’s needs and interests with “ecological therapy”. It is this sort of 
technology that should drive Africa’s future development.  It will be a technological 
framework “which knows how to respect African culture, since this alone is able to 
humanize technology in an African perspective”133.  
 
Thus profit, as understood in the philosophy of economism, cannot be the driving force 
underlying technological inventions and transfer to Africa. What must underlie them in 
fact is the Sotho maxim, quoted in section 6.2.2, that “if and when one is faced with a 
decisive choice between wealth and the preservation of the life of another human being 
then one should choose the preservation of that life”. This, presumably is because, 
ultimately, “it is the human being that counts” in all calculations of the consequences of 
human conduct. And a healthy and harmonious life in human community depends on an 
undamaged and balanced ecology. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
130 Bujo, B., 1997, Ethical Dimension, p. op. cit. p. 216 
131 Defined as ‘development that meets the needs of  the present without endangering the opportunities of 
future generations to meet their own needs. 
132 Peng, K. K., 1988, “Science and Development: Underdeveloping the Third World”, in Sardar, Z (ed), 
The Revenge of Athena: Science, Exploitation and the Third World, London: Mansell, p. 207 
133 Bujo, B., 1997, Ethical Dimension, op. cit, p. 219 
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5.7 Conclusion 
 
We have argued that in the African post-colonial experience, Eurocentric paradigms have 
determined the nature and purposes of Africa’s development and the theories and 
strategies for achieving them. These paradigms are sustained by internalist 
epistemologies that persist in advancing “lies, illusions and mystifications… about 
Africa”134. The effect of these lies and illusions are the epistemicide and valuecide being 
perpetuated in Africa’s strides towards development. These have culminated in the 
paradigmatic crisis proclaimed by social scientists at the dawn of the 1990s.  
 
The stranglehold of internalist epistemologies, with their attendant universalizing 
tendencies, has resulted in the impasse of rationality. By this we mean that Reason, 
apotheosized since the enlightenment, has advanced humanity out of barbarism to 
“civilization” but has now placed humanity on the brink of unredeemable barbarism. 
Thus Reason, through its manifestations in MAD and global warming, has blindfoldedly 
condemned humanity to willful but avoidable suicide.  
 
It is precisely at this moment of delirious impasse reached by Reason that the African 
ethics-based development paradigm, predicated on humaneness and “life is mutual aid”, 
can restore Reason to sober rationality and liberate Africa’s development efforts from the 
intoxicating prison of profit making. Hence the institutions and frameworks devoted to 
Africa’s development, such as the Constitution and Strategic Plan of the African Union as 
well as NEPAD, must incorporate salient features of the philosophic ethic emanating 
from the knowledge and ontological systems of indigenous Africa into visions of the 
African future.  
 
Such an orientation is more sustainable philosophically, as it yields a comprehensive 
vision of development that disputes the one founded on the ethic of competition.  Further, 
it will position Africa as the subject of the struggle for its liberation from the imperialist 
                                                 
134 Mudimbe, V. Y., 1988, The Invention of Africa, op. cit., pp. 142-143 
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and exploitative practices of Western science and technology that lead to epistemicide 
and valuecide.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 229
 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
 
Abraham, W. E, 1962, The Mind of Africa, Chicago: Chicago University Press 
   
Abudu, A. O., 2000, “Counterproductive Socio-Economic Management in Ghana”, in 
Lauer, H (ed.), Ghana: Changing Values Changing Technologies: Ghanaian 
Philosophical Studies, II Washington D. C.: Council for Research in Values and 
Philosophy 
 
Action Against Hunger and Poverty, 2004. The New York Declaration on the Action 
Against Hunger and Poverty; at 
www.mre.gov.br/ingles/politica_externa/temas_agenda/acfp/final_declaration.doc 
 
Adedeji, A., 1990, “Dimensions of the African Crisis”, Keynote Address to the 
Conference on the Economic Crisis in Africa, October 25-28 
 
Ademuwagun, Z. A. et al., (eds), 1979, African Therapeutic Systems, Waltham, Mass: 
Crossroads Press 
 
African Philosophy, 1998, Vol. 11, No. 2 
 
African Union Commission, 2004, Strategic Plan of the African Union Commission, 
Volume 1: Vision and Mission of the African Union, Addis Ababa: AU 
 
Agyakwa, K.O., 1974, Akan Epistemology and Western Thought, Unpublished PhD 
dissertation submitted to Teacher’s college, Columbia University 
 
Ajei, M. O. 2001, Indigenous Knowledge Systems and Good Governance in Ghana: The 
Traditional Akan Socio-political Example, Accra: Institute of Economic Affairs 
 
Ajei, M. O. 2000, The Paranormal: An Inquiry into some Features of Akan Metaphysics 
and Epistemology, A Thesis presented in  part-fulfillment of the requirements for the M. 
Phil Degree to the Department of Philosophy, Legon: University of Ghana. 
 
Ake, C, 1996, Democracy and Development in Africa, Ibadan: Spectrum Books 
 
Akyeampong, D., 1993, The Two Cultures Revisited: Interactions of Science and Culture, 
Accra, Ghana Academy of Arts and Sciences 
 
Almond, G. 1987. “The Development of Political Development”, in Myron Weiner et al. 
(eds) Understanding Political Development. Boston: Little, Brown. 
 
Amin, S. 1974. Accumulation on a World Scale: A Critique of the Theory of 
Underdevelopment. New York: Monthly Review Press. 
 
 230
Amin, S. 1976. Unequal Development. Sussex: Harvester Press 
 
Anta Diop, C, 1974, The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality, Westport: 
Lawrence Hill & Co. 
 
Appiah, K., 1989, Necessary Questions – An Introduction to Philosophy, Englewood 
Cliffs: Prentice-Hall 
 
Arnsperger, C., 1996, Competition, Consumerism and the “Other”, A philosophical 
Investigation into the Ethics of Economic Competition. Louvain-la-Neuve: Institut de 
Reserches Economiques 
 
Aristotle, 1997, Politics, Barker, E (trans), Oxford: OUP 
 
Awoonor, K., 2006, “Humanities and Globalization: An African Perspective”, in Legon 
Journal of the Humanities: Special Edition 2006, Legon: University of Ghana 
 
Bauer, P. T. 1981. Equality, The Third World and Economic Delusion. London: 
Wiedenfeld and Nicholson.  
 
Bella, R. N. 1957. Tokugawa Religion. Boston: Beacon 
 
Bello, W, 2006, “Afterthoughts: Doha Round Collapse Best for Developing Countries”, 
INQ7 Viewpoints/Columns, 
http://opinion.inq7.net/inq7viewpoints/columns/view_article.php?article_id=11543 
 
Bernstein, H, 1973, (ed), Underdevelopment and Development, Harmondsworth: Penguin 
 
Blalock, H, 1980, (ed) Sociological Theory and Research. New York: Free Press 
 
Bloomstrom, M and Hettne, B, 1984, Development Theory in Transition: The 
Dependency Debate and Beyond-Third World Responses, London: Zed 
 
Boafo-Arthur, K . 1999, “ Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPS) in Ghana: 
Interrogating PNDC’s Implementation”. West Africa Review: 1.1. also at 
www.icaap.org/iuicode?101.1.1.3 
 
Boahen, A. A., 1990, (ed), General History of Africa, VII: Africa Under Colonial 
Domination 1880 – 1935, Paris: UNESCO 
 
Bodunrin, P., “The problems of, and Prescriptions for, an Action Philosophy in Africa”, 
paper delivered at the Colloquium on the Place and Role of the Humanities in Africa 
Today, University of Ghana, April 1975 
 
 
 231
Brettonwoodsproject. 2003. Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A Rough Guide. At 
www.brettonwoodsproject.org/topic/adjustment/PRSP 
 
Brown, L. M. (ed), 2004, African Philosophy, New and Traditional Perspectives, Oxford: 
OUP 
 
Bujo, B., 1998, The Ethical Dimension of Community, Nganda, C. N. (trans), 
Nairobi: Paulines Publications Africa 
 
Bujo, B. 2001, Foundations of an African Ethic Beyond the Universal Claims of Western 
Morality, Nganda, C. N. (trans), Nairobi: Paulines Publications 
 
Burrt, E. A., 1932, The Metaphysical Foundations of Modern Physical Science. , London, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul 
 
Busia, K. A., 1968, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political State of Ashanti, 
London: Frank Cass 
 
Campbell, Dugald.1922, In the Heart of Bantuland, A Record of Twenty-Nine Years in 
Central Africa among the Bantu Peoples, London: Seely Services and Co.,  
 
Casely-Hayford, J. E., 1911, Ethiopia Unbound, London:  C. M Philips 
 
Chambers, R. 1983, Rural Development: Putting the Last First, New York: John Wiley 
 
Chilcote, R and Edelstein, J. 1974. Latin America: The Struggle with Dependency and 
Beyond. New York: John Wiley 
   
Chirot, D. 1981. “Changing Fashions in the Study of the Social Causes of Economic and 
Political Change” in James Short (ed) The State of Sociology. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage  
 
Coetzee, P. H and Roux, A. P. J. (ed), 2002, Philosophy from Africa, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
 
Cohen, A. V, & King, H. B., 1997, Microeconomics, Don Mills, Ontario: Addison-
Wesley 
 
Colclough, C and Manor, J., (ed) , 1991,  States or Markets?: Neo-liberalism and 
Development Policy Debate. Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
Comte, A., 1964, “The Progress of Civilizations through Three States” in Etzioni, A and 
Etzioni, E (eds) Social Change, New York: Basic Books 
 
Cooper, F and Packard R, 1997, (eds), International Development and the Social 
sciences: Essays on the Politics and History of Knowledge, CA: University of California 
Press 
 232
 
Cox, R. W. 1996 “Perspectives on Globalization” in Mittelman, J. H (ed) Globalization 
Critical Reflections,  London: Lynne Reiner Publishers 
 
Cruickshank, B., 1854, Eighteen Years on the Gold Coast of Africa, Vol. 1, London: 
Hurst & Blackett 
 
Cureau, A. L., 1915, A Study of Primitive Races in the French Congo, London: Fisher 
and Urwin 
 
Danquah, J. B., 1928, Akan Laws and Customs, London: Frank Cass 
 
Descartes, R., 1998, Discourse on Method and The Meditations, London: Penguin 
 
Diop, C. A., 1974, The African Origin of Civilization: Myth or Reality, Cook, M. (ed & 
trans.), Westport: Lawrence Hill and Co. 
 
Diop, C. A., 1987, Black Africa: The Economic and Cultural Basis for a Federated State,  
Salemson, H. J.(trans), Chicago: Lawrence Hill Books 
 
Doyal, L and Harris, R., 1986, Empiricism, Explanation and Rationality: An introduction 
to the Philosophy of the Social Sciences, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul 
 
Durkheim, E., 1964, The Division of Labour in Society, London: Collier-Macmillan 
 
Dussel, E, 1985,  Philosophy of Liberation, Martinez, A and Morkovsky, C (trans.), 
Eugene, Oregon: Wipf & Stock 
 
Economic Commission for Africa, 2002, Treaty Establishing the African Economic 
Community 
 
Economic Commission for Africa, 2005, Striving for Good Governance in Africa: 
Synopsis of the 2005 African Governance Report Prepared for the African Development 
Forum IV, Addis Ababa: ECA 
 
Economic Commission for Africa, 2005, Economic Report on Africa 2005, Addis Ababa: 
ECA 
 
Edwards, P., (ed), 1967, The Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Vol. 3, Macmillan 
 
Einstein, A., 1931, Relativity: The Special and General Theory, New York: Crown 
Publishers 
 
Emmet, D and MacIntyre, A., 1970, (eds), Sociological Theory and Philosophical 
Analysis, London: Macmillan 
 
 233
 
Escobar, A.,  1995, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third 
World, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
 
Esteva, G. 1992. “Development”, pp 6-25 in The Development Dictionary, Sachs, W. 
(ed) London: Zed Books 
 
Eze, E. C, (ed), 1997, Postcolonial African Philosophy: A Critical Reader, Oxford: 
Blackwell Publishers  
 
Feynman, R. P., Leighton, R. B., & Sands, M, 1965, The Feynman Lectures on Physics: 
Vol. 3. Quantum Mechanics. Menlo Park, CA: Addison-Wesley 
 
Finch, C.S., 1998, The Star of Deep Beginnings: The Genesis of African Science and 
Technology, Atlanta:  Khenti Inc. 
 
Floistad, G., (ed), 1987, Contemporary Philosophy: A New Survey: Vol. 5., Dorderecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers  
 
Frank, A. G. 1967. Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America. N. Y. Monthly 
Press Review 
 
Freire, P., 1990, Pedagogy of the Oppressed, Philadelphia: Temple University Press 
 
Friedman, M. 1962, Capitalism and Freedom, Chicago: University of Chicago Press 
 
Friedman, J. 1992. Empowerment. The Politics of Alternative development. Cambridge: 
Blackwell 
 
Frimpong-Ansah, J. A. 1991. The Vampire State in Africa: The Political Economy of 
Decline in Ghana. London: James Currey Ltd. 
 
Furmston, M., 2001, Chesire, Fifoot & Furmston’s Law of Contract, London: 
Butterworths 
 
Gettier, E., 1963, “Is Justified True Belief Knowledge?”, Analysis, 23, 6 ,  
 
Gould, C., 1978, "The Woman Question: Philosophy of Liberation and the Liberation of 
Philosophy", in Gould, C. C and Wartofsky, M. W, (eds), Women and Philosophy: 
Toward a Theory of Liberation, New York: G. P. Putnam & Sons 
 
Gracia, J. E. (ed),  1986, Latin American Philosophy in the Twentieth Century. New York: 
Prometheus Books 
 
Gran, G. 1983. Development by People: Citizen Construction of a Just World, New York: 
Praeger 
 234
 
Griaule, M., 1965, Conversations with Ogotemmeli, An Introduction to Dogon Religious 
Ideas, London: Oxford University Press 
 
Gutierrez, G., 1983, The Power of the Poor in History, Barr, R. R. (trans), New York: 
Maryknoll 
 
Gyekye, K., 1996, African Cultural Values, Accra: Sankofa Publishing 
 
Gyekye, K., 1987, An Essay on African Philosophical Thought – The Akan Conceptual 
Scheme, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 
 
Gyekye, K., 1994, “Taking Development Seriously” in Journal of Applied Philosophy, 
Vol. 11, No. 1 
 
Gyekye, K., 1997, Tradition and Modernity: Philosophical Reflections on the African 
Experience, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Hallen, B. and Sodipo, J. O, 1986, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, Analytic 
Experiments in African Philosophy, London: Ethnographica 
 
Hallen, B. 1998, “Academic Philosophy and African Intellectual Liberation”, in African 
Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 2 
 
Harre, R., 1964, Matter and Method, London: Macmillan & Co.  
 
Harre, R.,  1972, The Philosophies of Science, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Hegel, G. W. F., 1953, Reason in History: A General Introduction to the Philosophy of 
History, New York: Macmillan 
 
Hegel, G. W. F. 1990, The Philosophy of History, Sibree, J. (trans.), New York: Wiley 
Book Co 
 
Heiddeger, M., 1987, An Introduction to Metaphysics, New Haven: Yale University Press 
 
Hettne, B. 1990. Development Theory and the Three Worlds. London: Longman. 
 
Himmelstrand, U., Kinyanjui, K., and Mburugu, E (eds), 1994, African Perspectives on 
Development, London: James Currey Ltd 
 
Hinz, M. O. et. al (eds), 2006, The Shade of New Leaves: Governance in Traditional 
Authority - A Southern African Perspective, Berlin: LIT Verlag 
 
Hoekman, B. M and Kostecki, M. M, 2001, The Political Economy of the World Trading 
System, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 235
 
Honderich, T (ed.) 1995, The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press 
 
Hountondji, P, 1983, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality, London: Hutchison and Co. 
 
Horton, R, 1971, “African Traditional Thought and Western Science”, in Wilson, B (ed) 
Rationality, New York: Harper & Row 
 
Hungtington, S., 1976 “The Change to Change: Modernization, Development and 
Politics”, in Cyril E. Black (ed) Comparative Modernization: A Reader. New York: Free 
Press. 
 
Hume, D., 1975, Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding,  Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
Hyden, G. 1983, No Short Cuts to Progress: African Development management 
Perspectives, Berkeley: University of California Press 
 
ILO, 1976, Employment, Growth and Basic Needs: A One-World Problem, Geneva: ILO 
 
Jackson, J. H. 1997. The World Trading System: Law and Policy of International 
Economic Relations, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press 
 
Jeans, J., 1942, Physics and Philosophy, New York: Dover Publications 
 
JICA, 2001, Participatory Development and Good Governance. http:www.jica.go.jp/E-
infopart/MBp011.html 
 
Johnson, R.C., 1955, Psychical Research, London: English Universities Press 
 
Kan, K. T. and Hodges, D. C, 1971, (ed) Readings in  U. S. Imperialism. Boston: 
Extending Horizons 
 
Keita, L., 2004, “Philosophy and Development”, in Africa Development, Vol. XXIX, No 
1, Dakar: CODESRIA 
 
Kelsey, J. 1995. Economic Fundamentalism. London: Pluto Press 
 
Keynes, J. M., 1936, The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, London: 
McMillan & Co, (rendered into html for the University of Adelaide Library, at 
http:/etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/k/k44g/html) 
 
Kuhn, T., 1970, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press 
 
 236
Krueger, A. 1978. Foreign Trade Regimes and Economic Development: Liberalization 
Attempts and Consequences. Cambridge, Mass: Ballinger Publishing for National Bureau 
of Economic Research 
 
Kutu Akyeampong, erstwhile head of State under the Supreme Military Council of 
Ghana, Speech delivered at the inauguration of the reconstituted National Committee of 
the Charter of Redemption, Accra, 12th October, 1976 
 
Kutu Akyeampong, erstwhile head of State under the Supreme Military Council of 
Ghana, An interview broadcast on the BBC, 14th January 1977 
 
Lal, D. 1983. The Poverty of Development Economics. London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs 
 
Lauer, H. (ed), 2000, Ghana: Changing Values Changing Technologies: Ghanaian 
Philosophical Studies II, Washington D. C., Council; for Research in Values and 
Philosophy 
 
Lehulere, O. 2003. “NEPAD, The Program of South African Capital”. In Khanya: A 
South African Journal for Activists, Vol. 4 
 
Levy-Bruhl, L, 1910, Les fonctions mentales dans les societes inferierures, Paris: Presses 
Univer-sitaires de France 
 
Levy, M. J. 1967. “Social patterns (Structures) and problems of Modernization”, in 
Wilbert Moore and Robert Cook (eds). Readings on Social Change. Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall 
 
Locke, J., 1946, The Second Treatise of Civil Government and A Letter Concerning 
Toleration,  Oxford: Basil Blackwell  
 
Locke, J, 1995,  An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Oxford: Oxford 
University  
 
Lucien Levy-Bruhl, 1910,  Les fonctions mentales dans les societes inferieures, Paris: 
Presses Univer-sitaires de France 
 
Mackie, J. L., 1976, Problems from Locke, Oxford, Clarendon Press 
 
Mankiw, G. N., 2000, Principles of Microeconomics, N. Y. Thomson Learning 
 
Martinussen, J. 1997. State, Society & Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of 
Development. London: Zed Books 
 
Marx, K,1963, Selected Writings in Sociology and Social Philosophy, T. B. Bottomore 
and M. Rubel (eds), London: Penguin  
 237
 
Maquet, J., 1972, Africanity: The Cultural Unity of Black Africa, Rayfield, J. K. (tr.), 
New York: Oxford University Press 
 
Mbiti, J., 1970, African Religions and Philosophy, London: Heinemann 
 
McIntyre, L. J., 1999, The Practical Skeptic: Core Concepts in Sociology, Mountain 
View, CA: Mayfield Publishing 
 
Meier, G. M., 1989, Leading Issues in Economic Development,  New York: Oxford 
University Press 
 
Mensa, C., Welcome Address at the Conference on “Fifty Years of Sub-Sahara African 
Independence and the Role of Political; Parties: Promise, Decline and Resurgence”, held 
at the Golden Tulip Hotel, Accra, 4-5 May 2007 
 
Miller, E., 1984, Questions that Matter:  An Invitation to Philosophy, N. Y: McGraw-Hill 
     
Mkhwanazi, E. F & Ramose, M. B. 2005.  “Review Article: Thought and Practice in 
African Philosophy” in Tydskrift vir Letterkunde. 42 (2) 
 
Montgomery, G et al. (eds), 1970, Independent Africa, New York: Anchor Books 
 
Mosley, A., 1995, (ed) African Philosophy, New Jersey: Prentice Hall 
 
Mudimbe, V. Y., 1988, The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of 
Knowledge,  Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press   
 
Nelson, J. M, 1990, (ed) Economic Crisis and Policy Choice, Princeton: Princeton 
University Press 
 
New African Magazine, March 2007 
 
Newton, I., 1958, Papers and Letters on Natural Philosophy, Cohen, I. B. (ed), 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press. 
 
New African, February 2006, No. 448 
 
Ninsin, K., 1991, “The Impact of the PNDCs Economic Reform Policies on Ghanaian 
Society and Politics 1983 – 88” in Legon Journal of Humanities, Vol 5.  
 
Nkrumah, K.,1961, I Speak of Freedom, London: Heinemann 
 
Nkrumah, K. 1966. Neocolonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism, New York: 
International Publishers 
 
 238
Nkrumah, K, 1963, “We Must Unite Now or Perish”, A Speech delivered at the First 
Conference of Independent African Heads of State and Government at Addis Ababa, 24th 
May 1963 
 
Nkrumah, K., 1967, “African Socialism Revisited”, in Africa: National and Social 
Revolution. Prague: Peace and Socialism Publishers 
 
Nkrumah, K. 1973, The Revolutionary Path, New York: International Publishers. 
 
Nkrumah, K., 1998, Africa Must Unite, London: Panaf Books.  
 
Nyasani, J. M (ed.), 2005, Philosophical Focus on Culture and Traditional Thought 
Systems in Development, Nairobi: Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
 
Nyerere, J. K. 1968, Ujamaa: Essays on Socialism: Dar es Salaam: Oxford University 
Press 
 
OAU, 1982, Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa, 1980-2000, 
Geneva: International Institute for Labour Studies 
 
Obeng, S. 1997, (ed), Selected Speeches of Kwame Nkrumah, Vol. 5, Accra: Afram 
Publications 
 
Okere, T. 1983, African Philosophy: A Historico-Hermeneutical Investigation of the 
Conditions of its Possibility. Lanham: University Press of America 
 
Okere, T, 2005, “Is There One Science, Western Science?”, in Africa Development, Vol. 
XXX No. 3 
 
Oluwole, S., 1988, “African Philosophy as Illustrated in Ifa Corpus”, in African 
Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1988 
 
Osuagwu, C. G., 2006, Cybercosmos: The African Network Universe, A lecture delivered 
under thew Tshwane Renascent Africa Lectures series, University of South Africa, 
Pretoria, March 22-30 
 
Outlaw, L. 2002. “African ‘philosophy’: Deconstructive and reconstructive Challenges” 
pp 137 – 160 in  Coetzee, P. H and Roux, A. P. J (eds), Philosophy from Africa 
 
Oyugi, W. O. and Gitonga, A (eds), 1987, Democratic Theory and Practice in Africa, 
Nairobi: Heinemann 
 
Papa-Grimaldi, A., 1998, Time and Reality, Aldershot: Ashgate 
 
Pappas, G. S. and Swain, M, 1978, (eds), Essays on Knowledge and Justification, Ithaca, 
Cornell University Press 
 239
 
Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, 2nd March 2005, Paris. At 
http://www.adb.org/media/articles/2005/7033_international_community_aid/paris_declar
ation.pdf 
 
Parkinson, F. 1977. The Philosophy of International Relations: A study in the History of 
Thought. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications 
 
Parsons, T., 1952, The Social System, London: Tavistock 
 
Pearson, D. S. 1992. “Trends in planning for Growth and Development” in Aryeetey, E 
(ed) Planning African Growth and Development. Accra: ISSER and UNDP 
 
Pickering, A. (ed), 1992, Science as Practice and Culture, Chicago: The University of 
Chicago Press 
 
Plato, 1974, The Republic, Grube, G. M. A. (trans.), Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Co. 
 
Prebisch, R. 1950. The Economic Development of Latin America and its Principal 
Problems. NY: United Nations 
 
Presby, G., Smith, D., Abuya, P. & Nyarwath, O., 2002, (eds) Thought and Practice in 
African Philosophy. Nairobi: Konrad Adenaurer Foundation 
 
Preston, P. W. 1997. Development Theory: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell 
 
Ramose, M. B. 2002, African philosophy through Ubuntu, Harare: Mond Books 
 
Ramose, M. B, 2004, “Poverty: A Creature of Politics and a Question of Justice”, in 
International Journal for Humanistic Studies, Volume 3 
 
Rattray, R. S., 1929 Ashanti Law and Constitution, Oxford: Clarendon Press 
 
Rattray, R. S., 1929, Ashanti Law and Constitution, Oxford Clarendon Press 
 
Rimmer, D. 1992. Staying Poor: Ghana’s political Economy 1950 – 1990. Oxford: 
Pergamon 
   
Robert W., 1990: Governing the Market: Economic Theory and the Role of Government 
in East Asian Industrialization. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
 
Rodney, W. 1972. How Europe Underdeveloped Africa. Abuja: Panaf, 
 
Rostow, W. W. 1960. The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 
 240
Royal Tropical Institute/World Bank. 2000. Village Participation in Rural Development 
 
Ruch, E. A., and Anyanwu, K. C., (eds), 1981, African Philosophy, : An Introduction to 
the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary Africa, Rome: Catholic Book Agency 
 
Sachs, J. D., 2005, The End of Poverty, How we can make it happen in our Lifetime, New 
York: Penguin Books 
 
Sardar, Z, 1988, (ed), The Revenge of Athena: Science, Exploitation and the Third World, 
London: Mansell 
 
Schott, J. J, 2004, “Reviving the Doha Round”, In Speeches, Testimonies, Papers, May 
2004, Washington, D. C., Institute for International Economics 
 
Schumpeter, J. A. 1934, The Theory of Economic Development, Cambridge, MA: 
Harvard University Press 
 
Second Order, Vol. VII, Ile-Ife, Ife University Press 
 
Sefa-Dei J. S.  2000. “African Development: The Relevance and Implications of 
‘Indigenousness’”. pp 70-88 in George Sefa-Dei, Budd L. Hall and Dorothy G. 
Rosenberg (eds) Indigenous Knowledges in Global Contexts. Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press. 
 
Sen, A., 1999, “Democracy as a Universal Value”, in Journal of Democracy, 10. 3  
 
Sen, A., 1999, Development as Freedom, Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Serequeberhan, T. 1998. “Philosophy and Post-Colonial Africa”, pp. 9-22 in Emmanuel 
C. Eze (ed), African Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell 
 
 
Simmel, Georg, 2004, The Philosophy of Money, Bottomore, T & Frisby, D (eds), 
London: Routledge 
 
So, A. Y. 1990, Social Change and Development. Newbury Park, CA: Sage Publications  
 
Sogolo, G., 1993, Foundations of African Philosophy – A Definitive Analysis of 
Conceptual Issues in African Thought, Ibadan: Ibadan University Press 
 
South Report, 1990, The Challenge to the South: The Report of the South Commission, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Stallings, B. (ed). 1995. Global Change, Regional response: The New International 
Context of Development, NY: Cambridge University Press 
 
 241
Taran, L., 1965, Parmenides, Princeton: Princeton University Press 
 
Temples, P. 1959, Bantu Philosophy, Paris: Presence Africaine 
 
The Group of Lisbon, 1995, Limits to Competition: Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT 
Press. 
 
The World Bank, 2006, Evaluating the World Bank's Approach to Global Programs: 
Addressing the Challenges of Globalization,  
http://www.worldbank.org/ieg/gppp/index.html 
 
Tipps, D. C., 1976, “Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A 
Critical Perspective”, 62-88 in Black, C. E (ed) Comparative Modernization: A Reader. 
New York: Free Press 
 
Tipps, D. C. 1976. “Modernization Theory and the Comparative Study of Societies: A 
Critical Perspective” 
 
Torado, M. P., 1985, Economic Development in the Third World, New York and London: 
Longman 
 
Toye, J. 1987, Dilemmas of Development, Oxford: Blackwell 
 
Transactions of the Historical Society of Ghana, New Series No. 8, 2004, Legon: 
University of Ghana 
 
UNDP, 2003, Making Global Trade Work for People, New York: Earthscan Publications 
Limited 
 
UNDP, 2005, Human Development Report 
 
UNDP, 2006, Annual Report 
 
UNECA, 1988, The Khartoum Declaration: International Conference on the “Human 
Dimension of Africa’s Economic Recovery and Development”, Addis Ababa: UNECA 
 
United Nations, 1974, The Cocoyoc Declaration, A/C. 2/292,  New York 
 
United Nations, 1986, General Assembly Resolution 41/128. 
 
United Nations, 1986, United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic 
Recovery and Development, 1986-1990, New York: UN 
 
United Nations, 1986, United Nations Programme of Action for African Economic 
Recovery and Development 1986-1990, General Assembly Resolution A/RES/S-13/2,  
 
 242
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 1991, Final Review and 
Appraisal of the Implementation of the United Nations Programme of Action for African 
Economic Recovery and Development, 1986-1990, New York: U.N., 
 
United Nations, 1987, Report of the World Commission on Environment and 
Development, New York 
 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 1989, African Alternative Framework 
to Structural Adjustment Programmes for Socio-Economic Recovery and Transformation, 
Document E/ECA/CM, 15/6/Rev.3, Addis Ababa: UNECA 
 
United Nations. 1993. Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, as adopted by the 
World Conference on Human Rights (on 25th June 1993) 
 
United Nations. 1995. The Copenhagen Declaration on Social Development and 
Programme of Action of the World Summit for Social Development. New York.  
 
United Nations. 2000. Resolution 55/2: Millennium Declaration 
 
United Nations, 2002, Report of the International Conference on Financing for 
Development, New York 
 
United Nations. 2002. Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, 
Johannesburg 
 
United Nations, 2005. Revised Draft Outcome Document of the High-Level Plenary 
Meeting of the General Assembly of September 2005, Document Number 
A/59/HLPM/CRP.1/Rev.2 
 
Van den Bossche, P., 2005, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 
WTO, 2001, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health, WT/MIN 
(01)/DEC/2 
 
Watkins, K., 2002, Cultivating Poverty: The Impact of US Cotton Subsidies on Africa, 
Oxfam Briefing Paper 30, London: Oxfam International 
 
Whitehead, A. N., 1967, Science and the Modern World, New York: The Free Press 
 
Whitehead, A. N., 1929, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology,  New York: 
Macmillan 
 
Wiredu, K., 1980, Philosophy and an African Culture, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press 
 
 243
Wiredu, K., 1983, “The Akan Concept of Mind”, in Ibadan Journal of Humanistsic 
Studies, No. 3 
 
Wiredu, K., 2004, (ed), A companion to African Philosophy, Malden, MA: Blackwell 
 
Wiredu, K. and Gyekye, K. (eds), 1992, Person and Community, Ghanaian Philosophical 
Studies I, Washington, D. C.: Council for Research into Values and Philosophy 
 
Wright, R, 1977, (ed), African Philosophy: An Introduction, Washington D.C.: 
University Press of America 
 
Yankah, K., 1998, Free Speech in Traditional Society: The Cultural Foundations of 
Communication in Contemporary Ghana, Accra: Ghana Universities Press 
 
Zein-Elabdin, E. O., 1998, “The Question of Development in Africa: A Conversation for 
Propitious Change, in African Philosophy, Vol. 11, No. 2, 1998 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
